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Western development aid to the Third World has as one
of its main.functions dependency building of the Third World
on the West. The purpose of aid is to structure political
and economic advantages for the West's influence and expan-
sion over the Third World. The mechanisms used for structur-
ing this dependency are economic ties and credit facilities
which bind the aid receiving country to the donor. It is
common in aid agreements to include a component involving
technical assistance which reinforces dependency by making
use of Western development theory and Western technology
transfer. The process raises the question of the usefulness
and relevance of the consultant's work to the aid receiving
country.
In this thesis, within the framework described above,
three main objectives have been reached.
1. By examining the historical development of Egypt and
comparing it to a model structured around dependency
and its origins and the role debt plays in this de-
pendency, it has been determined that Egypt follows a
typical pattern, somewhat exagerated because of its
strategic importance to the West. Egypt is becoming
more reliant on the West and credit facilities bind it
to the West for the forseeable future.
22. By studying a U.S.A.I.D. program being carried out in
Egypt using M.I.T. as consultant it is argued that this
program reinforces the structuring of Egypt's dependency
on the U.S.A. However, problem areas within the pro-
gram raise the question of the full usefulness of the
program to Egypt.
3. It is in fact the relationships between the three main
actors; donor, aid receiver and consultant, with their
varying interests and goals, differences of opinion,
some basic contradictions and a strong need for com-
promise; that distract the product from its full use-
fulness. I have called this the Aid Triangle.
The process in Egypt has prepared her for a major role
in the Middle East, supportive of the West's interests there.
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By critically examining an aid program with respect to
the role of the consultant and the general set of conditions
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existing in the aid receiving country a fuller understanding
of the problems and goals of aid is achieved. Development
aid to the Third World involves more than a mutually bene-
ficial relationship between the West and the developing
nations. It is argued that by constructing dependencies of
the developing world on the West a relationship is structur-
ed in favor of the West's continued expansion and gives it
both political influence and economic advantages over the
Third World. The project chosen and the receiving country
are to be examined against a model based on the writings of
G. Kay (1975), C. Payer (1974), J. White (1974), and W.G.
Zeylstra (1975) with support from various sources as in-
dicated in the text. As a separate issue but running con-
currently within the sphere of the above statement, the
product and process of consultants in aid in relationships
to the quality and usefulness of their work to the Third
World is also examined. By combining the two areas examin-
ed, an aid triangle is formed involving the three main
actors, the donor organization, the receiving country and
the consultant and it is argued that in many cases it is
the differences of goals and interests of each of these
9
actors that often result in poor products and questionable
usefulness of this work to the Third World. It is under-
stood that the subject of foreign aid is an extremely broad
one, often unclear where it leaves off and other issues over-
lap, that it is loosely defined as dealing with development
of Third World nations and/or regions, and that, like
foreign policy it can shift and change its purpose over
time. It is therefore important to state that military
aid is not included in the scope of this document and that
while the aid donor is sometimes discussed in general terms
specific reference is placed on the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development (U.S.A.I.D.). The difficult task of
defining a developing country has not been attempted. The
words "developing country" describe the relationship of one
country to another, or to the world as a whole. It is a
continuum, changing over time, between the two poles, under-
developed and over-developed. This document assumes that
if a country is receiving aid, it has been defined by the
donor in this act as a developing country. The donor has
decided a country is in need of aid in the donors terms.
1(f
The Process
The subject of aid is complex and sometimes vague and
in the readings I have found many contradictory opinions
and stands, usually backed by statistics or "proofs." It
therefore became obvious that I required (a) a model to test
programs against and (b) a particular program to test. The
model has been structured to examine dependency and the
reasons for the massive debt growth in the Third World.
Out of the various programs that were available to me I
purposely chose one in progress at M.I.T. There are three
reasons for this. Firstly, I am studying at M.I.T. and it
has given me an opportunity to examine the workings of a
program in a technical institute. Secondly, because of its
academic structure and internationally known technical re-
putation, M.I.T. is supposed to produce a special kind of
product often involving high technology and well developed
specialization and theory. It is involved with many projects
in the Third World bringing to them technology transfer,
sophisticated modeling and process oriented recommendations.
And thirdly, it is the skills learned at the Institute which
I will be using in my future and a self evaluation of these
NOTE: These events include
1) the signing of a peace
treaty between Israel and
Egypt, 2) the Iranian re-
volution, 3) U.S.A. hos-
tages, 4) Arab reaction to
peace treaty, 5) massive
new aid to Egypt, 6) in-
crease in oil prices by
O.P.E.C.
NOTE: The questionnaire
is included in Appendix C.
skills is to my benefit.
The particular case chosen has relevance for three
reasons. Firstly, it involves two planning related compon-
ents (a) transportation and (b) housing and construction.
Secondly, it is structured under a standard form of contract
with the donor and thirdly, because it involves multidisci-
plinary team structures. I am interested in, housing as a
component of development, the standard form of contract, and
I consider multidisciplinary teams as an important part of
my planning future. Egypt was not important to me at the
time of choice of the case but the extraordinary set of
events that have occured involving the Middle East generally
and Egypt in particular since December 1978 have both added
to my interest in the case and distracted me in the struc-
turing of this document as might be imagined.
The project is in progress and this has caused some
difficulty in obtaining written information. No final re-
port is yet available and changes to the defined scope of
work have occured. I therefore, with the assistance of
Professor Phil Clay structured a questionnaire for project
directors and made use of a series of interviews with people
11
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working in the program.
Problem areas
1) The broadness of the subject matter has been a con-
stant hindrance to rapid progress and decisions as to the
relevance of information.
2) The closeness of people actually working in the pro-
gram has had some negative impact in the sense of working
relations and responses. One person considered the subject
irrelevant and criticism of practices or theory have not
always been followed up with the people concerned due to the
time constraint. This will be done.
3) The problem of moving from the specific (the case)
to the general or vice versa has been a constant discussion
for the last four months and was only recently settled.
Outline
Chapter One deals with Egypt's history, the model and
the fit between the two, and sets the framework for Chapter
Two.
Chapter Two has two foci. The first deals with the
case chosen giving the background, details of the contract,
problem areas and a brief comparison with another project,
13
having the same donor and subject and taking place in Egypt.
The second discusses the usefulness of the consultant to the
Third World and how this relates to the Egypt program.
Chapter Three sets out the relationships between Chap-
ters One and Two, thus forming the "triangle" of aid and
attempts to formulate the problems Egypt is likely to face
in the future.
An Epilogue is added in which the changing mood of the
West is suggested and where the problems within the aid
triangle are most likely to occur.
1B. A 1PERSONAL INTIElEST
IN All)
Every nation apparently strives after development.
REFERENCE: As discussed
in W.G. Zeylstra's Aid or
Development, Chapter 2.
NOTE: The symbol $ refers
It is an objective that most people take for granted. This
development involves more than just economic growth. It
deals with social and political changes and their growth
as well. It is a multidimensional process involving re-
organization and orientation of social and economic
structures and institutions, and can affect international
social and economic systems. When developed nations became
concerned about the poorer nations of the world, after
the Second World War, it took time for the technocrats to
establish a method with which to analyze the process of
economic growth in largely peasant, agrarian societies with
no "modern" economic base. They, wisely or not, divided
the world into the underdeveloped regions, hence developing
section, and called it the Third World, and the developed
regions, the Western World.
In the United Nations report (1951) on "Measures for
the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries" the
main standard to be used to measure economic development
was to be the level of per capita real income. $500 per
14
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to U.S. dollars throughout
the text.
year was a kind of arbitrary line drawn between developed
and underdeveloped nations and by so doing the world was
divided into potential donor and receiving countries. The
concept of aid developed, becoming more complex with each
success or failure and with the shift from the "Stages of
Growth" to a broader approach encompassing frameworks and
the growing importance of social factors of development, it
is in essence still the same. It involves money and advice,
and it's not for free.
There is disagreement between the various parties in-
volved over the success or failure of aid and no agrred
method of evaluating aid. Even at project level where donors
might consider a project successful, aid receivers might not.
At the consultant level "success" might be the completion of
a final report which will never be implemented. Each actor
has his/her own interpretation of what they consider progress
along the road to development is and within the complexity of
aid, varying interests, uncoordinated policies meeting from
different sources and the long term nature of overall devel-
opment, it is perhaps not surprising that some confusion is
apparent to an unbaised observer.
My personal interest in development aid stems from the
REFERENCE: M.I.T., Respot
on Sponsored Research,
Fiscal Year 1978.
real possibility that I will be working in various aid pro-
jects in Africa in the role of an environmental planner.
I therefore see this as an opportunity to build up an under-
standing of the workings of aid and some of the problems
encountered.
C.s THEu PROJVeC'T
M.I.T. is directly involved in research projects and
consultancy work for many organizations; U.S. Government
departments and agencies, private companies and foundations
and multi-national organizations. This research ($120
million in 1978, up 19% from 1977 figures) forms an impor-
tant part of its yearly budget of approximately $300 million.
Besides the many aid projects worked on by its professors
over the last thirty years it has at least, on three
occasions been instrumental in aid policies and aid objec-
16
REFERENCE: "Economic,
Social and Political Change
in the Underdeveloped Coun-
tries and its Implication
for the United States
Policy" by the Center for
International Studies,
M.I.T., March 1960.
tives. In the later 1950's M.I.T. produced a series of
reports on which President Kennedy, combining these with
the recommendations of the Brookings Institute, based his
aid reforms of the early 1960's. M.I.T. was part instigator
of A.I.D. and strongly supported the Alliance for Progress
policies of the Kennedy administration. Economists from
M.I.T. and Harvard; Rostow, Galbraith, and Lincoln Gordon
served on Kennedy's interrogation task force on foreign
economic affairs. Others like Bell and Mason had advising
and administrative capacities to various government agencies.
(Bell became director of A.I.D.) These people refused to
acknowledge Communism as the "cause for world problems" or
that free enterprise was its cure. Rather they located the
causes of revolution, and the attractiveness of Communism,
in the process of social and economic modernization. In
the 1960 M.I.T. report for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee they explained, "Particularly in the early stages
of the transition process, when leadership groups centered
among themselves for power, and central governments are apt
to be weak, societies are acutely vulnerable to invasion
or civil war.... The American interest is opposed to the
17
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heightening of tensions anywhere. Men who are close to
violence cannot direct their full energies to building stable
effective societies." M.I.T. recommended deeper military
involvement in economic and social activites in developing
countries to control and reduce these tensions. This
military strength could be used for road building, dam
construction, development of communication systems, irri-
gation construction, and land reclamation and surveying
projects. Military training time could also be used for
teaching peasant soldiers the basic skills of reading and
writing.
In 1961 M.I.T. was instrumental in forming a consortium
of institutions in the U.S.A. to assist the development of
an Institute of Technology in Kanpur, India. This involved
U.S. aid for its development.
And in 1970 M.I.T. produced a study directed by Caroll
L. Wilson concerning the environmental problems created by
man related to the biosphere. In 1971 the Club of Rome
published a preliminary report based on results of a
system analysis study carried out at M.I.T., directed by
D.L. Meadows and models by J.W. Forrester which predicted
19
the combined interdependent influences of expected changes
in world population, pollution, natural resources, and
investment over the next one hundred and thirty years. Both
these reports had a major impact on world organizations and
at the U.N. Conference in Stockholm (1972) brought in to
focus the qualitative image of development; to be treated
as a political rather than economic concept.
M.I.T. is at the present involved in a development
program in Egypt, organized by the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development. It is this project which will be
used to study the role of the consultant and how he/she
supports the overall structure and aims in Western aid to
a Third World country.
In January 1974, following the Egyptian/Israel dis-
engagement in the Sinai Pennisula, the U.S.A.I.D. granted
a $250 million loan to Egypt for development purposes.
Egypt was looked at in a new light and as a result of sig-
nificant political and social transformations, the Govern-
ment of Egypt had been faced with increased responsibility
to plan and execute programs contributing to national
development. The commitments to substantial, long term
REFERENCE: M.I.T./C.U.
Technological Planning
Program, Progess Report
December 1977, August 1978
page 2.
economic assistance from the United States and other
external sources has been a major force on the government
ministries responsible for these programs. The lack of
adequate Egyptian infrastructures to perform these activities
has hindered the achievement of improved development plan-
ning. To this end U.S.A.I.D. funded Phase I of the C.U./
M.I.T. Technological Planning Program in which M.I.T. and
Cairo University organized a set of research teams, in-
vestigating, in collaboration with ministry personnel,
problems of current concern to the ministries.
The main objective of the C.U./M.I.T. Technological
Planning Program centered on assisting Cairo University
to develop capabilities which would contribute to the
formulation and implementation of science and technology
related policies. Three specific objectives were identified:
1. Mobilization of academic interest in applied
research on specific development plans;
2. Organization of technical research in collaboration
with Egyptian government ministries;
3. Establishment of an institutional framework
through which permanent applied research and
training could be organized.
20
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NOTE: See Appendix A for
detail breakdown.
In January of 1977 a formal agreement between Cairo
University and M.I.T. establishing a Technological Planning
Program was signed by Walter A. Rosenblith, Provost of
M.I.T. and Soufi Abou Taleb, President of Cairo University.
In addition an Administrative Agreement between Cairo
University and M.I.T. was signed to define the administrative
arrangements between the Technological Planning Program
at Cairo University and the Technology Adaptation Program
at M.I.T.
Diagram Number 5 in Chapter Two indicates the progress
of this program and the various actors involved. The pro-
gram has defined thirteen projects from varying disciplines
including Hydraulic Engineering, Planning and Architecture,
Transportation planning, Economics and Social Sciences.
As of June 1979 the program management has been trans-
ferred to Cairo from M.I.T. It is envisaged that within
the next two years the new Institute will be running it-
self without outside U.S.A.I.D. help. The first independ-
ent research project has already been formalized and
negotiations are taking place. It involves, not unnaturally,
the Egyptian New Towns program initiated by President Sadat,
22
an attempt to deal with the urban growth problems of Egypt
and the continued erroding of fertile land by this growth.
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1
+VI) IN EGY1)T
In this chapter I will show that through an historical
analysis of aid and a comparison to Egypt's own history that
Egypt, due to the nature of its development, has become a
"typical" Third World country following the standard pattern
of progress by Third World countries. It has unintentionally
plotted its course into what Cheryl Payer refers to as the
"Debt Trap" with all the conditions attached to aid. These
conditions structure a dependency of Egypt to the West
through special trade agreements, foreign exchange require-
ments, fiscal and social policies, technical assistance and
technology transfer purposes of eccnomic and political con-
24
trol over Egypt. The exception from most other Third World
countries is that Egypt has more value to the West strategic-
ally than in terms of any special resource although her
cotton production is of importance. Egypt had two opportun-
ities to break this dependency but on both occasions she has
missed the chance by disregarding the importance of making
major social changes within a restructured economic base.
rE(iYPT IN IJ
11111)0ST %LJt kl- U-SR )CHINA
DIA5RAM Z
NOTE: Rostow argued that
once a country has reached
"self sustained growth" it
no longer required aid.
This was not always the objective. Before Keynes'
theories and treaties in economics, little thought was given
to underdevelopment as something to study and analyze. The
march of progress was somehow considered to be selective,
and economic progress was taken for granted. There was no
room for a concept of development aid. At the end of the
1940's aid, other than that used for the reconstruction of
Europe, was practiced as a political instrument, or on an
ad hoc basis and infrequently. It was only once progress
was conceived as a product of purposely directed human
effort that aid could be tied to development. In the U.S.A.
President Truman's "Point Four" (1950) simply assumed this
meant that economic development could be promoted by U.S.
technical assistance. It wasn't until Walter Rostow, in
1956, provided politicans with a suitable development theory
and goal, that of self sustaining growth, that aid effort
was limited towards a definite end and for a practical
political purpose. Since this theory and debate developed
in the U.S.A. it is not surprising that up to 1959 most aid
originated from here. By 1960 aid programs had started in
25
26
the U.S.S.R. and Europe. Few people considered these efforts
as contributions to a common cause. They were mostly bi-
lateral agreements. It was the United Nations, having de-
clared the 1960's the first development decade, which
implied that all donors should recognize their common re-
sponsibility. West Germany, Italy and Japan became new aid
donors and with the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., France and Great
Britain continued the process of pursuing aid programs for
political and national interests. Multilateral aid had its
start however.
Aid in Egypt is part of this process, and attached to
each agreement a set of conditions that reinforce the donor's
interests.
'1.1 EGYPT' S BACKIGROIUND)
Egypt consists of 386,000 miles of which only 10,000
square miles is cultivated, in a ribbon along the banks of
the Nile river and its wide delta. The rest of the country
27
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is desert. 99% of the 38 million (1974 estimate) Egyptians
live in this narrow band of country. Located in northeast
Africa it is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea,
on the west by Libia, on the south by the Sudan and on the
east by the Red Sea and Israel. It has a warm, arid climate
with the only major rainfall occurring along the north coast
(eight inches per year). Its main agricultural products,
all coming from the fetile land along the Nile, are cotton,
wheat, rice, and corn. Only 11% of the labor force is in-
volved in industry compared to Zambia 15%, and Kenya 13%.
The average per capita income in 1974 was $240. Egyptians
are a homogeneous group of Hamitic origin, a single people
sharing a common ancestry and culture. Indigenous minori-
ties include Copts (10%) and Bedouins (2%).
1.1.1 EGYPT'S HISTORY
Precolonial
Egypt has been an unbroken unity for over six thousand
years which has resulted in the remarkable homogeneity of
the population. For some 3000 years, and within varying
boundaries Egypt ruled itself until about 300 B.C. after
which she was constantly under foreign domination. Starting
V _
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with the Romans and followed by various groups including
the Moslem Arabs who invaded Egypt and Africa in the Seven-
th Century bringing Islam to Egypt. They in turn were
followed by Ayyubid and Mamluk dynasties (1169-1517) which
centered in Egypt and made Cairo the center of gravity in
the Arabic and Islamic World. The Turks defeated the Mam-
luks in 1517 and Egypt fell under the rule of the Ottoman
Empire up to 1832 when an Army Officer, appointed Viceroy
of Egypt in 1805, and his son, broke away from the empire
by routing the Turkish armies in Syria that year. The new
ruler, Mohammed Ali, interested in modernizing his country
along Western lines and in control of a feudal system with
the support of its landlords made it relatively easy for
Europe to exploit Egypt's cotton production which increased
by some 500% over a few years. A small but strong group of
foreign businessmen and traders established itself there.
The short time between being controlled by the Turks
and later the British, did not allow merchant capital time
to exploit Egypt fully. What is more fundamental is that
due to Europe's experience elsewhere a process was in place
for colonization. Egypt did have some strategic importance
30
NOTE: Khedives spent E.P.
2 million in entertaining
European royalty for the
opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869.
to Europe in the effort of containing Russia's expansion
but with industrialization and the technical ability of
building a canal joining the Mediterranean Sea with the
Red Sea and hence the Far East, Europe and particularly the
French became more interested in its relationship with Egypt.
The Suez Canal was built and Egypt and Europe became bound.
Due to the fall in cotton prices soon after the Ameri-
can Civil War, the U.S. producing cotton again on the Europ-
ean market, and a new King Khedives' personal extravagance
plus a growing national debt, this king was forced to sell
his shares in the Suez Canal Company to Britain. Britain
joined France with vested interests in the region.
Colonial History
In 1882 Egypt became the first country in the Middle
East to be occupied and ruled by a European power, Britain.
Her interests in staying in Egypt were (a) the rush for
colonies by Europe and the desire for an all British route
from the Cape to Cairo, (b) control of the Suez Canal and
the strategic importance of holding territory close to it,
and (c) the exploitation of cotton crops and grains which
were grown in the fertile Nile Valley. A colonial adminis-
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tration was introduced with Britain supporting a king and
aligning her interests with the powerful landowner elite.
However, as early as this there was already a desire on the
part of this elite, represented by the "Wafd," to become
independent. But because of the unity of its people and
their respect for a single authority, developed thousands
of years before, various governors had been able to command
and obtain loyalty and obedience of their subjects once
established in power. The struggle for independence from
the British, with the unwritten support of their King over
the 19th and early 20th Centuries finally produced Egypt's
independence as a separate country and a unified nation.
It was a nationalist struggle and was not identified with
Arabism, or Arab unity.
Independence
In 1922 Egypt became a monarchy under King Fuad I.
The British, however, retained extensive powers as well as
a major military presence in the Suez Canal Zone, which was
used as a major allied base of operations during this time.
The rest of the Middle East was not so fortunate. Conflict
and tension appear to have been endemic to the region due
32
to the sectorial and fragmented nature of the society and
failure of the region to gain its political equilibrium
following the demise of the Ottoman Empire. King Farouk
took over the throne in 1936 at the age of 17. He was more
aware than most of the "Arabness" of the continued struggle
against the British still intrenched in the Middle East.
But the King had two major faults which were (a) his exer-
cising of arbitrary power and (b) his scandalous, dissolute
private life, and these slowly changed the Egyptians respect
for their King over time. He quarrelled with the powerful
Wafd and in 1942, when the British forced the King to accept
their suggested government, he lost faith in the people and
ruled in isolation from them. Under the monarchy the uneven
distribution of land and wealth, abject poverty, degradation
of the peasant farmer and labor were constant problems re-
ceiving no attention. Cultivable land increased by some
20% from 1882 to 1936 but the population tripled, more
people sharing less land. The large majority of landowners
found it difficult to subsist due to the division of land
into smaller and smaller parcels through the inheritance
system. In 1952, of the 14.5 million farmers, less than a
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fifth owned land. 2100 landlords (0.1% of the population)
owned 19% of the land. The ratio of one or less acres per
person to 200 acres per person divided up the landowners in-
to a group of specially favored people (organization from
the previous dynasties) to which belonged the political
leadership, and the masses. Men of modest means were not
prevented from "moving up" but few ever succeeded. The Army
became more accessible to the poor.
The Second World War brought a large foreign military
presence to Egypt and soon after this conflict was settled
the Palestinian War took place (1948) and Egypt suffered
her first defeat against Israel. A group of young officers,
frustrated by this defeat, blaming old out-dated equipment,
lazy Generals working out of Cairo, and mistrust of the rul-
ing Wafd, took up the main thrust of the national movement.
Their purpose was to break the ties with Britain and change
the course of Egypt's future. Within this resistance there
was no overriding common ideology, The officers were partly
resentful of a "foreign" King but denounced him as corrupt
and not tyrannical. In 1950 the Wafd party was still strong
enough though to win an election (228 out of 319 seats), but
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on January the 26th, 1952, known as "Black Saturday" police
failed to prevent a violent riot organized by the now under-
ground Muslim Bretheren, socialists and communists. The
action discredited the Palace and the Wafd, and the end
results of the riots were the dismissal of the Cabinet and
Martial Law.
The Revolution
This well organized riot encouraged the "free officers"
committee to prepare for a takeover. They were a small
group of military men, including Sadat and Nasser, who had
formed a team soon after the 1948 Palastinian War. They
were from middle and lower middle class backgrounds of farm-
ers and government employees whose class interests were
different from the ruling elite. Nasser, already their
leader had a clear belief that the ruling regime had to be
destroyed to achieve liberation for Egypt and that the army
was to do the job. A series of events then set the stage
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for the coup. The government changes after Black Saturday,
the weakness of the political parties and the dissolution
of the Officers Club Board, soon after the Free Officers
had won an election there coupled with the approaching
appointment of a new War Minister (opposed to the Free
Officers) decided them to act on July 23rd 1952. Between
midnight and three a.m. that morning they, together with
3000 soldiers, siezed control of the army, occupied Army
Headquarters and arrested the higher commanding officers
meeting at that time to discuss the pending revolution, and
secured control of communications. Two soldiers were killed
and two were wounded and before the dawn General Naguib
was appointed Commander in Chief of the armed forces to
lead the movement. The coup was deceptive in its moder-
ation.
"1 ....The first communique about the coup, apparently
written by Amer, was broadcast at 7 A.M. (July 23) by
Anwar Sadat in the name of General Naguib. Its text
had been communicated earlier to the press. It neither
proclaimed a revolution, nor did it say that a coup d'etat
had just been carried out against the old regime of King
Farouk, whose name it did not even mention. The statement
was an apology for the military takeover and showed
primarily the military motives behind the officers'
action and their concern about the army's reputation.
It spoke of the bribery, corruption, and government
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instability that had a great influence on the army and
contributed to defeat in the Palestine War. The state-
ment reassured the people that the 'entire army is to-
day working for the interests of the fatherland within
the constitution and without any designs of its own,'
and gave assurances to the foreign residents, 'our
brothers,' about the safety of their lives and prop-
erty, The declaration, according to Sadat, was part
of a maneuver intended, first, to avert foreign inter-
vention before the king was expelled, and second, to
make the king believe for a while that the only goal
of the coup was the determination of the army to purge
its ranks."
It was on the 26th of July that the King was granted a
cordial departure into exile. The Free
Reference: Ibid, page 27.
Officers had as a
guide for their revolution the six principals they had agreed
upon before the Coup.
"...The six principles contained clearly the seeds
and directives of a revolution and included: The
destruction of imperialism and its treacherous Egyptian
agents; the abolition of feudalism; the ending of
monopolies and of the domination of the government by
capital; the establishment of social justice; the
building of a powerful national army; and the establish-
ment of a sound democratic system. In this light one
should therefore regard the statements in the Philo-
sophy of the Revolution about Nasser's disappointment
with the masses and with the leaders of opinion after
the coup as mere apologies for taking over the govern-
ment and for justifying his conclusion: 'I realized
that the task of the vanguard, far from being completed,
had only begun. "
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Nasser in Egypt
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The struggle for power quickly developed between
Naguib and Nasser. It revolved around three main factors. (a)
Both saw the role Naguib was to play differently. (b) There
was disagreement over Naguib's intention of disengaging the
military from power and, (c) both had a different outlook as
to the speed with which changes were to be made. There
followed a series of semi-coups and counter-coups, riots
and behind the door politicing until Nasser finally won the
battle for power.
"The success of the second coup against Naguib at the
end of March 1954 is a most significant event in the
modern history of Egypt and the Arab world. It meant
the end of that spirit of moderation and compromise
that had hitherto characterized all Arab military
regimes. It also meant the decisive defeat of the
attempts to restore freedom and parliamentary govern-
ment in Egypt. The military dictatorship under Nasser,
in the absence of any successful oppositions, felt
free to carry Egypt and with it other Arab states on
a revolutionary course whose benefits and achievements
have remained doubtful."
Censorship was reintroduced and political parties were
abolished. Nasser became Prime Minister in April 1954 and
the Muslim Brotherhood sealed their fate when they attempt-
ed to assassinate Nasser that same year. He wiped them
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(and his only real oppostion) out as a result. A constitu-
tion for the republic was ratified in a referendum in 1956
and Nasser was elected President.
Nasser is probably best known for his move away from
the West in order to pursue his revolution and goal of Arab
unity. The Communists approved of Egypt's move toward
"Scientific Socialism" which revised religious norms and
enabled Nasser to define Islam as the first religion to
proclaim socialism. The polarization of much of the world
between the two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
during the 1950's did not directly effect the Middle East
until Nasser in 1955, perceiving the competitive nature of
a bipolar gobal system began to structure the Egyptian
policy of "Positive Neutralism." He avoided rigid align-
ments with the great powers by manipulating the conflict to
the Arabs advantage. The U.S.A. up to this point
had not played a major role in the Middle East considering
it to be the responsibility of Europe but, when Nasser
managed to negotiate the Czech arms deal in 1955 after the
U.S. had refused his request for arms, and having taken
Egypt to the Bandung Conference thus defining his non-align-
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ment policy, the U.S. was thrown into competition with the
U.S.S.R. over Egypt's development. Nasser was successfully
able to play the one superpower against the other as can
be illustrated by the obtaining of funding for the Aswan
Dam in 1955. The junta's decision to build the dam, planned
from the first year of the revolution was presented as the
symbol of a new dynamic industrialized Egypt, to irrigate
125 million acres of land and provide electricity for in-
dustrialization. The U.S., Britain and the World Bank
offered to assist Egypt, but the loan contained conditions,
including the supervision of Egypt's budget and her balance
of payments. Nasser hesitated to allow the control of the
Egyptian economy to fall into Western hands. His hesitation
was interpreted by Eden and Dulles as a surreptitious effort
to negotiate a separate deal with the U.S.S.R. Dulles,
therefore, withdrew the U.S. offer. Nasser retaliated. In
a major speech a week later he declared that Egypt would
nationalize the Suez Canal Company thus to be able to pay
for the dam itself. Britain and France using the Israeli
attack on the Sinai as an excuse, as prearranged, attempted
to take over the canal for "safety purposes." But the
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initiative slowly came to a halt without U.S. support and
Eden and Mollet were forced to capitulate. The final out-
come was victory for Egypt. The British and French were
unable to topple Nasser, the canal remained in Egyptian
control and the U.S.S.R. offered aid for the dam soon after-
wards.
The Western influence already established in the Middle
East through France and Britain was increased with the Bagh-
dad pact of 1955, designed to form a nucleus of a Middle East
defense alliance directed against the U.S.SR., but Egypt
read this as a move to isolate her politically and strategic-
ally from the region. As mentioned above the U.S.S.R. had
already entered the Middle East arena with the Czech arms
deal, followed by its assistance to Nasser for funding of
the Aswan dam.
The response from the West was the "Eisenhower Doctrine."
It pledged U.S. assistance, including armed forces, to any
Arab nation requesting U.S. help "against the overt armed
aggression from any nation controlled by international com-
munism."
At the same time however, during the late fifties and
early sixties the World arena underwent gradual change.
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The increasing power of China and Japan and the beginnings
of the E.E.C. allowed them to move away from their earlier
dependence on the superpowers, decolonialization had creat-
ed states, who when banding together formed new alignments,
the African bloc, Arab bloc, etc. with growing influence
in world organizations like the United Nations. Within the
two superpowers there developed an understanding that
ideological polarity need not produce military confrontation.
They were both free to meddle in the Middle East as else-
where without the threat of total war.
"Conversely,...Egypt's chronic dependence upon the two
great powers for military and economic aid constituted
a clear constraint on the formulation and implementation
of her policies. However, the polarisation of the
global system meant that the operational effects of
this constraint on Egypt's decision-makers was not
crucial. Thus, the refusal of the United States and
Britain to meet Egypt's demands for arms was the
primary, if not the only reason for the Czech arms
deal. Similarly, the competitive nature of the global
system enabled the Egyptian leaders to turn to a new
patron, in the form of the Soviet Union, when con-
fronted with Dulles's withdrawl of aid for the Aswan
Dam. On the other side of the coin, the rupture be-
tween Nasser and the Russians over the Iraqi and
Syrian Communists in 1959 merely resulted in Egypt's
acceptance of American economic aid. Nevertheless,
while the constraint was by no means crucial, it
certainly was not significant. Egypt's gradual
dependence on the Soviet Union for her industrial
and military expansion, particularly in the post-1967
NOTE: The Arab Social'sm
of Egypt is not ridgially
Marxist, rejects the doc-
trine of class struggle,
and does not oppose private
ownership of property. It
is centered on state cap-
italism, raising living
standards throught indus-
trialization and bringing
about a broader distribution
of wealth.
period, certainly affected her freedom of manoeu-
vrability in the international arena. Furthermore,
Egypt's lack of vital raw materials, especially wheat,
meant that at times her very existence was dependent
on outside aid."
Nasser was also directly involved in the concept of
"Arabism" an amorphus concept based on emotional and senti-
mental attachments to a perceived entity called "The Arab
Nation." There are two distinct yet interrelated perspec-
tives of how this influenced Egypt. One was the Arab,
Israeli conflict and the other was the intra-Arab relations
of the region. In both spheres Egypt was the central lead-
ing actor. In its relations with Arab countries, Nasserism
was both aggressive and domineering, Egypt
failed to achieve what it told the Arab people it would
give them, Arab unity, and the restoration of Arab rights
in Palastine. Instead Egypt created division, between what
it called the liberated states and the reactionary and
within each state division between the radical socialist
supporters, "the real patriots," and the liberal democrats
and various elites who were described as traitors and im-
perial agents. This can be illustrated in the successful
formulation of the U.A.R., Egypt and Syria, in 1957 and
its break up in 1961. Nasser then soon abandoned his early
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policy of co-existence with the non-revolutionary Arab
countries. He was infuriated by Saudi Arabia's King Faisal
and his attempts at forming Muslim solidarity, clearly in-
tended to rally opposition to the revolutionary socialist
system. Nasser claimed that only socialists were good Arab
Nationalists and that non-socialist Muslim states were
reactionary and servants of imperialism.
"While government machinery was represented as the in-
strument of the popular will, the rulers refused to
share power with the people under the pretext, expressed
by Sadat, that 'the leadership of the revolution de-
fines what it thinks the interests and needs of the
people are.' Certain similarities have been found
between the one party organization in the Egyptian
system and the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.
In both, the one party organization is an officially
recognized entity and its leaders are high state
officials. But, whereas in Russia the Soviet State
was a creature of the Communist Party and served as
its instrument, in Egypt the one party organization -
The Socialist Union - is the creature of the State
and is subservient to it."
The first set of laws the new government introduced to
the country were aimed at achieving social justice and pre-
venting exploitation of the peasant and the worker. The
Agrarian Reform Law Number 178 set a limit for amounts of
land landlords could own, the state expropriating and re-
distributing lands in excess of this. Two objectives were
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thus reached. One was an attempt at breaking the feudal
pattern of the landlord, tenant relationship. The second
was to establish more peasants as landowners, increase state
control and modernize agriculture through cooperatives and
at the same time force landlords to invest capital into
industry. Other decrees, involving expansion of education
facilities, reduction in freedom of expression, and dis-
criminatory practices against Egyptian foreigners and the
wealthy Copts were also practiced in an attempt to close
the gap in living standards. Land redistribution only allow-
ed about one million out of the six million peasants to
actually gain land and while tenants received a 50% reduction
in rents the laborers did not benefit. While foreign invest-
ment was encouraged the restrictive laws of fixed prices,
ceiling on profits, etc. kept them away and by 1956,
frustrated by the lack of foreign investment and the flight
of capital out of the country the Nasser regime moved to
State Capital control. His first action was to nationalize
the Suez Canal and foreign banks and by 1961 Nasser had
issued his socialist laws and restructured the government
to one of virtual dictatorship. His National Charter had
three basic aims, freedom, socialism, and unity under his
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"Scientific Socialism" and it included "...the alliance of
the peoples forces representing the working people who in-
clude farmers, the laborers, the soldiers, the intelligentsia,
and National capital."
The real beneficiaries of this policy were the new
class of military and civilian bureaucrats in whose hands
political and economic power was concentrated. While the
gap between rich and poor was reduced it still existed. The
G.N.P. of Egypt lagged behind countries like Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon. Farmers had to sell their crops
at fixed prices to the government and labor, while allowed
to organize were not allowed to strike. Egypt, for the
first time, was suffering from shortages of basic food
supplies.
The most striking feature of the Egyptian cabinet
throughout Nasser's rule was its relative structural uni-
formity. The membership of officers or ex-officers in the
cabinet averaged over 40% and the majority of these were
the original Free Officers who had participated in the
revolution of 1952.
The 1967 war against Israel turned out to be a disaster
for the Egyptians. Nasser resigned but by popular demand
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reinstated himself as head of the country. He immediately
took over the functions of Prime Minister and Secretary
General of the Socialist Union to consolidate his position
but he had lost much of the support of his people. Riots
and demonstrations followed and while he made concessions
in his cabinet, including the appointment of Western ed-
ucated people and university officals, the intellectuals
did not consider he had gone far enough. They demanded
freedom of the press and freedom for political parties. In
the Arab world the myth about Nasser's striking force and
his infallable wisdom came into question. He was also
forced to modify his attitude towards Israel. He had to
move his non-alignment policy to open dependence on the Soviet
Union and its influence in his military establishment (from
500 advisors before the war to 1500 and more by 1968). By
1969, with new arms from the U.S.S.R., Egypt started its
"War of Attrition" against Israel, a constant harrassing
of the Israelies along the canal zone.
"The Egyptian revolution has failed in the achievement
of most of these positive goals. Experiments in govern-
ment have been following one another at the rate of
one every three years with nominal popular participation
and with a one-party organization created and dominated
by the government. Freedoms have consistently been
suppressed. The essentially administrative-bureaucratic
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nature of the state has been left intact. A new
hierarchy useful for the policies of the new regime
was set up with the military stratum at the top of the
hierarchy and with every other group, even professionals
and intellectuals, bureaucratized. The rising pros-
perous middle class was ruined and the old ruling elite
was destroyed without bringing substantial material
and more improvement to the condition of the low classes.
Corruption has been widespread in the economic system,
and the military officers and other favorites, mostly
from the poorer classes, have availed themselves with
impunity of the opportunity for accummulating wealth
while they were executives of state-controlled cor-
porations and projects. Economic development did not
achieve what was expected, and many losing industrial
projects had to be closed. The people in general, and
the intellectuals, workers, and students in particular,
were indoctrinated and regimented for the service of
the socialist state, while the educational and academic
standards have been degraded. The Egyptian revolution
gave Egypt no military strength to stand in the face of
Israel, and Israel was virtually the only justification
for building up that strength."
But because of Nasser's policies, Egypt required more
foreign aid. His insistance on building an army strong
enough to crush Israel, his constant involvement and support
for revolutionary forces in the Arab world, his venture into
Black Africa and his desire to industrialize Egypt could
only be supported by Egypt's cotton and wheat exports and
the Suez Canal. They were unable to produce sufficient funds
for these objectives. By 1969 Egypt's indebtedness was as
high as $3600 million.
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Sadat in Egypt
A ceasefire agreement was reached between Egypt and
Israel in August 1970. Nasser died unexpectedly in September
of that year at the age of 52. In spite of the setbacks the
Arab World had suffered since the start of the 1967 war, he
was still looked upon as the father of his people and a
popular hero. The question of who was to be his successor
and the future of the Nasser system had to be answered.
Anwar Sadat became the acting president in terms of the
constitution but it was unclear whether he was to stay. With
pressure from the Russians to quickly appoint a new leader
and some political manoeuvring on Sadat's part he was re-
commended for the position. He was close to Nasser and had
been with him right from the beginning of the revolution,
and he was likely to continue Nasser's policy. Sadat accept-
ed and proclaimed his adherence to Nasser's policy for the
achievement of the following goals: liberation of the occu-
pied land and settlement for the Palastinian refugees, unity
of the Arab countries, non-alignment between the power blocs,
support for the national liberation movements and defense of
the socialist gains. His appointment received support from
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the Arab bloc.
Through a series of moves, his expulsion of 21000 Soviet
personnel in 1972, the reshuffling of his cabinet in March
1973, and with Egypt's relative success in the October War,
he was able to move out from under the shadow of Nasser and
established himself as a decision-maker in his own right.
He immediately embarked on an economic "liberalization" pro-
gram opening the Egyptian economy to foreign investment and
encouraged emergence of a vigorous private sector designed
to work parallel to and in competition with the public
sector. In foreign policy his reapproachment with the U.S.A.
led to the decline in relations with the U.S.S.R. He dele-
gated administration duties to his chief lieutenants giving
them more say in developing policies. He moved Egypt's
earlier goal of "Arab unity" to emphasis on Egyptian affairs
with a more inwardly directed ideology. After the enormous
costs in life and materials of the October War he felt they
had made enough sacrifices for the Arab cause and the time
had come to turn attention towards domestic reconstruction.
Despite his break with Quadhafi of Libia over the F.A.R.
(formed in 1971) and his occasional denounciation of the
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Baath and the POL.O. Sadat vigorously pursued the objective
of Arab solidarity (not unity). Egypt's relations with the
majority of Arab states grew in cordiality in contrast to
Nasser's era and intra-Arab relations improved.
But it is "at home" where his biggest impact on and
shift away from Nasser's policies are evident.In their effort to
rectify the deteriorating economic situation the present
Egyptian Government has increasingly liberalized the Nasser-
ite economic structure. Since the October War the "open
door" policy has been pursued. In 1974 enterprizes invest-
ing in the Canal Zone were to be exempt from taxes and duties.
In the rest of Egypt new enterprises would not be required
to pay tax on profits for five to eight years. Business
and investment banks were exempt from currency controls.
By July 1975 Nasser's nationalization measures were effective-
ly reversed. Import and export restrictions were reversed
and the public sector had been decentralized. The Finance
Minister, Ahmed Abu Ismail set it out clearly: "The govern-
ment is set on the open door policy. One of the first
priorities has been to dissolve the public institutions and
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give individual economic units complete freedom to reform
their administration an remove all obstacles and hindrances
to the realization of this objective. Any unit failing to
achive these ends will be regarded as a burden and liquidated."
In 1974 the Highest Court
of Appeals turned around the confiscation and sequestration
of private property, and in 1976 Egypt agreed to compensate
U.S. investors for claims dating back to 1952. Sadat has
reshuffled his cabinet appointing Western trained ministers.
This path to capitalist development has not been free of
problems. Sadat has been challenged twice in 1971 and 1975
but survived both. He has had to cope with riots against
his new measures and foreign investors have been slow to move
into Egypt because of its poor infrastructure, ignored for
years and fear that further nationalization is possible.
"....The conservative background, social orientations
and political style of Sadat instinctively propels
him towards a Western-type social and economic order.
However, lacking the charismatic authority of Nasser,
Sadat's efforts to achieve his political aspirations
are constrained by the continuing persistence of his
52
predecessor's ideological and political imperatives and
social direction. Indeed, as one of Nasser's main
lieutenants, Sadat is himself inculcated with the
general tenets of Nasserite ideology. Whether Sadat
can succeed in completely extricating both Egypt and
himself from the Nasserite past is open to conjecture.
What is certain, however, is that this goal will not
be achieved by the efforts to undermine Nasser's
legacy through wholesale, anti-Nasser press campaigns.
It can be achieved only by the consolidation of Sadat's
own authority, which itself is dependent upon the
people's perception of him as a successful and merit-
orious leader."
'1.2EYPT AiN) TILE MODEL
The text presented here is based on the readings of
Zeylstra, Kay, White and Payer with two main foci. They are
the debt into which Third World countries fall and why, and
the conscious structuring of dependencies of the developing
countries on the Western World. One for the purposes of
continued exploitation and the other for the purposes of
tieing a developing country both politically and economically
into the western system.
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1.2.1 HISTORY OF AID
To understand more about aid receiving contries we
must examine their history to find the reasons for their
lack of development and slowness to industrialize. As
early as the 1500's confrontation took place between
European and overseas civilizations which initiated
the virtual European monoply of world trade, considered
to be the foundatibn of capitalism and the industrial
revolution. Sea power and not material wealth was the
deciding issue. Europes power, it can be argued, arose
out of the many conflicts that took place there in the
centuries before, which gave it the capacity to organize
war on a quasi-national base and to make use of sea power.
Directly related to this is the development of merchant
capital. The large commercial empires set up by Spain,
Portugal, Britain, France, and Holland established the
basis of our modern economy. Europe concentrated vast
capital wealth while overthrowing and subjugating whole
civilizations exploiting the potenial labor resources of
their colonies and oppressing any resistance. The
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foundations of modern development and underdevelopment
were laid at this time. Merchants by their nature tend
towards monolopy structures. Merchant capital using
Europe's sea power and knowledge and supported by
governments, set out on a planned exploitive and highly
profitable trade structure with the Third World. Be-
cause of its power it was partly responsible for the
containment of industrial development in Europe. The
purpose being to establish a strong market back home for
goods and raw materials. The Industrial Revolution
changed the historical form of merchant capital from
the independent and only form of capital to only one
aspect of industrial capital within the European areas.
To retain its power outside Europe merchant capital dis-
couraged any form of industrialization in the Third World
and in fact industrial capital had no desire to interfer
with this, seeing the Third World as a market for its
goods.
"Even if industrial capital had wished to migrate
to the underdeveloped world on any susbstantial
scale, it would have found the environment un-
welcoming because of the degree of social dis-
ruption brought about during the first phase
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of mercantile development. In fact, the conditions
which merchant capital had created throughout
the underdeveloped world by the middle of the
nineteenth century were absolutely unconducive
to the full development of captialism. But
there is yet a further reason for its staying
on the sidelines the importance of which is
easy to underestimate: we have seen that the
triumph of industrial capitalism involved a long
struggle against merchant capital. By the
middle of the nineteenth century industrial
capital had won decisive victories in the
metropoles but merchant capital remained power-
ful in the overseas empires. The result was
an uneasy stalemate in which merchant capital
was both winner and loser. It both lost and
retained its independence and subsequently
existed simultaneously in its two historical
forms. The consequences were doubly depressing
for the underdeveloped world: on the one side
the tendency of merchant capital to repress
general economic development in proportion
to its own independent development; on the other
the reorganisation of whole economics to the
requirements of external economic interests."
By the 1850's colonialism was the main force in
determining the course of underdeveloped countries. The
mother countries, taking over from the large merchantile
companies, established a central political authority up-
holding private property and money and gained the support
of local groups whose own power originated from the non-
capitalist forms of that society. The colonialists
established an administrative infrastructure to support
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regular and reliable trade which Europe demanded. In so
doing they created a small elite for political control
over these terratories. They set out a policy which
served a narrow set of interests, free trade between the
European capital at "home" and European capital in the
colonies. It is here that Emmanuel's thesis of "unequal
exchange" is based. This situation continued through
the nineteenth century but with increasing amounts of
capital passing to the colonies.
"...capital could not wipe out its own history
and begin as though nothing had happened pre-
viously: it was forced to operate in the
conditions of underdevelopment which it had
itself created: conditions that were quite
different from those that prevailed in the
developed countries in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Thus when industrial-
isation finally started in the underdeveloped
world in the 1930s and picked up steam in the
post-war period, it was a process altogether
different from that which had taken place earlier
in the developed countries. It took place in
conditions of deeply established underdevelopment
which it could not overcome but only reinforce."
Between the two world wars colonial powers had
accepted limited responsibility for the provision of
resources to their colonies development but this was
only an extention of their domestic politics. It was
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only after the Second World War that aid as we know it
today had its beginning. In April 1948 the Marshall Plan
was put into practice. Its main function was to get
Europe (and soon after the end of the war only Western
Europe) back on its feet, by providing foreign exchange
with which to import equipment and raw materials to
reconstruct its industries. It must be remembered that
Europe was not underdeveloped, but damaged after the war.
The plan was a success. Within four years most of Europe
had recovered from the effects of the war and was well
on its way to achieving prosperity. Europe is today one
side of the widening gap between rich and poor nations.
Four reasons which made this plan successful were:
(a) the volume of aid that was given, $3,000 million per
year (from U.S.A.); (b) the limited and clear objectives -
rebuild Europe; (c) the growing threat of communism to
the West welded the political relationships between the
recipients and donors; and (d) the belief that the U.S.A.
and Europe held a common cultural heritage. In this plan
the foundations for aid were structured.
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"...the present rules of the system were established
well before most developing countries had attained
independence, and they reflect the views at the
time of the countries that traditionally had
commanded world trade-especially the United States
and Great Britain. The broad outline of the
current international payments system was laid
down in 1944 in the Bretton Woods Agreement, which
also established the International Monetary Fund
as a lending institution and to police its rules.
In 1947, this agreement was complemented by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
"At Bretton Woods rules were agreed upon
intended to prevent recurrence of the cumulative
disorders of the interwar period, when nations
had resorted 'to measures destructive of national
or international prosperity'. The purpose was
'to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth
of international trade, and to contribute thereby
to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income'. The goal thus
described in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF
was considered to require fixed exchange rates
and removal of artificial exchange restrictions
on trade and other current payments. Trade move-
ment in goods and services was to be as free and
unfettered by controls as possible."
It must also be remembered that the developed world,
at war, had great need for imports from the colonies
but with little to trade except capital, the colonies
ended up after the war with large amounts of foreign
exchange, and claims on the future production of the
industrialized states. During the 50's with the
formation of colonial countries into newly independent
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states these reserves were dissipated with a flood of
imports sometimes as soon as three years. This consumer
spending spree placed most of the underdeveloped world
worse off than it was before the war, with a high demand
for imports and fast dwindling foreign resources.
The U.S.A. basing its experience on the Marshall
Plan attempted the same strategies in South Asia with
the goal of keeping the communists out. Aid was provided
under the Mutual Security Act (1952) with little regard
to the different circumstances of Asia to Europe. Ten
years later it was difficult to state that this program
was a success. The U.S.S.R. on the other hand only
reversed its isolationist policy in the mid-1950's with
credits and trade agreements to Afghanistan and India.
Previously the U.S.S.R. had pursued a policy of support
for local communist parties and armed rebellion. The
Bandung Conference of 1955 made it clear to the world
that a group of Third World countries were able and
willing to follow a doctrine of non-alignment. An area
of competiton was created between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
to win these countries favors.
REFERENCE: This list was
made up by combining infor-
mation from two sources:
1. J. White's The Politics
of Foreign Aid, and
2. C. Payer's The Debt
Trap.
By the end of the 1950's, with the large increase
in volume of aid, governmental involvement and rapidly
growing international trade, a new perspective was formed
around aid. The emergence of the Soviet Union as an
alternative aid source, the emergence of new candidates
for aid in Africa and Latin America and an Indian foreign
exchange crisis (1957-58) established a need for a fresh
look at aid. The main components were as follows:
1. Diffusion of aid to a wide range of developing
countries, and therefore a diminishing concentration
by donors on a small group of selected client states.
2. A presumption on the part of developing countries
that aid would be forthcoming, hence a closer
integration of aid into their policy-making processes.
3. Specification of the end uses of aid and a
growth in "tied aid."
4. Identification of these end uses in the form of
support for development strategies. A shift from
project to program aid.
5. The beginnings of a debate on alternative develop-
ment strategies.
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DEFINITION: I.M.F. =
International Monetary
Fund.
DEFINITION: Soft loans =
loans on terms very much
easier than commercial
loans.
6. The development of the "consortium" technique
in order to coordinate policies of several different
aid-givers, and to encourage more countries to
share the aid burden with the United States.
7. Increased use of loans instead of grants.
8. An increase in aid generally. 50% increase
In I.M.F. quotas and therefore lending power.
9. The decision to rely on I.M.F. stand-by
arrangements as a pilot for other aid programs.
10. The formation of the International Development
Association (I.D.A.), an affiliate of the World Bank,
which could administer lending of "soft" loans.
New aid organizations were formed during the 1960's.
The Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.) and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) being two of them. The major shift was a leveling
off of U.S. aid to the Third World.
Between 1965 and 1970 the main focus of aid shifted
again. In these years the most important issues raised
were:
1. The need for, and practice of, a more detailed
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REFERENCE: J. White's The
Politics of Foreign Aid.
He based his information on
'DAC Chairmans annual review'
OECD, 1972 Table 8, p. 224.
breakdown of the net flow of official resources
so that inflated figures, by inclusion of peripheral
expenditure items could be avoided.
2. An attempt to untie aid from the string of
conditions attached to it. This failed since not
all donors agreed to it (U.S.A. voting against).
It is obvious that if one donor did untie its aid,
that money could easily be used to pay for another
donors imports.
At the beginning of the 1970's as has already been
mentioned, there was some sense that aid had failed. It
is difficult to imagine what was actually supposed to
happen over a short ten years. The underdeveloped world
was however not the same thing as a war-torn and damaged
Europe. It is also true that while the target for aid
financing was agreed by the various aid organizations,
to be made up of 1% of the national income of all the
countries involved, it did in fact drop from 0.95% to
0.75% of national incomes of donor countries over the
1960's. Population growth, higher than originally
anticipated in the Third World also diminished the
i~j
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potential of the actual growth rate achieved (5%). But
the main reason for disillusionment lies in the fact that
aid as it was given cannot be guaranteed to alleviate
the circumstances of the poor, unless specifically
designed to do this.
The real problem of aid for the 1970's has
been to come to grips with the diversity of purposes
of aid, the confusion between what aid givers were trying
to do, and what they said they wanted to do, and what was
actually done. Also, now with clearer statistical bases
built up over the previous years, and with the awareness
that aid has been foolishly given and received in the past
and that the problem of development is complex, aid donors
are developing a clearer set of objectives and goals. They
are designing sets of strategies involving much more
complex solutions and monitoring processes than before
in the hopes of being able to improve over aid
performances in the past.
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Egypt and the History of Aid
1. Merchant Capital and Egypt
Merchant Capital did not get a chance to fully develop
and exploit Egypt as with other parts of Africa because of
four reasons.
(a) Access to Egypt by Europe only took place in the
19th Century where as exploitation of other African countries
had started 200 years before this.
(b) Besides cotton and some grain products which were
exploited, Egypt had few resources of interest to Europe at
the time.
(c) The influx of foreign businessmen and traders pro-
vided competition for what few products there were because
of Egypt's relative closeness to Europe.
(d) European countries were already directly involved
in the Third World. Although a company, the Suez Canal con-
struction group had government interests involved. Local
unskilled labor was used but the planning and implementation
were controlled by the French.
The Egyptian elite and their King were building up ties
to Europe. They brought and sought luxury goods and cultural
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exchange with an industrializing West.
2. Colonialism
Egypt was occupied and not clearly a colony but the
British aligned its interests with the ruling elite and allow-
ed the King to continue his reign. Britain did provide a
colonial administration structure for governing the people
which included education policy, military training and organ-
ization, health standards and government. The main purpose
of Britain's presence in Egypt was: (a) strategic importance
and control of the Suez Canal; (b) the fulfillment of an all
British route from the Cape to Cairo; (c) tourism from Europe
and therefore protection, banks, hotels, etc.; and, (d) ex-
ploitation of crops for trade to Europe.
The British built roads and railways to improve the in-
frastructure of the country - again planned and built by
British technical experts and cheap Egyptian labor.
3. Independence
Egypt obtained its independence early in colonial history
and this was due to two factors.
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1) The nationalist movement was organized by the land-
owner elite and they were prepared to compromise giving Brit-
ain continued control of the Suez Canal Zone and freedom
of military movement if the necessity arose. They also
wished to retain their ties to Europe.
2) Egypt did not have many resources and its masses
were poor.
During the Second World War Egypt further strengthened
her ties with Europe due to: (a) the large military presence
in Egypt with the war reaching her "front door;" (b) her own
army developed, trained and serving under the British control;
(c) technology spin-off due to the war; (d) the flow of money
buying power by the military and individual soldiers and grow-
ing ties with Europe's defense effort.
Before the revolution then Egypt had a poorly developed
agricultural sector; few resources; reliance on foreign tech-
nical assistance and implementation of projects and military
development; a colonial administration structure and an elite
power group with strong ties to Europe.
4. The Revolution
I 4(
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The so-called socialist revolution was in fact a military
takeover followed by state capitalism. The only factor that
had really changed was that power had shifted from the land-
owner elite to the military. Nasser and his colleagues,
through their development strategy became candidates for aid
early on. Their desire to industrialize before developing
their agricultural potential, Nasser's external interests in
the Arab cause, the costs of a policy of destruction of Israel
and the inherited reliance on foreign technical assistance
and few resources to pay for this caused them to turn to aid.
Nasser's non-alignment policy allowed Egypt to get aid from
two sources, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
5. Egypt after the 50's
Egypt's growth in the reliance of aid can be shown by
relating it to the ten points mentioned in the text above.
1) Egypt becomes one of many countries receiving aid.
2) Egypt plans on aid in its revolutionary development
policy.
3) Aid becomes tied in Egypt.
4) Aid for development strategies like the Aswan Dam
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and a shift. from project aid to program aid takes place in
Egypt. At the present both program and project aid are
being used.
5) Alternative development strategies are illustrated
by the two housing projects discussed in Chapter Two.
6) The consortium technique is used in Egypt. Example,
the widening of the Suez Canal. (European, I.M.F. and
G.A.D.E. money involved.)
7) Egypt makes use of loans and grants.
8) A massive increase in aid generally has taken place
in Egypt over the last ten years.
9) Presumably I.M.F. standby arrangements to be used
as a pilot for other aid program took place in Egypt (no
research done).
10) Egypt gets soft loans.
Egypt has, through its historical progress, as with
many Third World countries, moved towards a growing reliance
on aid in its rush forward to full development.
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NOTE: Specific examples of
Third World countries be-
coming dependent on the
Western World are described
in literature like Payer's
The Debt Trap, Lipton's
Why Poor People Stay Poor,
and Leys' Underdevelopment
in Kenya to name a few.
NOTE: Brazil actually man-
aged to finance itself on
these alternatives in the
1960's when trying to break
away from the I.M.F.'s
1.2.2 DEPENDENCY IN THE THIRD WORLD
The dependency theory, simplified, states that some
countries are dependent on other countries for their
continued development. The developed world used tied aid
as one of the means of bringing this dependency about.
The objective, not always apparent at first glance, is
usually tied to import/export considerations and world
markets for the developed world's goods. The Third World
wants and needs the import of capital goods and sophisticated
technology in order to raise the standards of its people.
It uses aid for this purpose but most forms of aid are
in fact debt repayments in the future. The debt burden
of the Third World is growing and it is considered the
main cause of most payments crises. Many aid organizations
and particularly the I.M.F. seldom advise a country on
how to reduce imports but rather coaches these countries
on how to qualify for increased quantities of new credit.
And so the wheel goes round. More credit (or aid) and
more debt or obligations. When credit is short in the
form of aid, supplier credits and commercial loans can
sometimes fill the gap. This, of course, only adds
fJ.
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solution to its economic
problems. But eventually
the debt requirements
forced it to comply with
I.M.F. in order to obtain
a loan to pay back its
debts that had accrued.
to the debt owed at a later time.
Once countries have accepted the aid solution they
find themselves unable to free themselves from debt
service. In this process because of the 'special conditions'
attached to aid, they usually suffer internal friction
between the power elite and the rest of the population.
This further weakens their ability to seek independence
since aid expands to fill many parts of their power base.
Military aid agreements, technical assistance, imports
and trade agreements, food imports, etc. It can be
argued that to guarantee a market (even if limited) and
source of raw materials, the purpose of the donor is
neither to collect the debt nor force an economic crisis,
but rather to keep the dependent country bound, through
its debt to the donor organization.
This relationship is monitored by two inter-
linking criteria. One is foreign exchange and the other
is the balance of payments. Arising out of the Bretton
Woods agreement a country's currency has to be valued
and backed by gold for foreign currency uses. That is,
the country has to make up the difference between supply
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and demand for foreign exchange through its gold reserves.
If supply and demand are consistently out of balance,
say deficits in the balance of payments, a foreign ex-
change crisis follows. In the Third World it is usually
this situation that exists
NOTE: The revolution in
Cuba brought about this
crisis. The cause of
the revolution was in part
due to the agreements the
deposed elite had made with
the U.S.A.
When aid debts and a balance of payments crisis is
close, a country can take different courses of action.
What actions it takes and how well it survives this
action will illustrate its independence.
1. Acountry can refuse to pay its debts. This will
result in sactions and trade blockades as for Cuba.
Cuba, however, became dependent on the U.S.S.R.
2. A country can reschedule and refinance its debts.
This is only a method of putting debt off with added
interest. If anything, for a country to be able to
do this it would have to be tied to another.
3. Acountry can obtain new foreign aid. (This is
the most used technique). The situation is the same
as point 2.
4. It can enforce foreign companies to reinvest
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their profits back into the country. This will
scare away new investment, and some companies
might decide to close down their operations in
that country. To survive the repercussions
of this action, without having to give away some-
thing else is an indicator of a certain amount of
independence. (South Africa)
5. It can, of course, nationalize foreign invest-
ment. This is likely to result in sanctions of
international trade.
6. A country can reduce its imports bill and en-
hance earnings from its exports. This can be done
by;
(a) Exchange controls. Allows for corruption and
misuse.
(b) Devaluation or a floating exchange rate. This
should give exports a boost but the problems are that
on an open market there is no guarantee that imports
will stop, at even higher prices. It could, however,
reinforce the elite class since they would be
encouraged to make higher profits to pay for the
the increased prices. If this is not coupled with
foreign exchange limitations, foreign firms could
in fact make higher profitsto be sent out of the
country. The country might in fact loose money
if they are already selling all they can produce
of a particular product.
(c) Multiple exchange rates - better solution than (b).
(d) and import restrictions.
To be able to do any of these will indicate a certain
amount of independence but it is unlikely to change
the situation much. It could, in fact, make a
country more dependent in a narrower field.
7. A country can follow a policy of deflation of monetary
and fiscal policies by control of free foreign ex-
change market internally, increase taxes and decrease
government spending. This is more likely to illustrate
the strength of the government in power than to
illustrate its independence from outside forces.
The concept of dualism helps define dependency, since
it is the difference between nations that can make one
reliant on another. The different sets of conditions make
NOTE: This is certainly
true when examining the
gap in G.N.P. per capita.
See Todaro's Economics for
a Developing World, Chapter
5.
the one "superior" and the other "inferior." The conditions
of modern versus traditional methods of production, urban
versus rural sectors, the co-existance of powerful wealthy
nations with poor weak nations all make the one dependent
on the other, and there is reason to believe this situation
is chronic and not transitional. The gap between the
developed world and the underdeveloped world is growing.
Dependency and Egypt
The beginning of Egypt's dependency on the West can be
traced back to the construction of the Suez Canal but it is
really during the colonial rule and the Second World War that
this dependency is concretely put into place in Egypt. Col-
onial rule, or more accurately occupation, brought with it
the administration that allowed Egypt to (a) understand and
accept the Western system of power and economic development,
(b) trained its army in the British tradition and, (c) built
up its reliance on European technical assistance and tech-
nology transfer. The Second World War reinforced Egypt's
dependence on the West and the creation of Israel about which
it had little choice, further increased dependence on mili-
tary equipment supplies and training for the purposes of
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destroying that country. Nasser and the revolution presented
an opportunity for decreasing dependency on the outside world
and succeeded in breaking most ties to the West but his fail-
ure to mobilize the masses into production rather than sup-
port for his rhetoric, his impatience at industrializing the
Egyptian economy, and his constant involvement in the Arab
question drained what little economic potential his country
had and while he was clever enough to play the U.S.S.R. with
the West he lost sight of the real implications of this.
The growing need for aid.
REFERENCE: B. Hanson and
G. Marzouk's Development and
Economic Policy in the UAR,
1. Balance of Payments and Foreign exchange.
The balance of payments in Egypt can best be illustrated
by the widening gap between exports and imports as shown in
Diagram 3. Between 1968 and 1972, at great cost to Egypt,
the gap was almost closed but with her swing to the West after
1973 and the oil price increases this balance had become
a negative factor of almost $3,000 million. This state of
affairs was further aggrevated by the fact that up to 1962
deficits had been financed largely through Egypt's gold re-
serves. From 1946 to 1962 $1,082 million in foreign exchange
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REFERENCE: Marie-Christine
Aulas' "Sadat's Egypt" from
The New Left Review Number
98, July-August 1976, page
89.
NOTE: Sadat attempted to.
reschedule debts to the U.S.
S.R. in 1972 but was refused.
had been bought with gold, depleating Egypt's gold reserves
to -$20 million. This meant that after 1962 the annual de-
ficit had to be made up by a mounting foreign indebtedness.
A 1972 balance of payments crisis created the restrictive
imports control and was partly responsible for the timing of
the October War in 1973, an attempt to get the stagnating
economy back on its feet. The 1976 payments crisis is dis-
cussed under item 2 point 3 in this section.
In 1969 Egypt's non-military foreign debt was $3,600
million but by 1975 this debt had increased to $6,900 million.
2. Dependence
To illustrate Egypt's dependence I will examine it
against the criteria set out in the text above.
1) Default of debts. To my knowledge Egypt has not
attempted this. The repercussions both internally and
externally would be too severe for the existing govern-
ment to retain control. It is therefore dependent on
aid.
2) Reschedule debts. Egypt has done this with the
obvious repercussions. Growing debt and dependency.
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This was an attempt to draw
Sadat away from his already
growing interest in the West.
REFERENCE: Hammond and
Alexander's Political Dy-
namics in the Middle East,
Malcom Kerr's article "The
United Arab Republic," page
208.
3) New foreign aid. Nasser was able to generate dif-
ferent sources of new aid by playing the West against
the U.S.S.R.
Sadat, on the other hand, was not able to carry out
these political gymnastics, partly because he had chosen,
after the 1973 War to align his interests with the West
and partly because of the experience both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. had had with Nasser. In the 1976 Egyptian
economic crisis he tried a "stand off" with the I.M.F.
but G.A.D.E. (under I.M.F. influence), the World Bank
and the I.M.F. withheld loans unless:
(a) production controls were eliminated;
(b) public sector institutions were decentralized;
(c) food subsidies were reduced and the E.P. had
to be freefloating;
(d) compensation for U.S. investments from 1952
had to be paid in full.
Sadat finally gave in to the demands and within two
weeks G.A.D.E. provided a $250 million loan, the I.M.F.
provided a $450 million loan over three years, and the
U.S.A.I.D. grant, part of which was the M.I.T./C.U.
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program, was okayed. New aid was available but condi-
tions were attached. Egypt became more dependent on
the West.
4) Forced reinvestment. Egypt has reversed policies
after 1975 that now allow for foreign investment into
Egypt and profits out.
5) Nationalize foreign investment. After the revolu-
tion, attempts at attracting foreign investment were
made but the economic situation deteriorated. Nasser
attempted to rescue Egypt by nationalizing all the
financial institutions and heavy industry and hold
direct control over external trade in the early 1960's.
This increased the public sectors involvement in the
G.D.P. and government spending in industry, finance,
transport and communications grew from 11% of G.D.P.
in 1953 to 55% in 1962. It did not work. The-results
were a growing bureaucracy and still a constant need
for aid. Sadat has reversed these policies but is still
left with an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy and
the original move to nationalize industry, banks, etc.
has left Egypt with a double problem.
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6) Import, Export controls.
(a) Exchange controls have been used, and misused in
Egypt.
(b) Devaluation. Egypt has in the last ten years de-
valued at least twice and both occasions were related
to conditions in aid grants. But it must be remember-
ed that Egypt has to import resources so devaluation
actually increases the costs of local industrial pro-
ducts. Cotton production, while not at its potential
maximum supply, it is under present conditions unable
to increase and therefore devaluation actually reduces
foreign income from cotton.
(c) Multiple exchange rates (no research done).
(d) Import restrictions. In 1972 Egypt suffered from
an impending financial crisis. In an attempt to
cure its ills it introduced import limitations that
severely hampered efficient use of existing agricul-
tural and industrial capacity. The lack of imported
pesticides and fertilizer has delayed the "Green
Revolution" and industrial plant lies idle in some
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cases due to the lack of spare parts and raw materials.
Egypt's ability to earn foreign exchange for needed
imports is circumscribed by its financial inability
to import the necessary imports for export production.
The 1976 financial crisis brought about new foreign
aid with the conditions that import restrictions be
totally lifted. This was done. To get aid it has
to allow imports which it needs anyway.
Egypt's military spending, coupled with its over-
population and the paucity of its basic raw materials and
currency earning commodities, have made Egypt almost
totally dependent on foreign aid for economic survival
and solvency. In 1974 Egypt received $300 million in aid
from Saudi Arabia, $84 million from France and $1,285
million in credits and assistance from the I.B.R.D. By
mid- 1975 Egypt's indebtedness to the West alone was
approximately $3,000 million and the Soviet bloc loans
for civilian projects was over $1,000 million. This debt
has had to be paid by exports of cotton and earnings of
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the Suez Canal which have reduced the hard currency earn-
ing capacity of the country. It is increasingly depend-
ent on the West for its survival.
NOTE: This text is based
mainly on an article by
S. Amin, "Self Reliance
and the New International
Economic Order" in the
Monthly Review, Vol. 29
(1977).
1.2.3 THE HELPING HAND. A RADICAL VIEW.
Putting aside for the moment the large multi-national
organizations, it can be argued that capitalism does not
require foreign relations to make it work. The external
relations of a capitalist nation are subject to the logic
and requirements of self reliant internal accumulation.
Based on this assumption, three points illustrate the
differences between a developed capitalist nation and a
developing one.
1. The developed countries emerged from the gradual
breaking up of the feudal modes of production. First
the "Agricultural" revolution and then the "Industrial"
revolution taking place.
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2. The interrelationship between the new industrial
dominant class and the ruling landowners was
essential to form a mature and powerful nation state.
3. Subjection of the external economic and political
relations to internal accumulation shaped the
capitalist world.
None of these points hold true for the developing
Third World as can be illustrated by looking at the stages
of their evolution there.
Accumulation under the impetus from the developed world
starts with the creation-of the export sector. This is
because raw materials and food will have lower production
costs. The "backwardness" of an undeveloped country allows
for cheap labor. The major difference at this stage is one
of heterogeneous productive forces in the undeveloped world,
advanced in the export sector and retarded in the rest of
the economy, versus homogeneous productive forces in the
developed world. The domestic market is distorted and the
wealthy grow richer in the developed world, their con-
sumption is based on the Third World production.
After a time the domestic market emerges but this is
( (~
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NOTE: This is clearly il-
lustrated in C. Leys' Under-
development in Kenya.
NOTE: This happened in
Egypt with the Wafd.
for the few. Most of the capital for the export sector is
foreign and returns often flow back to the developed world.
A few people however do get some of it. This usually
makes for a luxury goods demand, imports from the developed
world. These few form the elite class and to keep labor
costs low they strengthen their power over labor with the
help of the developed world. The differences then are
(a) the capitalist mode of production is introduced from
"outside", (b) class alliances are international and not
national, (c) external relations are not subject to the
logic of internal development.
The three forces that might act on this situation are
(a) the exploited, but small, proletariate, (b) the present
masses and, (c) the national bourgeoise who want a part
in the economic base. Also, during this time it is usual
that the Third World exports primary commodities and has
to buy manufactured goods. They are not "allowed" to in-
dustrialize by the developed world. The national
bourgeoise compete with the poletariate for leadership
and usually the bourgeoise win. Because of their
connections and class alliance with the developed world
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they are able to industrialize. Industrialization acts as
an import substitution for luxury goods, usually highly
capital intensive and using scarce resources distorting
the allocation of resources in favor of new products.
As a result of this refocus of interests stagnation in
the subsistence agriculture takes place and hence the
marginalization of the masses.
Urbanization follows naturally, people move off the
low productive land and this guarantees a labor source
for the industiral areas. This migration is usually larger
than the number of jobs available and the resulting un-
employment guarantees a low minimum wage rate. Marginal-
ization is the condition underlying the integration of the
elite minority with the world system and confirms the
social, cultural, ideological and political integration
of the privilaged class with the developed world.
The mechanisms of domination by transnational companies
and dependance on the transfer of technology now are in
place. The growing luxury goods sector requires capital
intensive investments provided by these companies. A more
complex form of ownership and economic management make their
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appearance, often brought into being by the state. There
is still no move towards self reliance or development of
mass consumption. No agricultural revolution has yet
taken place in spite of the introduction of land reforms.
In fact the Third World becomes importers of food.
The dominant class soon has to spread its power to
retain control. Its alignment with foreign influences
has weakened its nationalistic attitude. Development
still remains dependent on exports of raw materials and the
rate of growth of the country is determined within the
existing order of relationships. To avoid a crisis the
dominant class demands the creation of a "new inter-
national order" by imposing increases in real prices of
raw materials. Further resources thus gained coupled with
the imported technology allows the Third World to finance
a new stage in industrialization, with large scale exports
back to the developed world.
Whether this situation allows for the development of
political independence on this new economic base is debat-
able. The situation could be manipulated by international
monopolies and not controlled by a Third World wanting self
[, (4
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reliance. One thing does happen however and that is the
beginnings of the Fourth World. Theoretically, the stage
reached should not require any interrelationships between
Third World countries since its momentum would be achieved
by exports back to the developed world. The Third World
is very uneven in terms of economic development. A
country with the abundance of raw material, political
solidity and-well developed links to the developed world
could advance faster if it also had markets in the other
less developed Third World and access to their raw materials
at still cheaper prices.
Egypt and the Helping Hand
There has been no agricultural revolution in Egypt.
There is still a landlord tenant relationship and while the
landlords have lost political and economic power the re-
volution did not restructure the existing social relation-
ships betwen landlord and peasant. External economic and
political relations are not subject to internal accumulation.
The Capitalist mode of production is being introduced from
REFERENCE: Dawishas' Egypt
in the Arab World, page 188.
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the outside and class alliances are being structured at the
international level. External relations are determining
internal development.
The results of Egypt's growing dependency are obvious.
1) Trade agreements are bound up with aid agreements
and Egypt is not free to seek out the "best prices"
for its products.
2) Egypt imports capital goods, sophisticated tech-
nology and more recently, food.
3) Egypt suffers from growing internal frictions.
"The worsening economic situation has naturally re-
sulted in much social discontent, particularly among
industrial workers whose inadequate $30 a month wage
packets have been further eroded by the soaring in-
flation. A number of strikes, demonstrations and
riots have thus occurred during 1974 and 1975, which
have manifested the growing impatience of this most
'Nasserite' sector of society with the economic and
social policies of the present leadership. For example,
on January 1, 1975, workers from the Helwan iron and
steel complex rioted in downtown Cairo chanting: 'Ya
batal al-Ulbur, feen al-futur.' which translates to
'hero of the (Canal) crossing, where is our breakfast?'
Sadat responded to the demonstrations by announcing
reallocations from the hard currency budget for imports
of essentials like meat, tea, sugar and cheap cotton
fabrics.
"The demands of the rioting crowd, however reflected a
more general malaise than the mere concern over the
rising cost of living. Chanting such slogans as 'Sadat,
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your government are thieves and you are blind', and
'We work full-time and the government robs the country
full-time,' the demonstrating workers and their stu-
dent sympathisers were communicating to the leadership
their disillusionment with the country's entire social
structure. In present day Egypt, and particularly in
Cairo, mass transport, sewage systems, water supplies,
telephone communications, roads, hospitals and similar
services are painfully inadequate. Government and
bureaucratic corruption is rampant, and the gap be-
tween the rich few and the poor masses has, if any-
thing, become greater as a result of the 'liberalisa-
tion measures.'"
4) One thing Egypt does have is a potentially cheap
labor force. Marginalization of the masses is apparent
and a high rate of urbanization is in progress with
resulting low minimum wages.
The one exception from the text above that Egypt has
is that the West's interests in the area are not related
to any resources Egypt might possess but rather in her
strategic importance in the Middle East, both her physical
relationship and the political importance she holds for
the Arab world. Egypt is in debt "up to her ears" and her
growing dependency on the West will provide those countries
with the political leverage and economic "stick" they need
in the Middle East to protect their interests in oil and
maintain some form of equilibrium if not peace there.
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Egypt then is a Third World country that has, through
its desire to develop, accrued a large debt to the Western
world and has progressively become more dependent on the
West.
In this chapter I will show that the M.I.T./C.U. pro-
gram is directly linked to U.S. foreign policy and that the
U.S.A.I.D. has the power to define projects to be tackled.
There is reaction to this by the Egyptian Government. M.I.T.
has been used as a consultant body, presumably because of its
reputation as a highly sophisticated technologically oriented
school, and this is what is needed in Egypt to improve its
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problem definition techniques and research capabilities.
The problem areas, defined by M.I.T., are large and some
background to the housing situation is included to illustrate
this. The M.I.T./C.U. program, started in December 1977,
has uncovered program complications, some general to all
projects, others specific to a particular project as is
illustrated with the Housing and Construction project. These
complications suggest the complexity of the interrelationships
between the three main actors, donor (the U.S.A.I.D.), the
receiver (Egypt) and the consultant (M.I.T.). For comparison
purposes another housing program being carried out in Egypt
through aid is briefly discussed. It is shown that the two
projects, dealing with Egypt's housing problem have a differ-
ence in approach.
Throughout the chapter two main factors become apparent:
(a) that the M.I.T./C.U. program supports the aid donor's
objective of increasing Western influence over Egypt at many
levels. (b) That there is some doubt, due to the complications
within the M.I.T./C.U. program, as to the true value of the
program and its projects to Egypt. In conclusion then the
consultant's role is examined in depth with reference to the
PI.I.T./C.U. program to reinforce this doubt.
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REFERENCE: Various quotes
and basis for this text
come from The Cost Reim-
bursement Contract with
Education Institution
N. NE-C-1291 December 15,
1977, between M.I.T. and
U.S.A.I.D.
Sadat's "open door" policy (Infitah) in the aftermath
of the 1973 October War had two proclaimed aims. One
political and the other economic. Rapproachment with the
U.S.A. was supposed to permit a rapid solution of the Arab/
Israel conflict, and by the same token extract Egypt from its
state of war. Egypt also was to abandon the path of Nasser-
ite "socialism" and take that of an openly capitalist devel-
opment. With the move towards peace between Egypt and Israel
and the restructuring of foreign policy, aid started to flow
into Egypt. The M.I.T./C.U. program is part of that flow of aid.
2W oi1 Trii M IT IJ xii P1iGA3L
It is clear that this program is directly linked to
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It is stated in the
contract that.. ."Egypt as the traditional leader of the
Arab World, is the lynchpin in the U.S. diplomatic effort
to structure a stable peace in the Middle East." This
program makes up approximately 5% of the total U.S.A.I.D.
loan to Egypt, negotiated in 1975, and is therefore only
one part of a larger program with the same objective. It
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has been discussed in Chapter One that the conditions
attached to the overall loan are real and form a standard
pattern in U.S. aid to the Third World. These conditions
are not apparent within the M.I.T./C.U. program at first
glance, but it will be shown that the program reinforces
them.
In the opening discussions in early 1974 the U.S.
Treasury Secretary Simon found a.. ."lack of array of accept-
able projects for financing" and with the followup in
November 1974 of the investigation by the U.S.A.I.D./
Treasury Team it was established that what Egypt needed was
the ability to define "acceptable projects" and that it was
weak in research capability and project definition. The
focus was to be process oriented and the product while
important was not to be the only concern. The U.S.A.I.D.
identified the agencies responsible for the execution and
administration of development programs as the individual
Ministries in the Egyptian Government. Any program then was
to be aimed at upgrading the Ministries capabilities in
project definition and evaluation and because U.S.A.I.D.
considered that.. ."numerous advances (had) been made in the
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NOTE: I have no proof of
this personal contact but
two interviewees suggested
it was possible.
NOTE: The U.S.A.I.D. list
categories were (a) Energy,
(b) Public Works (Building
methodologies and procedures for economic evaluation of
development projects, and in several disciplines that focus
on the transfer and adaptation of technology to developing
regions...." it was obvious that U.S. expertise was to be
included. The U.S.S.R. had provided economic as well as
military aid to Egypt in the past but these projects were
mostly "turnkey" operations and did not require the abili-
ties of project evaluation and definition on the part of
the Ministries involved. Nasser had also limited the power
of the Ministries during his leadership.
Because this program had to deal with teaching and
process building as well as actual projects and because of
M.I.T.'s record and experience with projects in the Third
World it is understandable that M.I.T. was approached for
consultant services. The fact that individuals at M.I.T.
had personal contact with the U.S.A.I.D. presumably assist-
ed in the structuring and negotiations over the contract
that was signed in December 1977. Cairo University was to
be used as the local foundation for research development.
The first task was to define a number of projects under
the main program within fixed areas as described by the
materials, Housing, Trans-
port), (c) Water resources,
(d) Manufacturing, (e) Eco-
nomic Assessments, (f) De-
mographic and manpower
studies, (g) Communication,
education and health.
NOTE: Diagram 1 illustrates
the overall structure of
the program over time (see
next page).
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U.S.A.I.D. M.I.T. carried this task out making sure that it
had the required expertise, that the Ministries were inter-
ested in and concerned about the area of study and that
Cairo University had the back up facilities. Thirteen pro-
ject areas were defined (see Appendix A) and work began in
1978. The contract is between U.S.A.I.D. and M.I.T. and
Cairo University became a third party subcontracted to
M.I.T. The contract has been renewed three times and the
latest development shifts most of the administration of
the program to Cairo University. In parallel, program
monitoring has been moved from U.S.A.I.D. in Washington to
its offices in Cairo.
The program is to continue for five years (starting
December 1977) at which time it is envisaged that an
institute of research will be in place at Cairo University.
U.S.A.I.D. funding will then stop and the institute will
be required to fund its own work. Three scenarios for the
future of M.I.T. as related to this institute are (a) either
M.I.T. drops out of the program altogether, or (b) the
contract is renewed for a further number of years, but not
necessarily carrying all 13 projects, or (c) the most
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REFERENCE: Issues, as de-
fined in Immediate Action
Proposals for Housing in
Egypt, the Joint Housing
Team, June 1976.
NOTE: Some of these issues
deal with world-wide pro-
blems. It is difficult to
understand how Egypt is
supposed to be able to
solve the problems surround-
ing the issues by itself.
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favored by the Technical Adaptation Program at M.I.T., that
the institute, now in charge of its development will con-
tinue to use M.I.T. expertise within special contracts in
particular programs.
Of the 13 projects, focus will be placed on the project
dealing with the Housing and Construction development in Egypt.
Before describing this project a brief outline of the
basic issues facing Egypt should be discussed. There is a
complex set of interlinking factors which distract from Egypt's
development potential. These have to be tackled if Egypt
wishes to progress into the sphere of Western development.
The U.S.A.I.D. defines the most critical as follows:
(a) An increasing deficit in balance of payments has to
be turned around.
(b) Slow growth of domestic product has to be improved.
(c) The large foreign debt service and consequent debt
service charges and lack of foreign exchange have to be
dealt with.
(d) The skyrocketing cost of living subsidies, due to
world-wide increase in food prices has to be steadied.
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(e) Inflation (29% in 1975) has to be reduced.
(f) The skew income distribution has to be flattened out.
The average income per capita is approximately U.S.
$250.00 with the top 10% earning over U.S.$1600 and
40% below $200.00.
(g) Attention has to be payed to the massive increase in
urban population. The national growth average of
2.5% can be compared with an urban population growth
of 3.6% (and in Cairo 4%) with 40% of the population
urbanized.
(h) Item (g) results in a series of urban problems that
have to be tackled. There is a chronic shortage of
housing and building materials and service infra-
structures are being overloaded and breaking down.
Water, sewerage and garbage disposal, electricty and
transportation requirements all need attention.
(i) Population location causes conflicts of land use for
major urban and farming expansion. Most Egyptians,
both urban and rural, live in a tight band of land
along the edges of the Nile. They cannot live in the
nine-tenths of Egypt which is desert.
99
E-'(;3'YPT
o 50 t00 150 ZOO
MAILE5
o 50 100 200 300
-~ KOA&Eflefz5
DIACRFCAAA 5
P (P1
I )Ikr11U I.",lljo
IDIACRAMATC
LOW DE14SrIT.
REFERENCE: Joint Report.
Housing and Community Up-
grading for Low Income
Egyptians, Draft May 1977
Ministry of Housing and Re-
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(j) And a set of legislative controls have to be changed
which at present tend to retard rather than assist
most areas of development.
A set of short term goals as well as long term strat-
egies are required in Egypt both for political reasons for
the power elite and for alleviation of the population from
the problems that are approaching the critical level. The
M.I.T./C.U. program does not attempt to tackle all these
problems, nor define which are the most critical but simply
carries out projects around which they have the expertise,
and focus on the process of problem definition and evalua-
tion.
2.1.1 THE HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECT WITHIN THE
M.I.T./C.U. PROGRAM
The Situation at Present.
There is an estimated present need for 1.5 million
housing units in the urban areas of Egypt. It is likely
this will double in the next ten years. While the people
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construction, U.S.AI.D.
and F.C.H.
of Egypt have experienced major advances in their living
standards over the last 15 years many problems still remain
such as, high rate of population increase, rapid urbaniza-
tion, and a low level of income among large numbers of
people. The economy has been heavily burned by the cost-
ly military confrontations of the past decade, hopefully
now to be reduced. One of the major challenges at present
is the need to provide shelter and opportunities for
advancement for its growing urban population. The poorest
families spend 20% of their income on rents, twice that
of the middle income group and a large floating population,
not included in the above figures, probably spend more on
shelter. Their cost of shelter per m2 is higher than that
of the middle income group. The informal sector accounts for
over half of the current construction activity. Taking Cairo
as an example it is not surprising to find that the housing
problem is especially severe here. In 1970 only 44% of
buildings in the Greater Cairo region were connected to
public or private sewerage systems. Water served 50% of
the buildings. Over 40% of buildings were not connected to
any electricity network. Health services were poor, one
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general clinic for every 180,000 people, and recreation
facilities are scarce. Add to this rising land values,
encroachment on agricultural land, imbalance in the dis-
tribution of housing and employment, traffic conjestion,
supply of public housing outstripped by demand, mounting
densities, overcrowding and the proliferation of uncontrol-
led settlements (housing some 300,000 people per year) and
one has some understanding of the breadth of the problem.
These problems have been growing over a period of time and
the Egyptian Government has already made several attempts
at aleviating them. By introducing rent control, housing
inflation was to be controlled and a demonstration of the
governments egaliterian objectives was given. Rent was
just to cover original costs, but this was 20 years ago.
More recent construction had its rents rolled back to the
original rates and therefore over time incentives for new
housing diminished. This in turn created a demand with
little or no supply of housing. "Key money" has become
the practice, more regressive than market rents would be and
resulting in a horizontal inequity, poor housing maintenance
and slow turnover in the housing stock. In an attempt to
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deal with the rising costs of housing, fixed rents and trade
deficits, the government set prices and allocation of build-
ing materials. The prices were fixed below the international
level. The reaction was the development of a black market
in building materials with costs higher than international
levels and bribing and corruption for allocations. Fearing
a further reduction in private housing supply (which was
correctly founded) the government instigated a large scale
public housing program, taking advantage of the possibility
to improve the average quality of existing housing with the
result that even with huge subsidization, housing at this
level was far too expensive for the poor.
With the assistance of economic development experts
Egypt has now set itself a goal directed at a fast economic
recovery and growth through a massive reconstruction and
development program. Five objectives have been defined:
(1) rapid recovery from the physical damages sustained in
the Suez Canal region during the 1967 and 1973 wars.
(2) diversion of population settlements from the crowded
cities of Cairo and Alexandria, and the arrest of encroach-
ment of urban growth into agricultural lands by developments
REFERENCE: Progress Report
Volume II, December-August
1978, M.I.T. Technology
Adaptation Program, Housing
and Construction project IV.
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in the Suez Canal area, the coastal zones of the western and
eastern deserts, the Sinai Pennisula, and the development of
up to five satellite cities around Cairo.
(3) the development of massive desert reclaimation projects
for agro-industrial operations.
(4) the upgrading of the long neglected infrastructure system,
particularly in the cities of Cairo and Alexandria.
(5) to develop the construction industry, through industrial-
ization of the building sector and development of the con-
struction materials industry to meet the increasing demands
of the domestic market, and eventually to produce surplus
material for export.
The Project Outline
The M.I.T./C.U. program (Housing and Construction pro-
ject) defined three subprojects, only one of which consid-
ered the plight of the poor directly.
1. STUDYOF INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, PUBLIC POLICY AND ECO-
NOMICS OF HOUSING.
"The Housing Economy Subproject has been developing a
working simulation model of the Egyptian housing
economy in order to study a range of policy issues
of long range interest to the Ministries of Housing
and New Communities."
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"The relative roles of the public and private sectors
in housing and construction are of particular interest,
in terms of how to encourage the private sector's
development and increase its contribution to the
industry in line with Egypt's need for increased con-
struction capacity. The long-term goal, then, is to
develop specific and detailed recommendations entail-
ing significant structural suggestions for change,
identification of mechanisms for their achievement,
and evaluation of their impacts on overall industry
operations.
"The research was further extended as a result of the
seminar on 'Development of New Approaches to Housing
Policy and Production in Egypt', held in Cairo 21-24
January 1978, where the importance of organization
and management was stressed. It was thus decided to
include studies and investigations on actual practices
of organization and on potential opportunities for
the application of modern management tools and tech-
niques to raise productivity in the traditional, pre-
fabrication and informal types of building.
"The original plan was to start the study in one of
the eleven prefabricated houses companies, and the
Helwan Company was selected. But because of the de-
lays in the operation of the Company, it was thought
that undertaking the study on the traditional sector
could be more useful. The development of methods,
specifications and measurements in the traditional
sector of building could lead to suggestions for
adaptations in the prefabricated products and com-
ponents in order to help the introduction of more
mechanization and standardization to both the tradi-
tional and informal sectors of building. Furthermore,
economies of cost and time of building could be
achieved by cutting down the range and variety of
designs and specifications of units and components
produced, Thus, the advantages of tools like simpli-
fication, standardization and specialization could
be of benefit."
REFERENCE: Ibid.
2. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS AND DESIGN NORMS: PRE-
FABRICATION.
The initial aim was to evaluate the effectiveness and
production capacity of the prefabrication factories
imported to Egypt. For the reasons discussed above
this has been shifted to work on "minimum" standards
and norms, now conceived as trade-off functions and
the "prefabrication" team has developed a set of
proposals for a basic "support" system, along with
suggestions for modular coordination and simplific-
ation of precast elements, based on the "Dunstone
Formula" and the 10-20 cm tartan grid system developed
by Professor N.J. Habraken's Stichting Architecten
Research (SAR) methodology. The methodology does not
aim at the "design" of specific plan solutions or
"minimum" layouts, but provides dwelling "sites" of
specific spatial and modular capacity to accommodate
clearly defined ranges of variations of plans and
layouts.
3. HOUSING FOR THE LOW INCOME AND INFORMAL SECTOR.
"This research is directed toward development of
alternative physical planning models to replace
existing public housing practices. The 'informal
development' process is the primary basis for devel-
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opment of compact, urban models, but the investi-
gation also includes the appropriate involvement
of the private sector. Focus is on the physical
planning (site development, utilities, and dwel-
lings), but the research includes other directly
related aspects which are being prepared by sep-
arate 'expertise groups': alternative materials
and construction techniques, user needs, institutional/
organizational parameters and economic impact of
proposed alternative housing policies."
2cl.2 PROBLEM AREAS WITHIN THE OVERALL PROGRAM AREA
Through a series of interviews with various members of the
program team and the use of a structured questionnair I have
been able to isolate out some problem areas. The questionnaire
and the responses are reproduced in full in Appendix C. In
the following sections reference will only be made to specific
questions which can be followed up by reference to this Appen-
dix. The Housing and Construction project has also contributed
to this questionnaire and many of the problems apply to them as
well as other project areas. A more detailed evaluation of the
Housing and Construction project follows the general areas of
concern.
Formal interviews were held with:
Dr. N. John Habraken (Housing and Construction)
Dr. William Wheaton (Housing and Construction)
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Dr. Ralph Gakenheimer (Urban Transportation)
Dr. Martin Weitzman (Energy)
Dr. Peter Eagleson (Water Resource Planning)
Professor Suzane Berger (Small Scale Industry)
NOTE: All questions and
answers referred to ir the
text are included in
Appendix C.
These interviews were preceeded with and followed by
informal discussions with Habraken, Wheaton and Gakenheimer.
Other informal interviews were held with Dr. Fred Moaven-
zadeh (Steering Committee Director), Kevin O'Toole (T.A.P.,
M.I.T.), Carol Van Aken (O.S.P., M.I.T.), and Nezar Al
Sayyad (Research Assistant).
The issues which surfaced can be summerized as follows.
(A) Questionable response of the Egyptian Government to
the program.
From the answers to Question 18 various team
members are aware of some resistance to the program
by the Egyptian Government. Question 14 indicates
that Cairo University must also be aware of this.
Question 15 reaffirms it "There is some resistance
to the research" (response 2). It is also apparent
that in the Progress Report, November 1978 while most
REFERENCE: Immediate Ac-
tion Proposals for Housing
in Egypt, June 1976, The
Joint Housing Team, page
xvi.
NOTE: Objectives (2) and
(3) deal with the formu-
lation of an Institute of
project teams consider their relationships with the
various Ministries as excellent a few have suggested
that there is room for improvement. It is possible
that this resentment has its origins in the relation-
ship between the U.S.A.I.D. and the Egyptian Govern-
ment. U.S.A.I.D. clearly stated that they were not in
favor of supporting a "New Towns" policy of President
Sadat. In terms of the actual M.I.T./C.U. program,
there are no immediate results or actions to be taken
which would demostrate to the Egyptian people that
progress is being made. Something the Egyptian
Government had hoped for, especially in the light of
the publicity given to the "Open door" policy with
headlines in the government controlled newspaper like
"Dollar Knocking on Egypt's Door."
(B) The Team Structure
This breaks down into two areas of criticism. The
first deals with the isolation of the Steering Commit-
tee and the administration of the program (for reach-
ing objectives (2) and (3) see Introduction) from the
rest of the program, and the weak interrelationships
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research in Cairo and improv-
ing the evaluation and de-
finition capabilities of
the Ministries.
between the projects, Dr. Wheaton sees each project
separated out and little attempt has been made at
making inter-project connections to his disappointment.
Drs. Gakenheimer and Habraken are also aware of this
weak linkage in the overall program due in part to
the "individualism" which prevails at M.I.T. (See
also Question 9 response 4). Question 9 indicates
that most people interviewed consider the cross
discipline links and relationships between projects
as satisfactory but Question 3 indicates to me, be-
cause of the varying answers, that other teams are
not concerned about the Steering Committee or other
projects beyond the necessary contacts demanded by
the nature of the problem at hand.
The second team structure problem relates to the
competence of team counterparts at Cairo University.
Question 8 (C), 11 (A) responses 1, 3 and 6 and
Question 12 (A) all indicate that M.I.T. is forced
to accommodate the naivety and partially unsophisti-
cated intellectual abilities of the people
at Cairo University. The product therefore suffers
REFERENCE: Progress Report
Volume 1, November 1978,
M.I.T. Technology Adapta-
tion Program, page 8 illus-
trates this problem.
from a compromise on the part of the M.I.T. expert.
There appears to be little problem within M.I.T.
(Question 12 (B)).
In summary there is, at least for some of the people
interviewed, a lack of overall program and cross team
understanding and spirit with little attempt to
integrate individual projects within the overall
objectives of the program. This does not mean that
these objectives are not being reached. There is also
apparently some frustration with Cairo University
counterparts in their inability to grasp the sophis-
ticated level at which M.I.T. works. This is
illustrated in physical terms by the problem some of
the project areas are having in adapting their models
to Cairo University's computer.
(C) Distance and Data Base
In Question 23 five out of six people interviewed con-
sidered the distance between the two institutions as
a limiting factor on the program. A poor Egyptian
data base also appeared to be a consistent problem
as illustrated by responses 2 and 4 to Question 11 (A).
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(D) Sustained Interest
Two people suggested that there was a possible problem
of sustaining interest at the project level by M.I.T.
members. M.I.T. wants to keep on the move. This is
supported by responses to Question 8 (A) and Dr. Peter
Eagleson's statement that he was now acting in a
supervisory capacity with "other" people carrying out
most of the work.
(E) Open-ended Program Structure
Questions 4, 5 and 6 clearly indicate that project
definition was open-ended, to be controlled and struc-
tured by M.I.T. with input from Cairo and the Minis-
tries. There are two issues which a broadly defined
program might generate. The first is that a particular
project itself might be too loosely defined and there-
fore become unwieldly or too broad for practical pur-
poses. This is evidently not a problem for all teams
since only once in the interviews has anyone referred
to the looseness of the program (Question 11 (A)
response 6). The second issue is that within an open-
ended structure it is extremely probable that a West-
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REFERENCE: Paper presented
at the Construction Poli-
cies and Industrial Build-
ing Systems in the Arab
Countries and Iran, Co.nfer-
ern educated professional will bring to the problem
his/her own experience, Western theory and structure
Western based solutions to that problem to "tighten"
it up. It could be argued that this would happen
anyway but the point here is that if a problem area is
not specifically defined and limited it is more likely
to happen and local factors are less likely to aid
in the structuring of the problem, since the problem
has to be defined before research can start. Whether
the system is flexible enough to allow for refocusing
is now being tested in the Housing and Construction
project.
(F) Two issues not covered in the Questionnaire but require
mention here are; Cultural Differences. It is
obvious that the history, religion, language, arts,
and social norms of a foreign country will have
important impact on any program developed outside that
country.
"Dr. Gidel then concentrated on explaining some of the
characteristics of Islamic-Sharia Law, which is based
on the Koran, and which embodies principles of law,
often quite different from western codices. For
example, according to Sharia Law, no interest is
ence held in Vienna, Aus-
tria, September 1978 by Dr.
G'del. Reported by Dr. E.
Dluhosch in M.I.T./C.U.
T.A.P. Progress Report,
Volume II, December 1977-
August 1978.
REFERENCE: Marie Christine
Aulas' Sadat's Egypt in
The New Left Review, No.
98 (July/August 1976),
page 85.
REFERENCE: Immediate Ac-
tion Proposals for Housing
in Egypt, June 1976 by the
Joint Housing Team, page
xii.
allowed on debts, and there is no time limits on
deeds. There are equally different procedural rules,
e.g., the witness of two Moslems automatically over-
rides that of a Christian, even in the case of legal
documentation."
In the M.I.T./C.U. program this can be illustrated by
the comment from a member of one of the teams, an
Egyptian, that the final report when translated "would
have to be worded slightly differently to make a more
successful impact on the Minister concerned.
Realistic Goals of the Egyptian Government.
I
The
Egyptian Government is guilty of setting extremely
high goals as is illustrated by an attempted growth
rate of 12.6% over five years at the beginning of
the 1976-80 five year plan. This has not been ful-
filled. U.S.A.I.D. however considers a more realistic
goal to be much lower than this.
"The Government of Egypt looks, with some justified
optimism, on the potential of the national economy
in the years ahead. Nonetheless, the growth target
of 6.5 percent real growth in the economy to the
year 2000 must be considered at the top range of
possible performance as there are still many basic
economic problems to be dealt with and, of course,
unforeseen events may occur over such a long time
period."
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REFERENCE: The Cost Reim-
(G) Program Administration Administration plays an
excessively large role in the overall M.I.T./C.U. pro-
gram because two of the three objectives (see Intro-
duction) are concerned with the development of an
institution, and awareness in problem definition and
evaluation capabilities in the Ministries. The projects
only reinforce these goals and are not directly
responsible for their development. This means a large
number of committees and departments are involved in
structuring this aspect of the program
There are over twelve committees, departments and
organizations not counting each Egyptian Ministry or
the individual teams involved which are concerned with
this project. There even is an administrator who
decides what should go where and who should meet who.
It becomes too large for full understanding at the
individual project level. Three people interviewed,
Carol Van Aken, Ralph Gakenheimer and one respondent
(Question 11 (B) response 2) have made reference to the
size of the bureaucracy involved.
The contract sum is made up of U.S. $790,000 and Egypt-
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bursement Contract with
Education Institution, No.
NE-C-1291, December 1977
between M.I.T. and U.S.
A.I.D.
ian Pounds E.P. 433,000. The actual exchange value is
U.S. $5.5 to E.P. 3.3 (as of March 1979) while for the
purposes of this contract a ratio of 1 to 1 is being
used. It must also be noted that as part of the sub-
contract between M.I.T. and Cairo University, Cairo
costs will be paid in E.P.'s presumably to
flow of foreign exchange to Egypt.
Actual cost breakdowns per year (for 1978)
reduce the
are:
NOTE: High costs of the
administration, fellow
visits obviously to U.S.A.
and conferences toEgypt.
Flow of Western knowledge
and know-how reinforced.
Administration Services
Teams (before their own adminis-
tration costs have been taken off)
Visits Fellows Program
Conferences and Seminars
Other
REFERENCE: Progress Report
Volume I, November 1978,
M.I.T. Technology Adap-
tation Program, page 2,
Table I.
2.1.3 PROBLEM AREAS WITHIN THE HOUSING AND CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT
As stated in the contract document it is obvious that
the M.I.T./C.U. program is designed to work indirectly down
to the people of Egypt from the top. This is further re-
inforced by the programs evaluation criteria.
332,000
314,000
98,000
4,000
E.P.
154,400
123,700
5,600
74,400
94,900
433,000
42,000
790,000
There is con-
REFERENCE: Public Policy
and the Economics of Housing,
Professor W. Wheaton and Dr.
Abdul-Mohsen Barrada, page
43.
trol and direction for the established projects but as
indicated from responses to Questions 4, 5 and 6 this lies
within a loose framework in which M.I.T. brings to bare its
own abilities and Western theory. The Housing and Construc-
tion project illustrates this. With response to, and
guidance from the Egyptian Ministry involved it has clear-
ly brought a "theory" of space use and the likely construc-
tion methods of prefabrication to join with Egypt's interest
in prefabrication and indirectly, its New Towns policy.
The Egyptian Government, despite the high costs of
capital required, lower cost of its labor structure, and
the scarcity of foreign exchange, in 1975 signed contracts
with eleven prefrabrication housing firms from Western and
Eastern Europe. Each firm was to deliver and erect a pre-
fabricated housing plant with capacities that varied from
one to two thousand units annually. Some prototypes have
been produced but none of the factories have yet been put
into full operation. The high cost of prefabrication be-
ing the main limiting factor. This has been proven by
Professor Wheaton (within the assumption that the model used
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REFERENCE: Ibid, page 5.
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is a relatively accurate reflection of conditions in Egypt).
"Conclusions
(1) The total cost per m2 of floor space in a four
story walk-up apartment, using 1978 market prices,
varies between three building systems roughly
as shown:
Conventional load-bearing 61LE
Conventional skeleton 67LE
Large panel prefabrication 84LE
(2) The large panel prefabrication system has the
highest usage of cement and steel, while the
load-bearing method has the least. In terms of
wood and brick usage, the ranking is exactly
the reverse. In both cases, conventional
skeleton construction is the middle. The dif-
ference in total costs, between prefabrication
and conventional skeleton, breaks down as
follows:
Material costs +6LE
Labor costs +3LE
Plant capital costs +8LE
Total 18LE
(3) These results are reasonably sensitive to the
particular input prices used. If the calculations
are done with official Government materials prices
then the material cost differential above approx-
imately disappears. Similarly, if the current
Government discount rate of 8% is used, the cost
of plant capital in prefabrication will be half
of the value above (which is based on estimates
of the true opportunity cost of capital).
(4) These results run contrary to the conventional
wisdom that prefabrication substitutes captial
for labor. This wisdom is based on the assumption
that factory labor is generally less expensive
than the site of labor of conventional construc-
6
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tion. In Egypt, the site labor displaced by the
large panel prefabrication system is the least
skilled, while factory labor is relatively more
highly skilled.
(5) Based on the tenative conclusions, the wisdom of
proceeding in the large panel prefabrication has
to be questioned. Even if the plant and equip-
ment costs are regarded as sunk, the variable
costs of prefabrication (labor, materials) appear
substantially higher than conventional systems."
The Egyptian government has been aware of the need to
subsidize these factories but at the rates required to make
this industry viable it would again be stretching its re-
sources as with its own previous housing program.
REFERENCE: Progress Report "The Information concerning the organizational inte-
Volume II, December-August gration of the factories within the overall struc-
1978, M.I.T. Technology ture of the building industry in Egypt is not only
Adaptation Program, Housing ambiguous, but currently undecided.
and Construction Project IV.
"Currently, 9 of the 11 factories are nominally public
sector companies, and 2 are 'independent,' but never-
theless supported by government loans and subsidies
(Prefabricated Houses Co. and Rolan Co.). All
factories are also nominally 'independent' in that
they are expected to find their own markets for their
products, their own clients, and their own sites.
In view of the past European and North American
experience, large scale prefabrication of housing has
been effective only where:
a) The government(s) have provided capital (loans
and/or subsidies) for plant and equipment. This
condition has been met in Egypt.
b) Assured the plants of continuous large series
production runs by providing prepared sites and
projects to absorb production.
REFERENCE: Joint Report,
Housing and Community Up-
grading for Low Income Egypt-
ians, Draft May 1977, Min-
istry of Housing and Re-
construction, U.S.A.I.D.,
and F.C.H. page 2.
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"The policy of 'independence' does not provide such
an assurance of continuity of quantity production. On
the other hand, there is a tacit understanding between
the government and the factories that when sites will
become available, the factories will have an opportunity
to bid on large-scale housing projects, or to enter
into contractual, fixed-cost agreements for a given
number of units for a given site.
"However, based on discussions with the developers of
Sadat City, no large-scale prefabrication of five-
story dwellings (the standard product of all the
eleven factories now installed in Egypt) for this new
town is anticipated. Since Sadat City is high on the
list of priorities for immediate implementation, and
since at least 6 of the eleven factories are ready to
assume full production, it is of more than academic
interest where the output will eventually be allocated."
Added to this are the interest groups involved in con-
struction and building materials, supply and manufacture,
aware that a sophisticated construction industry will
guarantee them work.
The U.S.A.I.D. has indicated the need for a broad
approach to the housing and construction industry, working
at both levels, government and with the people. However, major
emphasis was placed on the situation of the poorer people
in Egypt.
"During March and April 1976 A.I.D. funded a group
of U.S. housing consultants which visited Egypt and
worked jointly with Egyptian housing officials from
the M.O.H.R. producing a report published in June
1976 titled 'Immediate Action Proposals for Housing
in Egypt'.
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"The report made major recommendations for shifting
attention from middle and upper income housing to
new programs directed at lower income groups. It
was well received in Egypt and by A.I.D. The major
recommendations of the 1976 report included (1) re-
ducing the average cost of housing units by reducing
the average size and improving design and construction
techniques; (2) increasing the recovery of housing
funds from completed dwelling units and reducing
subsidies; (3) encouraging the private sector to play
a larger role in housing production including mobil-
ization of finance for housing, increasing production
of building materials, and phasing out rent controls;
(4) developing new emergency programs to focus on the
the needs of lowest income families who cannot afford
regular housing programs; (5) continuing emphasis on
training of skilled labor; (6) developing an operation-
al land policy and procedures to reduce speculation
and control costs; (7) developing an overall housing
policy setting the framework for future projects."
This was followed up by the Joint Report, Housing and
Community Upgrading for Low Income Egyptians, Draft May 1977
by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, U.S.A.I.D.
and F.C.H. which states its main objectives as identifying
potential demonstration projects which would illustrate new
approaches to providing shelter and community services for
low income Egyptians in urban areas.
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NOTE: Remembering the high
costs involved in prefabric-
ation.
REFERENCE: Progress Report
Volume I, November 1978,
M.I.T. Technology Adapta-
tion Program, page 15 and 16
The problems and restrictions of prefabrication and
the attempt at integrating these with the S.A.R. method
bridge all three subprojects. It is the common thread
throughout the project. The problem then seems to be "if
you have a prefabrication policy and are reluctant to give
it up what is the most preferred way of moving towards
solving the housing problem in Egypt." It appears unlikely
that the M.I.T./C.U. Housing and Construction project will
conclude that prefabrication; with the cost problems, with
the need for the prefabrication industry to standardize
products thus avoiding the present inflexibility in their
methods; with low user participation in developing these
prefab parts, and a supportive government involvement, should
in fact be shelved.
To futher complicate the present situation there has
been a development within the Egyptian Government which has
caused setbacks for this M.I.T. team.
"Relations with Ministries
Establishing strong working relations with the
appropiate ministries has been the goal throughout
the research. Particularly the attempt is to
directly involve ministry personnel instead of
them just being advisors to the research. Strong
ties have been made with the Ministries of Housing
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and Reconstruction (now split into two separate
ministries), Planning, and the General Organization
for Physical Planning. However, recent personnel
changes may require re-establishment of relations
in some instances. The longer term duration of the
project has allowed a more productive collaborative
effort.
"Difficulties Encountered:
A primary difficulty throughout has been the lack
of continuity in the ministries, particularly in
the top positions. The problem of rapid turnover
of personnel and reorganization is a problem en-
countered in many countries, but nonetheless, it
leads to shifts in government policies and an
inability to develop longer term strategies and
research schedules."
Two further complications must be added to the list of
problems facing this project. The first, possibly obvious
for a Third World country, but also due to the Western
methods of problem solutions, is poor data base. All teams
on the various projects had data base problems of some kind.
In the Housing and Construction project they chose to
supplement available data with a new survey on which some
statistical analysis was based. It has been suggested by
one of the team members that this new data is no better
than the existing. The second factor, influencing to some
degree the progress of the program,is the fact that insti-
tutional jobs are sought after by local professionals be-
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cause of the stability and security they offer. They do not
pay well but they are frequently used as a base source of
income and private "outside" work is carried out to supple-
ment incomes. Recent history in Egypt, mainly during
Nasser's leadership, weakened the private sector considerably.
The government is responsible for over 50% of the G.N.P.
at present. The West now clearly wants a reduction in big
government allowing the private sector to grow, foreign
investment to flow into Egypt and a freer market economy to
be created. This does have repercussions amongst the small
group of professionals. Presumably job opportunities will
grow in the private sector and either the institutions will
lose professionals or the "private" workload will increase,
further reducing their time commitments to the institution
and its own work.
In summary, the Housing and Construction project has
concentrated its efforts to reinforce the Egyptian Govern-
ments interests in prefabrication rather than focus all its
efforts on assisting the low income family's need for housing.
It has retained close ties with the Ministries involved
(which have recently changed) and used sophisticated, West-
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ern methods for interpreting the status quo and set-
ting up models for impact of future policy decisions. In
the process it has built up research capabilities at Cairo
University. It is fulfilling the requirements of the pro-
gram as set out in the three main objectives (see Intro-
duction) but has surfaced a major question about the
efficiency of using prefabrication to solve the housing
problem.
r0
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Development within the Third World does not follow the
West's historicalgrowth patterns. It is occurring in a
different time and place and in a vastly different social
and economic environment. The question to ask is whether
consultants can be of use to the Third World given the
radical differences in the economic structure, political
and social objectives and the cultural development between
the two. Is Western professional skill parochial and there-
fore misleading and mostly irrelevant to developing coun-
tries? The consultant is responsible for the nature and
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type of technology transfer required in his solution. This
transfer of information and aid includes diagnostic and
decision making techniques. To be able to understand these
he must cushion them within his scope of Western knowledge
gained. The techniques, economic, spatial, social, organ-
izational, and even surveying and data gathering require
a base of procedural definition, gained in the West. The
production, testing and monitoring responsibilities for
program evaluation are also Western, and rightly so since
it is their money and skills being used. There is not much
room, either in time or abilities on the part of the con-
sultant, to evaluate
spective what should
all. It is all part
of which lies in the
pants, aid receiving
The M.I.T./C.U.
tion, has surfaced a
technical institute.
from the developing countries' per-
be done before anything is done at
of a dynamic relationship, the start
histories of the respective partici-
countries, aid donors and consultants.
program section, Housing and Construc-
problem. M.I.T. is a world renowned
It is therefore not surprising that
this project has made use of a highly developed set of
technical skills and Western founded theory biased towards
prefabrication in its approach to its objectives. The use
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of sophisticated computer modeling and programs and a de-
tailed method (S.A.R.) of defining space norms and use have
been practiced. The project has also been supportive of
the Egyptian Government's desire to develop an industrial-
ized process for housing and its interest and development
of New Towns. This support is bound up in its mandate to
develop research capabilities in Egypt and to develop
procedural methods and evaluation know-how at Ministry
levels. This has brought the project into conflict with
one of its objectives, housing the poor. The circumstances
and skills of the team seemed to have shifted the project
away from the real problem in Egypt. This does not mean
that progress has not been made. They have managed to pro-
duce a model for purposes of testing policy decisions on
the housing market. They have evaluated the cost differ-
entials between different construction methods. They have
advised in the methods required to improve the supply of
building materials. They have defined a set of space norms
that can be used by both site and services and completed
housing projects. But they are not able to concentrate
all their efforts on housing from "outside" the technical
world.
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REFERENCE: Public Policy
and the Economics of Housing
Professor W. Wheaton and
Dr. Abul-Mohsen Barrada,
page 11.
DEFINITION: G.A.D.E. =
Gulf Authority formed for
the Development of Egypt.
NOTE: For background to
aid organizations see
Appendix E.
"It seems clear that any centrally planned system of
price and quantity allocations which runs contrary
to individual interests, will require some form of
enforcement. Individuals on their own accord will
exchange commodities and achieve arbitrage unless
the expected gains from this activity (relative to
the official resource allocation) are less than the
costs of some imposed sanctions."
This project is not the only aid program in progress
in Egypt. Aid loans and projects have been supplied by
the I.M.F., the World Bank, G.A.D.E., and from many organ-
izations in Europe and the U.S.A. The World Bank (I.B.R.D.)
alone has six projects in Egypt with four of these dealing
with urban problems and two dealing with low cost housing.
U.S.A.I.D. also has a series of programs in Egypt, one of
which deals directly with low cost housing for the poor.
2.2.1 THE U.S. AID FOR HOUSING AND COMMUNITY UPGRADING
FOR LOW INCOME EGYPTIANS.
The main objective described in the text above is to
identify potential demonstration projects which would
illustrate new approaches to providing shelter and community
services for low income Egyptians in urban areas. This
program is based on the initial report published in June
1976 titled "Immediate Action Proposals for Housing in
Egypt" (before the M.I.T./C.U. program was started) and was
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produced by a joint team of the M.O.H.R. and a group of
U.S. housing consultants.
"It can be concluded that the national context within
which housing policy must be formulated is greatly
constrained. The existing housing deficit of 1.5
million dwelling units is enormous. Population growth
will create the demand for an additional 1.6 million
dwelling units by the year 2000. The economy, al-
though improving, cannot support the level of housing
investment which can materially overcome the shortage
or even keep up with the new demand in spite of the
high priority given housing. The national urban
strategy, while correct in concept, will be too time
consuming and costly to meet needs in the short run.
Therefore, the continued growth of existing centers
and particularly Cairo is inevitable.
"There are no simple solutions for these problems.
Housing will be an acute problem in Egypt, as in most
countries of the world, throughout the remainder of
this century. In the chapters which follow, the
housing problem is analyzed and a series of recommend-
ations are made which are aimed at optimizing the use
of public and private resources in housing and in
minimizing the human misery and hardships faced by
the low-income people who are least equipped to com-
pete for the scarce housing resources that are
available."
Several steps were taken by the Egyptian Government as
a result of the initial report.
(a) The budget for housing has remained high.
(b) A low-cost housing fund was established.
(c) Conversion of rental public housing units to
ownership on a lease-purchase arrangement has
REFERENCE: Joint Report,
Housing and Community Up-
grading for Low Income
Egyptians, Draft May 1977,
The Ministry of Housing and
Reconstruction, U.S.A.I.D.
and F.C.H., page 56 and 57.
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been started.
(d) And revision of the building code was made to
improve design and allowing the use of new
materials but not increase the cost of housing.
The new report, produced in May 1977, defines its
recommendations within the demonstration projects as follows;
(a) Upgrading of existing "informal (squatter) settle-
ments."
(b) Upgrading and rehabilitation in central Cairo.
(c) And the Development of a "growth pole" project
in Minia or Qena in upper Egypt.
"In search of better ways to use the resources that
are available, many governments are now taking a
closer look at the positive aspects of the unauthor-
ized self-help construction taking place in marginal
areas. It is recognized that many of the houses con-
structed by families in marginal areas without outside
help do meet the minimum standards of their occupants.
Even the worst shack of scrap lumber and tin represents
some investment of money and labor on the part of its
owners and provides some shelter. The total number
of dwelling units produced in this way far surpasses
those produced by government housing programs. In
several countries, programs are now being developed
which seek to capitalize on the initiative of these
families in trying to solve their own housing prob-
lems. Priorities are shifting from the construction
of traditional standard housing with relatively high
standards, serving only a few, to programs of en-
couraging and controlling the private construction
efforts of families living in marginal areas. There
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is also a growing interest in site-and-service pro-
grams to prevent the development of new uncontrolled
settlements.
"There is a feeling that government efforts should be
concentrated on things that cannot be done by private
individuals and groups, such as land acquisition,
overall planning and control, provision of community
services, assistance in providing credit for housing
and encouragement of job training and job-producing
activities.
"The demonstration projects described in this chapter
would allow testing of a number of ideas developed by
the joint teams. The informal construction process
... (is) already making an important contribution to
housing thousands of low and middle income Egyptians.
The demonstration upgrading projects would seek to
control and improve this process which already in-
volves a maximum self-help effort by the residents
and requires a minimum input of government financial
and technical resources,
"The new community project in the Helwan area would
demonstrate techniques for the construction of new
housing designed to fit the economic capacity of low-
er income families while allowing for gradual expansion
and improvement over time, and as their incomes in-
crease.
"The upgrading project in old (Gamalia) Cairo could
lead to a city-wide rehabilitation program in the
future. The purpose would be to demonstrate that the
upgrading process is a better approach to problem
solving in older areas of Cairo than the demolition
and reconstruction approach. The upgrading process
should retain and enhance the positive, traditional
character of the area while correcting the negative
aspects, such as overcrowding, deterioration, con-
gestion and poor sanitation.
"....During the project design phase each area would
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be studied in detail to determine real needs and
priorities of the residents. Cost estimates would
be prepared, and time phased implementation plans
would be developed."
The project components are made up of,social and
economic factors, the neighborhood, health, employment,
programs for women, credit facilities, university and
community development, community participation and organ-
ization, and design and construction considerations.
Which is the better program is not to be evaluated
here. That is a thesis in itself. It is true, if the low-
cost housing program proceeds, that in the short run the
low income people of Egypt will benefit the most. But if
Egypt gets its economic growth moving at a high rate, in
the long term it might well be that the government housing
program will, in developing policy and an industrialized
building method, provide a more enduring and better stand-
ard of housing for all Egyptians. It is obvious that the
two programs discussed here have differences of approach,
of purpose and that the end products are different. The
consultants involved with these two programs have, by their
approach to the problem, developed vastly differing atti-
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tudes to tackling the same problem.
).5 T'lIJ EFFICIN(N AND
JS FJLN1ESS OF
C(NSI1]ANTS
2.3.1 THE NEED FOR THE CONSULTANT
The West, through the use of aid, wishes to influence
the Third World structure to the West's own ends. It will
attempt this influence at both the top level, the govern-
ment, and with the people if possible. Along with aid
agreements is the understanding that because of a donor's
experience it knows what and who will best be able to direct
a country towards development. The developing country
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realizes that if it wishes to proceed along this road of
development as quickly as possible, for its own interests,
it must accept this aid with the conditions attached. And
so the need and usefulness of the "expert" is established.
If these experts can obtain the support of the local pro-
fessionals it makes the process easier. Because within the
Third World countries power usually lies in the hands of a
well educated, and often Western educated, elite group, the
elements that constitute client and consultant are close
entities. They are likely to have common goals and educa-
tion, and political and ideological similarities. Add to
this the weak skills of the nationals in higher education
and it is understandable that this elite might easily accept
outside consultants for advice. The donor has defined what
is needed and who shall be used.
Within the structuring of the M.I.T./C.U. program it
has been shown that in Western terms, Egypt needs the skills
of the U.S. consultant. The program was originated around
the U.S.'s perceived need for stability in the Middle East.
By including Cairo University in the process a bond, based
on Western know-how, has been created at the professional
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level between Egypt and M.I.T. (see Question 16 and 17).
Top level government has also been involved since it is
here where part of the development skills are to be develop-
ed. The donor has defined what is needed and who shall be
used.
NOTE: For readings on the
professional and elitism
see Samuel Bowles and Paul
Lawter Edwards in Riech
and Weisskopf's The Capital-
ist System. Also A. Gould-
ner's The Future of Intel-
lectuals and the Rise of
'the New Class.
2.3.2 THE CONSULTANT'S PERSPECTIVE
Having established the need for consultants the donor
organization will encourage the "best" professionals at
home to be used. These agents of knowledge bring with them
a series of factors that reinforce Western attitudes and
thinking. They are first of all an elite group serving
society, and more accurately the leaders of that society.
They are well paid and perform within their range of
skills supposedly unbiased examinations and problem solving
techniques for that society. But they are trained and
practice in the donor country and have as a framework in
which to work a Western oriented one (in the case of the
U.S.A.). The professional within the capitalist world
is interested in profit, experience and self perpetuation.
The consultant while he is performing his professional
136
REFERENCE: The basis for
this text was obtained from
two sections in Ilchman and
Benveniste's Agents of
Change: Professionals in
Developing Countries.
skills and abilities brings with him certain "hidden" roles,
whether he is aware of it or not, which also effect his
client.
A. As an agent of professional knowledge. There is a
degree of causation in the types of solutions or
plans he produces. If "this" is the chosen course
of action, then the solution will require "that"
technology. Or, within time limitations, if "this"
sequence of events should be properly followed then
it will take "that" amount of time to bring about
the desired change or solution. He also causes
stratification between people who assist in implement-
ing change and people who will resist that change.
His training reflects for him how the work is defined
socially, economically, politically, and technically
in those societies in which his profession began and
is developed. This creates the predisposition to
elevate the ends of any strategy and conceive of the
rest of the world in terms of the extent to which it
impedes or facilitates these ends. Barriers are not
appreciated as signals to reassess theory or as feed-
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back, but something to overcome. Added to this is the
preference to accept judgement of the quality of his
work from peer groups and not those who have been
affected by his work. The belief that true profession-
alism is anti-political also sets limitations on his
work and narrows the real range of solutions which
are anyway effected by political forces.
To illustrate further the anti-political connotations
within the professions involved in development, and
the need for political approaches it must be mentioned
that in the 1950's few consultants played any roles
in the government of the developing country. They
were thus able to debate the ideological differences
between approaches and strategies within their work
and theories of development, often being strong
advocates of government ownership and control, and at
the same time equally supportive of unbridled private
enterprise. At the present many more consultants have
influence in policy structure and decision making
processes. More experience has brought about the
greater pragmatism. Hopefully policies are defined
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as workable before they are considered as ideologic-
ally pure.
B. As an agent of a National Culture. The consultant
draws his definitions of change and his standards of
optimal conditions from the culture in which he
lives. For example, a consultant from the U.S.A.
considers automatically that the private sector is
more efficient than the public sector, that there is
a preference for individual achievement but a capacity
for cooperation in groups, that graft and corruption
have no function in a modern society, that timing
is important, and that personal favors within kin
groups are to be distrusted. Any of these issues
might not be regarded in the same way in a developing,
or any other, country.
C. As an agent of an Organization or Regime. With
respect to the vast amount of variables within his
scope of work but outside his professional control he
seeks a circumstance where these variables are largely
controlled by policy and "clout" or strength. Aid
organizations and the conditions of aid solve some
E. As a specialist
of these while a strong ruling regime will solve
others. It does not mean that the "best" solution
is extremely difficult to define but that certain in-
terest groups have influence over the control of some
of the variables, which in turn leads to compromise.
D. As an agent of a Superior Power. The consultant,
coming from a developed country, is confident that
because he is from a developed country his solutions
are the right ones and that he is technically more
competent than the local technocrats. He has the
right answer before the question is even asked.
E. In industrialized countries of the world, with the
growth in technology and no guarantee of work as was
the case in the colonies, professionals quickly con-
verted their theories into practice and applied tech-
niques and hence specialization. Within disciplines
themselves specialization took place demanding team
structures to deal with more complex situations.
Planning was separated from implementation and in the
Third World, implementing programs of development were
often left up to the respective governments.
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One condition often attached to aid is the required use
of local professionals and training programs. These people
often only perform service functions with the real decisions
being made back "home." The product is also usually pro-
duced back "home" and the trained personnel are in the
end left to deal with the problems of implementation. I
am not suggesting that a particular program does not anti-
cipate implementation problems but that it is up to the
developing country to carry out the solution, and if they
require further assistance in doing this another contract
is to be drawn up, very possibly with a different group
of specialists.
Financing even at program level is constructed to
support the donor country. Expert salaries are to be paid
back "home" and special requirements regarding local
taxes, accommodation, administrative services, etc. are to
be provided. These costs are, of course, included in the
aid grant.
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Within the M.I.T./C.U. program these issues are clear.
Because of the loose framework in which M.I.T. has defined
the projects to be undertaken, Western theories have been
brought to bear on the problems to be solved. Cairo
University has been considered as somewhat naive and there
appears to have been little resistance to project definition
by M.I.T. The Ministries, on the other hand, have defined
the areas of their interests and M.I.T. has built on these.
In the Housing and Construction project it has already been
illustrated that advice has to be implemented by the
Egyptian Government as is illustrated in the case of cement
prices. Those were far below international prices and have
now been raised by the Ministry involved.
Training and contact with local professionals through
the link with Cairo University have been made. While the
university has itself been more active in decision making,
they have also been responsible for data collection and
service functions. The reports are still produced at M.I.T.
while Cairo de-bugs and adjusts programs so they can be
used on that university's computer.
Financing of the project favors the U.S.A. as with all
REFERENCE: G. Benveniste
and W. Ilchman's Agents of
Change: Professionals in
Developing Countries.
U.S.A.I.D. contracts.
The expert then, with a Western background reinforces
the donors influence over the receiving country.
2.3.3 THE NEED FOR TEAMS
"The tradition of professionalism in the modern West--
the accent on technical task as a justification for
exclusive jurisdiction--is pursued by hundreds of
occupations in the rich countries; and indigenous
experts in the underdeveloped nations have themselves
been trained in schools of drawing on this tradition.
The typical professional man--the export product under
discussion here--thus suffers from the familiar limit-
ations of the expert: a 'trained incapacity,' an
intensity of focus that blinds the vision; he is like-
ly to be unaware of the contributions of other experts
(not to mention non-experts) and to be inflexible when
he must apply his skills to new situations and strange
places. So far, specialization, conservatism, and the
device of the mystery combine to make the professional
man irrelevant to the urgent tasks of development in
poor countries."
The scale and nature of development problems in the
Third World have not necessarily changed. It is the aware-
ness of the complexity of these problems that has. It is
now usual within the aid package to include a team of more
than one discipline. Historically it was the economist who
was looked upon as the main actor in development. With the
failure of development economies to fully satisfy the re-
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quirements of growth and the growing complexity in economic
models which attempted to evaluate social and political
forces within this growth it became obvious that a wider
net of disciplines was required to fully understand and
construct the path to development. The alternative was to
avoid the complexities of aid and set highly restrictive
assumptions so as to be able to proceed with models. There
is no indication that "better" results have been reached by
this method and most donor organizations agree that devel-
opment is not an economic problem only. So while it might
be the important base on which all societies are structured
it is the interlinking of the economic base with the social
and political factors in all societies that facilitate the
possibilities of growth. The multidisciplinary team is there-
fore in a far better position to deal with this. It allows
for specialization within a team objective and potentially
provides a greater threshold of relevant knowledge and data
about a particular problem and goal. If the team is work-
ing well it will also have a greater spread of influence
and impact. There is however within the American system
a contradiction between the belief in individualism, a
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cherished social norm, and the self discipline required in
the team. It can manifest itself from disagreement on
relevant theory to petty professional jealousies.
Within the M.I.T./C.U. program the following issues
are clear.
The problem is a broad one and a multidisciplinary team
is required. The projects, structured by M.I.T., do not
necessarily deal with the most critical issues in Egypt.
For example, no project deals with agriculture and all its
related problems. Where the specialized skills do not
exist at M.I.T. neither does the project. Each project is
developed separately and the advantage of crosslinking
projects has to some extent been missed. One project can
"die out" without affecting the others as has actually
happened. Within the Housing and Construction project one
theory has been imposed over the subgroups and a contra-
diction is developing between this theory, its application
to prefabrication, and the realities of the housing problem
in Egypt.
The problem is broad and multidisciplinary teams are
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required, but within these teams and within the overview
function of the Steering Committee, opportunities have been
missed and the disadvantages of teams are apparent.
2.3.4 THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES OF RECEIVING COUNTRIES
The Historical Precedent
Before World War II most developing countries had few
trained personnel in the "Western World" sense. Those that
they did have came out of Europe as colonialists and ad-
ministrators or to complete a particular project. The
colonial administration planned and implemented changes to
the development of these countries bringing with the change
their customs, technology and skills. There was a contin-
uous close coordination between planning and implementation
which later resulted in an acceptance of the role of the
"expert" by the newly formed independent nations of the
Third World. The new countries had, in spite of their
often violent reactions to the colonialists, inherited an
administrative capacity direct from colonial rule in-
fluencing education, health, planning and military devel-
opment, in which the expert was used for both problem de-
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REFERENCE: From United
Nations Manual on the Use
of Consultants in Develop-
ing Countries.
NOTE: Between 1945 and 19-
72 some 1200 national de-
velopment plans had been
elaborated. 125 central
planning offices had been
established (both in de-
veloped and developing coun-
tries). 100 specialized
training centers existed
that provided courses in
National and Regional Plan-
ning. Source: G. Benven-
iste's Agents of Change:
Professionals in Developing
Countries.
fining and the implementation of solutions.
The demand for and use of consultants in developing
countries increased after World War II. In the 1950's
any experience in developing countries was an asset. There
was little practice with development problems or economic
policy and "learning from mistakes" while costly, was
common. Trained economists had only started returning back
to developing countries, and they were few. Government
officials had only begun to shift from administrative to
economic policy structures. The experts were therefore
first used in governments and by larger, more rapidly grow-
ing firms. While the advice from consultants over these
years could be associated with growth and expansion, it
was not anticipated that aid would carry on- indefinitely
into the future. Professional aid advisors were considered
to be a temporary phenomena and no specialization into this
field was immediately apparent. So there were less people
with the skills than needed and more plans with questionable
usefulness. The consultant was both expected to be of use-
ful service to the new countries and treated with suspicion.
From his peers in these countries and administrative
REFERENCE: M. Todar's
Economics for a Developing
World, page 92.
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officials he was often received with indeference and resent-
ment.
By the late 1960's the situation had improved. More
experience was accumulated both within developing countries
and aid organizations. More people had been trained to
deal with development problems and people were more aware
of these problems and their scale. However, there was,
on the part of the developing countries, a weariness and
disillusionment in the abilities of consultants that per-
sists today and they had raised important questions about
the true function of aid.
Institutional and Government Structure
" ...leading university intellectuals, trade unionists,
future high level government economists and other
civil servants all get their training in developed
country institutions where they are unwittingly
served an unhealthy dose of alien concepts and models
camouflaged by excessive sophistication and esoteric
irrelevance. Having little or no really useful know-
ledge to enable them to come to grips in an effective
way with real development problems, they often tend
to become unknowing or reluctant apologists for the
existing system of elitist policies and institutional
structures. In university economics courses, for
example, this typically entails the perpetuation of
the teaching of inappropriate or irrelevant Western
concepts and models, while in government policy
discussion too much emphasis is placed on the notion
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of capital-output ratios, savings and investment
ratios and growth rates of G.N.P. As a result,
desirable institutional and structural reforms...
are neglected or given only cursory attention."
There is often a disagreement between what a Third
World country plans to do with received aid and what the
donor will allow that aid to be used for. This is especial-
ly true if a receiving country has already shown its in-
ability to plan coherently towards growth using realistic
goals. The Third World government usually needs to show
to its people immediate and tangible changes once it has
accepted aid. It needs the support of its intellectuals.
Most aid programs involve long term economic structural
changes which confuse the government and seldom demonstrate
to the people any visible sign of progress. The power
elite also often have to walk the tight rope between major
changes and shifts in policy and social upheaval within
their countries. Aid, because of the many conditions
attached to it, might aggravate social unrest, not avoid it.
Egypt has, within the Housing and Construction project,
attempted to influence the project to include its chosen de-
velopment policy of both Sadat's New Towns and industrial build-
ing development, with no support from U.S.A.I.D. The newly
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formed research institute's first "private" project has been
initiated. It involves the New Towns program. Egypt has
provided little evidence that it can implement a develop-
ment program within realistic goals without Western assis-
tance and advice. And Chapter Two will indicate that Egypt
has a well established ruling elite and that its historic
development allows for the easy accessability of the expert
to a position of power and influence in that country. It
also faces social unrest over particular policy changes as
is illustrated by the riots in 1977 over the removing of
food subsidies.
All issues raised in this chapter have not been fully
resolved. This will be attempted in Chapter Three but the
two main issues; (a) the M.I.T./C.U. program as an exten-
sion of U.S.A.I.D. policy in aid and, (b) the real value of
the consultant need to be summarized here.
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U.S.A.I.D. had, with other donors, set conditions to be
met by the Egyptian Government before any aid was to be
arranged. Egypt fulfilled these requirements and aid contracts
were negotiated (Chapter One). U.S.A.I.D. then defined what
they considered the main problems in Egypt were and structured
a program that would require Western expertise to be carried
out. It also questioned the New Towns policy and Egypt's
desire to industrialize before other developments had taken
place. As one of their programs they then approached M.I.T.
for consulting services and structured this program to include
the interests of the various Ministries, which themselves were
undergoing change in an attempt to reduce government involve-
ment, in Egypt's production abilities. M.I.T. defined project
areas and commenced work on these projects bringing to them
sophisticated techniques and technology transfer. The pro-
blems chosen were complex and multidisciplinary teams were
structured to handle them. Within this arrangement a number
of complications have arisen. They include problems simple
to understand, like poor data bases, and others far more
complex, like cultural differences between client and con-
sultant, or as has surfaced in the Housing and Construction
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project, the dilemma of having to tell your client that his
anticipated solution to part of the housing problem (pre-
fabrication) might not be usable when contemplating housing
for the poor. This, of course, raises other issues, like
what role should the Egyptian Government be playing in the
housing of its people anyway. If we add to these problems
the structural differences between the U.S.A. and Egypt as
discussed previously some doubt as to the eventual useful-
ness of the consultant to Egypt arises. Will the final report
be trivial? One that does not alter any uncertainties. A
statement about future events that will take place anyway,
to be used to confirm a policy already considered as necessary
by Egypt. Will the final report be utopian in the sense that
it describes events that no one expects to see happen and
therefore unlikely to effect behavior or decisions in Egypt?
Will it be an "imperative" product? One that sets out plans
and policies that are mandatory and that require an existing
control structure which has the means of enforcing them.
It should be a useful document. A more reasonable
product in the pragmatic sense setting out policy situations
where existing control is insufficient to implement the plan
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but where it is possible to move toward this state of affairs
with adjustments and agreements by all parties concerned.
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THIF All) T1ITANGxLE
In this chapter I will draw out from Chapters One and
Two the main issues and show how, when considered together,
these make up the "aid triangle." A list of the various
conflicts and differences between the parties follows as
an illustration of how complex these are, and how they
impact on the effectiveness of the consultants work in aid
programs using the M.I.T./C.U. program as an example. I
then follow with a tenative discussion on one possible
scenario for the future of Egypt, in my opinion the most
likely, demonstrating that the confusion and complexity with-
in aid does have possible direction, in this case preparing
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Egypt for its role as a base for multi-national organizations
and also as supportive of Western oriented countries interests
in the Middle East.
5.'1 TJ )E liT TrP MND
DEP 1END)ENCY
3.1.1 THE MACRO SCALE
From Chapter One I have shown that Egypt is dependent
on the West for its development and that this dependency is
tied with its growing debt. A few statistics would prove
this however and so the question of why so much detail is
given should be answered. The attempt to establish how this
came about has led me to understand that it is due to Egypt's
historical development. The first impact of the West taking
place in the 1850's during which time Egypt showed curiosity
and interest rather than dependence on the West. The Suez
Canal and the exploitation of cotton followed and the begin-
nings of dependency were laid in trade and technology tran-
sfer. This, followed by "colonialism," structured an admin-
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istration framework that is still visable today (military
rank, government responsibility for telecommunications, etc.).
Egypt's independence only facilitated the Egyptian elite's
relations with Europe, and Nasser, after the revolution due
to his foreign policy and desire to industrialize only shift-
ed the source of dependency from one economic system to two.
He never actually reduced it. With Sadat as the chief
executive dependency has merely swung back to the West which
was always highly probable considering Nasser's socialism
never restructured Egypt's economic system completely. Egypt's
dependency is built into its history which has defined it
as a Third World Country.
It is obvious that the West's interest in structuring
this dependency is related to oil supplies and the Middle
East. Egypt's geographical location, relative stability and
homogeneity of its people, the fact that it is considered
as the center of the Arab World and the possibility of
reaching a peace between the Arabs and Israeli have defined
it as stretegically important to the West.
The West, and the U.S.S.R. before it, uses aid as the
tool to structure this dependency.
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REFERENCE: Dawisha's Egypt
in the Arab World, page 86
"There is no doubt that heavy dependence on foreign aid
constitutes a clear constraint on the recipient party's
foregin policy. Indeed, it is a double-edged limitation.
On the one hand, it is always a variable to be con-
sidered by the recipient decision-makers when formulat-
ing their policies, and on the other hand, it is a
possible weapon for the donor state if it wishes to
affect a specific reorientation in the domestic or
foreign policy of the recipient country. For example,
Heikal contends that during the rupture between Egypt
and the Soviet Union over the Iraqui Communists in 1959,
Krushchev wrote a letter to Nasser intimating that 'the
present situation (may) give rise to complications for
discharging our obligations under the agreement for the
construction of the Aswan Dam.' Moreover, it was a
conscious policy on the part of the Kennedy administra-
tion to extend generous aid facilities, particularly
in much needed counterpart funds (i.e. surplus wheat,
meat, etc.), to Egypt in the wake of the ensuing re-
criminations between Nasser and Khrushchev. More
specifically, and for the opposite reason, there is
some evidence which suggests that American aid was used
by the Johnson administration to discourage Nasser from
continuing his involvement in the Yemeni war. In May
1966, in response to increased Egyptian militancy, the
United States deferred negotiation on an Egyptian re-
quest for $140 million worth of surplus food. At the
same time, the International Monetary Fund refused to
grant an Egyptian request for a loan of $195 million
because of alleged dissatisfaction with the economic
performance of Egypt through its costly commitments in
the Yemen. Given the already mentioned Egyptian de-
pendence on foreign aid for the success of its five-
year plan, it is interesting to note that the reopening
of the negotiations with the IMF in August 1966 was
accompanied in the same month by a peace agreement
(though short-lived) over the Yemen signed between
Egyptian and Saudi respresentatives in Kuwait."
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3.1.2 AID PROGRAMS
From Chapter Two I have argued that aid programs in-
volving technical assistance reinforce this reliance of Egypt
on the West. By prescribing Western solutions through West-
ern experts, building up research capabilities and problem
definition techniques very likely requiring further expertise
in the future, Egypt is moved one step closer to the West.
I do not wish to suggest that there is an evil calculated
plot on the part of all consultants to bind Egypt's develop-
ment with the U.S.A. or any other country but that very
naturally given the economic structure of the West this
occurs. For example, the scenario preferred by the admin-
istration of the M.I.T./C.U. program is one where a research
institute in Egypt returns again and again to use M.I.T.
expertise for consultant services.
5.2 THE TRIANGLE
During the course of this study one thing has become
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more and more obvious to me and it relates to the performance
of aid programs. The three main actors (in aid which involves
technical assistance) have differing agendas, different objec-
tives, they see the world from different perspectives, between
them they have conflict of interests, they see their roles
differently from each actor's point of view, they are influ-
enced by outside relationships not part of aid and usually
in a relatively short time attempt to structure development
strategies which will take years to be realized. It is not
surprising to me that many aid programs might not be con-
sidered as successful by all three. I will attempt to set
out just a few of the problem areas to illustrate this and
show that the complex relationships in this triangle have
as much to do with poor aid program results as other factors
put forward by other studies.
1. Underdevelopment
The decision to divide the world up into developed,
developing and underdeveloped countries is already in
question by development theorists. Planning a country on
the continuum between overdeveloped and underdeveloped can
only be as accurate as the data and information available.
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Underdevelopment is not an inferior degree of development
but an independent phenomena. Its causes are rooted in
history. There are development problems in all countries.
The idea of development aid only makes sense if "poor"
countries are supposed to be struggling with economic pro-
blems familiar to the donor and to which it has found a
solution. There is no single theory or solution however
and without this understanding a divergence of purposes,
confusion and poor problem definition can occur.
Aid will not solve all the problems in a country. In
fact while it might solve some it will create others. It
is therefore extremely important that the field of objectives
be understood by all parties involved and that the reper-
cussions be evaluated. The time frame in aid programs is
also important. Circumstances can change and alternative
strategies might be required.
2. Use of Aid
The contradiction between the need for aid (and the
resulting dependency structure), and a countries desire for
self sufficiency causes the biggest problem between the
donor and the receiver. It is unfortunately usual that aid
financed operations are often the highest priority to the
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developing countries. If developmental priorities could
be separated from aid priorities, the aid receiver would be
in a better position to negotiate the conditions of aid.
There is an element of uncertainty in the operation of
external controls and constraints which can frustrate the
goals of the aid receiver. Aid is not to be used for any-
thing. It has to be approved by the donor country and
political bias influences this approval.
The basic problems facing Egypt in its course to devel-
opment have been interpreted as aid issues.
3. The Real Purpose of Aid
If the real function of aid from the donor's point of
view is to gain influence in the economic and political life
of the aid receiver then it can be assumed that the success
of aid programs is not absolutely vital to the donor. It
is to the benefit of the donor if success is achieved but in
getting to the point where program aid is being used, the
receiver has already made important concessions to the donor
and the donor's first level of influence might already be
established.
This can be illustrated by noting that the U.S.A.I.D.,
in describing what Egypt has to achieve, points (a) to (j)
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under 2.1 in Chapter Two in order to reach full development
potential, are in some cases a direct contradiction to the
process Egypt has to go through to obtain aid.
4. The Donor Organization
Aid organizations differ from each other. An aid donor
might have a broad or narrow focus of interests in a country.
There is likely to be a specific reason for this focus, a
political bias or strategic importance of the aid receiver.
Each donor has its own set of internal pressures, from with-
in the country (or for multilateral donors, within its con-
stituents), from within the organization itself, and from
within the government structure under which it operates.
The problem of aid donors and more specifically aid organ-
izations as part of the government structure and their
administrators, vary from, the fact that aid agencies are
subject to pressures within their own societies, to the high-
ly centralized nature of these agencies. The donor admin-
istration wishes to withdraw from the political arena to
achieve more concrete but possibly highly topical strategies.
But by the nature of the organization and its funding source,
the tax payer, this is not possible. It has to state pub-
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licly the developmental character of aid and thus support
particular policies and also avoid this being interpreted
as dictating another nations development policies.
5. Receiving Country
Developing countries face the dilemma of balancing
the ruling elite and what it perceives as making up develop-
ment with the will of its people. The consultant is caught
in this dilemma as well. On the one side is the need for
technology and increasing specialization, interdependence
and expertise and all funneled through societal controls
that for efficiency in the eyes of the elite rulers, reduce
the accessibility of decision-makers to the public. On the
other side is the perceived need by this elite for individual
and group self expression and self determination with higher
levels of political participation associated with modern-
ization for the people.
6. Government Reaction
Country programming places a large burden on the U.S.
aid machine and its relationships with the recipient govern-
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ments. This relationship has become one in which Americans
serving in both government and private capacities take the
lead in promoting and organizing a host of initiatives at
the macro level of broad development policies and at the
micro level of individual capital investment and technical
assistance projects. This approach inevitably causes resent-
ment in the receiver country, further developed because the
U.S. also represents the most powerful country in the world.
It has a depressive effect on the initiative of the author-
ities in the receiving countries. In Egypt this can be
illustrated by the lack of recognition of U.S.A.I.D. in
Egypt's attempts to solve its problems with the New Towns
policy. They have in fact refused to fund any program that
supports the development of these towns directly. To be
told your planned growth rate is unrealistically higher when
it needs to be, and by so doing, undermining the perceived
capabilities of the Egyptian Government, while possibly
correct must leave some ruffled feathers. Within the M.I.T./
C.U. Housing and Construction project U.S.A.I.D. has also
questioned Egypt's obsession with industrialization as a
tool to solve part of the housing crisis when local techniques
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REFERENCE: Marie Christine
Aulas' Sadat's Egypt from
The New Left Review, Number
98 (July - August 1976),
page 84.
NOTE: Hassanein Heykal was
fired form his position the
next day.
are very likely to be more possible and avoid added import
requirements. The consultant, having surfaced this problem
is left in between the other two parties struggle for the
"correct" path to follow. And lastly there must be some
resentment by the lower levels of the power elite who are
likely to be directly effected by a reduction in and de-
centralization of government departments. In February 1974
Sadat was criticized as going too far in his systematic turn
to the West by Hassanein Heykal, editor in chief of Al Ahram.
7. Government Administration
A project of this nature (Housing group) obviously
generates new workloads and administrative requirements for
the Ministries involved. In the light of the governments
cutback in its attempts to encourage the private sector to
grow and take on part of the development responsibilities
there is presumably some pressure to reduce size and increase
productivity. Of course it is understood that part of the
development strategy will be focussed at moving the Ministries
away from certain responsibilities but during this period of
change, overlap and continuity are effected as illustrated
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by the recent split of the Ministry of Housing and Recon-
struction into two sections. This must effect the implemen-
tation strategies after M.I.T. has left the scene.
It must also be remembered that Egypt has created a huge
bureaucracy which is not easy to dismantle. On the surface
it might appear to be a slow but smooth running operation.
This is not necessarily so, One department or one person
in one department might easily have the power and desire to
disrupt a program or, one department might be opposed to a
particular project where as another might regard it as vital.
The decisions to proceed under these circumstances are far
away from the consultant's influence or reach.
8. Realistic Goals
As has been discussed in previous chapters Egypt has
a strong desire to industrialize. The poor resources base
retards its efforts at industrialization. For example, the
steel plant, built by the Russians at Helwan has to import
raw iron and coal. The coal is mined in the Ukraine, railed
to Odessa, shipped to Alexandria, and trucked to the factory.
Buying steel on the world market might be cheaper than this
process. A similar situation surrounds the Egyptians desire
to build prefabricated housing with imported materials and
NOTE: Egypt's main drain
on its resources has been
military spending, 13.7% of
G.NOP. in 1967 and 34.1%
in 1975.
REFERENCE: New York Times
Magazine, June 1, 1975,
page 71.
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technology when traditional methods have been analyzed to be
cheaper. Egypt's industrialization seems to carry political
implications which overshadow economic rational. Egypt ties
industrialization to modernization and the ability to have a
military capability free from foreign powers. This policy
has serious repercussions for other sectors of her economy.
With growing domestic demand for her export crops, Egypt now
needs $1,000 million per year just to feed her population,
leaving little over for capital investment.
9. Technical Assistance
Technical assistance has a strong and defused impact
on attitudes to aid in a recipient country. The expert
can be considered to have little benefit if he/she is per-
ceived as pre-empting jobs for locals. On the other hand,
if local people around him/her derive benefit from the work
performed he/she will be more readily accepted. Professional
jealousy, frustration with progress and past experience
are all factors which influence the relationship between
consultant and local intelligentsia.
10. The M.I.T. Team Structure
Whatever its internal weaknesses are M.I.T. is in the
process of making bonds between the ruling elite, the Egyptian
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intelligentsia and the U.S. From the responses to Question
Seven, Twenty-one and Twenty-two in the interviews (see
Appendix C) it is clear to the M.I.T. people involved that
the people to benefit the most from the project are (a) Cairo
University, (b) the Egyptian Government, (c) A.I.D. and a
weak (d) M.I.T., in that order. Under the category "People
of Egypt" no one ventured to place any priority on a scale
of one to four. From the text it is known that the govern-
ment is isolated from the people and this program reinforces
the elite groups with their already considerable power over
the masses. Because of the nature of the projects (partic-
ularly the Housing and Construction project) there is little
room left for contact with these masses directly. Wide scale
participation is not possible. The Egyptian people are
interested in housing, any type, where as this M.I.T./C.U.
project is concerned about the housing policy and process
and the role the government should and can play in this.
11. Implementation
The problems of implementation of the recommendations
are of concern to the Egyptian Government once M.I.T. gets
out of this program and into the "next one." The Egyptian
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Government must decide to take action, or not to, if it is
in its own interests to do so. It could, for example,
"shelve" recommendations.
12. The MI.T0 Product
M.I.T. is providing a highly sophisticated technical
approach to problem solving techniques. One hopes not too
sophisticated for Egypt. I find little evidence of M.I.T.
attempting to evaluate and interpret what each Ministry is
actually capable of doing. One hopes carefully structured
models are not ignored because few people can interpret re-
sults from them or that due to the lack of skills available,
adjustments to models are not made to allow them to grow
with the likely changes in input data.
Assuming the Egyptian Government recognizes the need
for the industrialized building system factories to stand-
ardize production and move to an "open" set of prefab parts,
to work within a predetermined structural system (S.A.R.),
can it force them to do so when it is attempting to reduce
controls? What further subsidies will these firms require
to adjust their production lines?
The S.A.R. method, not under criticism here, is however
a relatively sophisticated spatial system to be inserted in-
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to a history ridden country. Presumably, if it is to be
used on a large scale will it be by the government only, or
will it be used through codes, regulations, etc. as a basis
for all housing? If it is to be used as a guide only there
is the possibility that granting of exceptions will become
the rule. Its impact on housing and associated policy will
only be carried out if it has strong support.
13. The Alternative Approach
The alternative project discussed in Chapter Two is
sponsored by the same organization as the M.I.T./C.U. program,
namely U.S.A.I.D. It has the same client, Egypt, and deals
with the same subject matter, housing. This somewhat dual
approach expresses clearly the confusing structure of aid.
In comparing the M.I.T./
C.U. project (Housing group) with the Joint Report, Housing
and Community Upgrading for Low Income Egyptians, the dif-
ferences are obvious.
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REFERENCE: Joint Report:
Housing and Community Up-
grading for Low Income
Egyptians, Draft May 1977,
Ministry of Housing and Re-
construction, U.S.A.I.D.
and F.C.H., page 6
"Summary and Recommendations
"The joint team recommends the development of several
demonstration projects directed at improving the shelter
and general well-being of low-income families. The
program would include upgrading of existing 'informal
(squatter) settlements' in the Greater Cairo area, up-
grading and rehabilitation in central Cairo and the
development of a 'growth pole' project in Minia or
Qena in upper Egypt.
"The projects would be comprehensive in nature, includ-
ing the provision of home improvement loans, water,
sewer, electricity, schools, health centers, and other
services of high priority to the residents. Vocational
training and employment generating activities would be
included, along with programs to improve nutrition,
child care, and family planning services.
"A complementary program to the demonstration projects
would include increasing the production of building
materials to reduce imports, create jobs, and help
stabilize prices.
"A technical exchange and training program would also
be needed to strengthen the housing institutions.while
they are gaining experience in this new approach.
"The recommendations of the joint housing finance team
and the joint land policy team would be considered and
incorporated into the demonstration program.
"Successful completion of the demonstration projects
should result in a shifting of national housing policy
toward lower income groups while reducing the need for
heavy government subsidies. By channeling a larger
share of resources into upgrading projects instead of
only constructing new standard apartment units, many
more Egyptians should benefit from limited financial
resources."
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In terms of approach the one deals with the top, the
government and works down to the people. The other starts
with the problem where the people are and works up, defining
the necessary government actions once the "pilot" programs
have been evaluated.
In terms of their purpose the one restructures housing
policy, provides a broad framework to maximize a method of
dealing with housing and materials while the other provides
means and methods of testing alternative housing in the
field by the people who will live in them.
In terms of product the one produces legislation and
controls as a basis for housing policy and the other pro-
duces actual living units.
I must again state that the purpose of this comparison
is not to evaluate one procedure as "better" than the other
but only that they are different, that they exist at the
same time and that they are both likely at this stage to
continue. It is imperative that the housing problem be
approached from the policy level as well as the private
sector, that "pilot" programs be carried out in the field
as well as the development of recommendations for government
participation.
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14. Continuity
Most aid programs are not isolated occurences in a
receiving country. Aid agreements are likely to have exist-
ed before and will exist after a particular project. It
is relevant to determine what previous aid agreements existed
before, who benefited, and this relationship to new aid if
any.
Hopefully this is occurring in Egypt but with the many
aid projects being carried out there, there must be problems
with continuity and overlap,
15. Cultural Differences
Although this factor is appreciated by the Housing
group one cannot help but wonder what impact (for example)
an Islamic revival might have on policies as has happened
in Iran. The ease with which Western theory has penetrated
the Egyptian system is no indication of its depth of
acceptance.
16. Poor Results from Aid
The full usefulness of the consultant to Egypt, as a
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total system, does come into question. Consultants, in their
efforts to bring about change and development have produced
many failures in the past. At the level of country planning
for example, the U.S. at the end of the sixties, regarded
aid to Pakistan as having been successful on the grounds that
it had greatly assisted business activity in that country.
It was admitted that the benefits of this had been very un-
evenly distributed, going largely to the rich in West
Pakistan, not to the poor in East Pakistan, but it was agreed
that some degree of social injustice was the inevitable price
that one had to pay in the early stages of development.
These same inequalities, however, in addition to stimulating
rapid growth in the short run, also contributed to the
tension and bitterness which resulted in, first the fall of
President Ayub Khan and then in 1971 a descent into bloodshed.
At the sectorial level, also in the sixties, America sent
several hundred head of cattle to Chad, so improving its
agricultural potential. What they did not realize was that
the area receiving the cattle was a virtual desert and huge
quantities of water reeds and underwater vegitation from the
only lake had to be "farmed" to keep the cattle alive. This
not only disturbed the ecosystem of the surrounding region
but took many man hours of labor away from the precious pro-
cess of subsistance farming already well established but
under stress. At the city level one need only be aware that
no less than three master plans have been drawn up for the
city of Baghdad only to be shelved. And at the project level,
a multi-million dollar suspension bridge designed and con-
structed in 1969 by an international consortium, financed
through aid grants, was built outside Abu Dhabi. The bridge
itself was well thought out and worked perfectly. The only
problem was that Abu Dhabi was not an island and in fact a
perfectly adequate road existed under the bridge which link-
ed the city with the surrounding country.
I do not wish to suggest that the M.I.T./C.U. program
is destined to failure. If anything we have learned from
these types of mistakes. There is no evidence to suggest
that the M.I.T./C.U. program will produce a series of use-
less projects. I do wish to point out that any aid program
involves a number of issues that similar programs within a
country (internally funded) do not have. There is a balance
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which has to be constantly readjusted between the desires
of the receiving country and the goals of the donor. Aid
programs are particularly sensitive to foreign policy and any
interlinking developments can terminate aid in mid-stream,
or more likely hold it up. As discussed in Chapter Two the
consultant, whatever important skills he/she has developed,
is only able to "advise" in most aid programs. This might
well include strategies for implementation but follow-through
procedures are not common. This means, coupled with the
weaknesses and resistance already discussed, that any set of
recommendations can be influenced one way or the other by
local politics, economic developments or social changes in
the receiving country. One of the ways to reinforce implemen-
tation is to institutionalize procedural measures but in a
country like Egypt these very institutions which would do
this are undergoing major changes. Actual physical projects
like sites and services projects, or bridges, etc. have a
more direct impact on the country receiving aid in the short
term. Aid to Egypt is large however. By taking only the
figures mentioned in Chapter One for 1974 (these do not
account for European and other Arab countries) we arrive at
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a figure of approximately $40 per capita of population in
comparison to Vietnam in the late 1960's which received
approximately $26 per capita. Aid to Egypt is therefore not
being used to house poor people only, or build a needed
bridge, but is aimed at restructuring the very economy of
the country and its various policies. It is extremely com-
plicated, with many actors involved and it is quite possible
that some projects will succumb to the overall sway and
change of life and development in Egypt. Within the M.I.T./
C.U. program the three main parties involved will require
perserverance, tolerance, understanding and above all contact
with each other for this program to be a success in terms of
all three.
Whatever the results of these programs might be in
Egypt they and others are likely to proceed. The many
variables in aided development also make it impossible to
predict with any certainty how Egypt will adjust to its new
role and what social impacts will occur due to the changes
accompanying this adjustment. The M.I.T./C.U. program has
been studied and the problem areas within it identified.
It has been shown that other methods than those being pur-
sued in the Housing and Construction project are possible
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and are in fact in progress in Egypt. These programs do
reinforce the influence of the West over Egypt and its
political and economic development. On the macro scale
Egypt has had to concede to foreign intervention in its
domestic structure and external relations with the world.
Egypt's dependency on the West grows with each new package
of development aid and its indebtedness to the West will
provide a long term link the West requires to be able to
influence developments in the Middle East.
3.53W EPT ATiNH) FUTIl
Egypt is a "typical" Third World country enjoying the
special interests of the super powers due to her strategic
importance in the Middle East, both geographically and
spiritually. Where then does Egypt stand now?
Egypt is undergoing major structural changes in its
political and economic environment both internally and
externally, as different from Nasser's Egypt as that was
from the Monarchy before it. The government is being de-
centralized, to allow for the development of the private
sector. Each ministry and department is gaining power to
carry out its functions free from the totalitarian decrees
REFERENCE: The New York
Times, Friday April 20,
1979, page A10.
NOTE: This election has
taken place and obviously
Sadat's party won the
majority of seats.
NOTE: Israel and Egypt now
compete for the European
market in vegetables and
fruit.
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of one man. Incentives, subsidization and the removal of
restrictions are aimed at building up an open, free enter-
prize sector hopefully with the participation of foreign
investment and companies. For the first time since 1952
Egypt has held an election with more than one party (June
1979) and advances have been made in obtaining greater press
freedom and a declaration of individual rights. In a
referendum in May 1978 political activity by Communists,
religious extremists and people who held office before 1952
was barred. And Egypt's effort at development is receiving
massive amounts of aid from the West and the conservative
Middle East nations. It is also no longer at war with
Israel, which has now become an economic rival as well as
possible future partner. Egypt also still has a vast
majority of extremely low income people in relation to West-
ern standards. Many of these people are living in marginal
conditions both in the urban centers and on the land. The
political power still lies with the established military
and exmilitary elite and a small but growing upper and
middle class.
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REFERENCE: Joint Report:
Housing and Community Up-
grading for Low Income
Egyptians, Draft May 1977.
Ministry of Housing and Re-
construction, U.S.A.I.D.
and F.C.H., pages 12 - 13.
"Category A:
Category B:
Category C:
Category D:
Category E:
High officials, business owners, managers
of modern establishments, practitioners
in the high earning professions, univer-
sity professors.
Upper echelon government employees, pro-
fessionals, business owners and managers.
High level trade and service employees,
supervisors, technicians, higher level
teaching staff, skilled craftsmen, factory
workers, trade bosses, head machinists,
qualified butlers and head cooks, etc.
Semi-skilled labor in the construction
trades, transport and manufacturing
sectors, highly qualified clerical workers,
experienced sales and service workers,
middle level teachers.
Low skill employment in industry, commerce,
government, services and construction,
including clerks, elementary school teach-
ers, cooks, waiters, salesmen, etc.
Category F:
"Income/Occupation
Category
Unskilled labor of all
servants, office boys,
tices, day laborers in
and services."
1974 Income in
Category in L.E.
per year
types: household
janitors, appren-
construction, sales
Percent of House-
holds in Category
1,500 or more
700 - 1,000
550 - 700
400 - 550
250 - 400
250 or less
A
B
C
D
E
F
10
14
11
14
17
34
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REFERENCE: From the Depart-
ment of State, Background
Notes: Egypt, page 6.
NOTE: For outline of donor
organizations see Appendix
E.
REFERENCE: Cheryl Payer's
Third World Problems: The
New Wave of Defaults in the
Egypt still has a lopsided and poorly maintained in-
dustrial base as a result of raw material shortages and
slow technology transfer aggrivated by her balance of pay-
ments problems and she has not, as yet, been able to ration-
alize, and so improve, the agricultural production of her
extremely fertile agricultural land. Egypt imports food so
she can sell part of her own production of wheat and rice
at higher prices to gain foreign currency.
The question is how far can Egypt, and Sadat, go or
how far should they go in tieing their future to the West.
The West sees aid as a means of retaining the alliance of
Egypt to itself for the security and stability of the Middle
East. From the known influence the I.M.F. and the World
Bank have over G.A.D.E. it can be assumed that by building
up these ties to the West so that it becomes difficult for
Egypt to break its contacts there, and by involving the
more conservative Arab states (G.A.D.E.) in aid agreements
with Egypt a bond is formed from the West, through Egypt to
the Middle East and its oil. The leaver is the debt trap.
Cheryl Payer, in a recent article, considers balance of pay-
ments requirements as fictional. National imbalances have
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Monthly Review, September
1976, Volume 28 Number 4.
DEFINITION: Peonage - in-
voluntary servitude growing
out of payment in work for
debts incurred.
become persistent, structural and ineradicable, because
powerful interest groups want things to stay that way.
They wish to create a system of "Peonage." This could be
applied to the relatipnship of Egypt to the West. Foreign
loans appear to be available to Egypt and they are an
attractive alternative to taxing her own people. They pay
for imports and Egypt as in the past perhaps naively thinks
her exports will increase and pay for the borrowing. If
bankruptcy occurs there is still the possibility of re-
scheduling her debt.
3.3,1 THE REPERCUSSIONS
Egypt has the potential of improving her agricultural
base but she still has focussed her development efforts in
an expanding industrial base. Unfortunately it appears that
her only real resource might turn out to be cheap labor.
If Egypt continues to improve her poor infrastructure she
might find herself in the position of having a large supply
of cheap labor, provisions of transport, communication,
organization and new process technologies and therefore
growing industrialization sponsored by foreign companies.
182
REFERENCE: Frobel, Hein-
richs and Kreye's Export
Oriented Industrialization
of Underdeveloped Countries
in Monthly Review, November
1978, Volume 30 Number 6,
page 24.
It depends on how she can manage these multi-national cor-
porations since it has happened in other countries that they
bring with them as many problems as they solve. They use the
lowest wage earners, young women, and do not necessarily im-
prove the employment problem much. The plants, forming parts
of the final product are often located in different countries,
one piece being made here, another there and assembled else-
where, so a balanced technology transfer is not a natural
repercussion to any one country. If cheap labor is the
reason for location, there is no guarantee that education
will necessarily follow. The plants can be designed to make
use of basic skills, useless to the country without backup.
This type of industry does not necessarily stimulate exports
either. Special conditions in foreign aid allow profits out
of the country back "home" and accounting can be organized
to reflect multi-national profits where they want them.
Only large organizations with big markets can carry this out
and it is possible that they will avoid competition for the
labor. It is extremely important that Egypt understand these
"dangers" in her drive towards industrialization and develop-
ment.
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One further repercussion is the possible social reaction
to the changing political and economic structure taking place
in Egypt. In spite of Egypt's homogeneous population there
have been various signs of social unrest in the last five
years. Egypt has to both control violent opposition and free
up the political strings developed in its immediate past.
Its economy is still weak and it cannot guarantee the quick
improvements, promised some seven years ago, to its poor.
The developments in Iran should not be forgotten.
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EPILOGI JE
Two issues have come to my attention while working on
this thesis which deserve mention. Little research has been
carried out with respect to them and I have therefore in-
cluded them in this epilogue. The first concerns the even
larger arena of the Western world in the global context,
part of which is Western aid to the Third World. The in-
formation base used to discuss this matter is sketchy and
time might well prove my interpretation as only partially
correct. The second issue relates to the options open to
receiving countries for improving the performance of aid
through the consultant.
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NOTE: The O.E.C.D. coun-
tries include North America,
Western Europe and Japan.
NOTE: Sources of informa-
tion for this section come
from various newspapers and
T.V. Few have been checked
and therefore their.accuracy
could be questioned. I do,
however, consider these
statistics to have rational
base. Sources include:
-The New York Times, March
28, 1979, September 9, 1979
-The Sunday Times (South
Africa), December 9, 1979
-T.V. News, U.S.A. various
dates
-Paul M. Sweeny's article
on The Global Disorder in
Monthly Review, April 1979,
Volume 30 Number 11
-Oil and Gas Journal - World
Wide Report, July 1976
4.'1ITHE CHANNGWrLD
There are approximately 17 million unemployed people in
the O.E.C.D. countries, and unlike most of the Third World
and its unemployed, these people are skilled, organized and
politically capable of making their influence felt. Debt
services cost the Third World an average of 15% of its ex-
ports and in Egypt this rizes to approximately 50%. The
Sudan spends 60% of its earnings from exports on repayments,
The Third World has borrowed a staggering $400,000 million
from the industrial countries. Inflation and the weakening
of the Western monetary system is reflected in the increasing
price of gold. It has been the result of an explosive in-
crease in the global supply of money in the last decade,
mainly to pay for oil. Inflation has undermined major
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currencies and triggered a clamp down on credit. Interest
rates are as high as 15% drying up the sources of money.
If the West prints more money it aggravates inflation and
if it tightens up money supply it moves economies towards
recession. The cost of oil from the Middle East has in-
creased from $1.80 per barrel in 1970 to $26.00 per barrel
in 1980. If production of oil remains at the present level
of 28 million barrels a day the Middle East will start
running out of oil in thirty years taking the known reserves
there at 360,000 million barrels. In the near future one
of the biggest problems facing the world is going to be
energy. If we add to all this the worsening relationships
between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. it is not surprising
that there is evidence of a change in attitude of the West
to the Third World. It takes little intelligence to per-
ceive a clash of interests developing between the domestic
affairs of the Western industrial powers and the credit
hungry Third World. In Iran the stage has been set for a
tougher line by the West, but it is not the "hostage"
situation which reflects this. Iran has defaulted, by its
own choice, on debts of $15000 million. Reaction is taking
place outside Iran, and not in the U.N., but in Germany
where an American Bank is attempting to sieze Iran's share
in the Krupp factories there as payment for the outstanding
debt. Western banks are getting nervous and the general
situation is reaching crisis proportions in the opinion of
Paul Sweezy. Western guilt for its colonial past is being
replaced by Western irritation with people who repay "friend-
ship" with anti-West intentions. The proportion of output
which Western countries are prepared to devote to aid is
declining. There is skepticism as the ability of some Third
World countries to deliver any where near the full potential
of their natural resources. The developed nations have
attempted for many years to assist the underdeveloped coun-
tries but the gap between the two grows. Despite foreign
aid, special programs and many different attempts to close
this gap, the Third World countries still suffer from urban
over population, rural stagnation, large numbers of un-
employed people and growing inequalities in income.
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The evidence presented here is thin, but there is pre-
sumably, as a result of the West's changing perspective, a
possibility of a shift in attitude to aid. My speculations
on this shift can be defined into three main sections:
1. The Tightening Up on Aid
The first obvious action is one of cutting back on aid.
It must be remembered that aid makes up less than 0.75% of
most Western countries' G.N.P. Any large cutback would not,
in my opinion, make a major contribution to alleviating a
particular country's troubles but would cause extreme hard-
ship for aid receiving countries.
Another action a Western country could take is to be
more selective about which countries receive aid. This would
be an attempt at showing that by spending a lot of money in
one country (and by doing this not providing aid to another),
development is more likely to take place. The repercussions
would be that the West would have to define, and agree on,
which countries are to receive aid and which not. They do
this to some extent already but to make it a declared policy
would bring about many more questions from the Third World
as to their motives.
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The West could set higher priority on the conditions of
aid and make these conditions more stringent. I consider
this a likely strategy.
2. Shift the Focus of Aid
Whether the global problems would cause focus on domestic
issues in the West and therefore possibly give aid organiz-
ations more leeway, or whether these problems would be seen
as arising out of external factors and therefore placing
more attention to foreign policy and aid is open to debate.
It is unlikely that private banks would be encouraged
to lend more money to the Third World since they have already
increased their loans to the developing countries ten times
over the last six years.
What is likely, in my opinion, is an increase in mili-
tary aid and military agreements in the near future.
3. Testing Dependencies
I also consider the developments in Iran and Afghanistan
as a testing ground for the West's structuring of dependencies.
A test of how much political influence they have bought with
their aid and depending on the result, which at present
appears to be favorable to the U.S.A. at least, a reevaluation
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of the aid component in their policies.
Aid in Egypt however is unlikely to diminish in the near
future. As I have already shown Egypt is getting more aid
than ever before, an increase far above inflation. This is
born out in the article form the New York Times as shown on
the following page. The issue is not relevant to Egypt but
rather to other Third World countries that do not enjoy the
strategic advantages of that country for the West.
4.2 TIE ENVIR( )NMEN
PLANNER AND) All)
Within this reflection of the state of the world, and
assuming that the West is reevaluating its relationship to
the rest of the world, aid presumably will continue in one
form or another. There is still, for the aid receiver the
important question of whether aid performance can be improved.
In fact, more so if aid is going to be cut back, or conditions
increased. There is little an environmental planner can do
about the larger framework of aid into which he/she might
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Dollar Diplomacy in the Middle East
As far as we can determine, the dowries that Presi-
dent Carter promised Egypt and Israel for their peace-
making would cost the United States an additional $500
million a year for the next three years. Most of that will
be gifts. The rest will generate huge loans for military
purchases, largely in the United States, but these will
be repaid with normal commercial interest. If peace
can truly be served at these amounts, it's a bargain.
Only by adding the total loans and gifts for all three
years do you reach the more commonly heard figure of
$4.8 billion in new assistance for the two countries.*
That total can be made to'sound even more impressive
- or horrendous - by adding the prior levels of aid,
which would continue: $1.8 billion a year for Israel and
$970 million for Egypt. If Congress agrees,, then the an-
nual levels of support would climb to $2.8 billion for Is-
rael, more than half of it In gifts or concessional loans
that amount to the same thing, and $1.6 billion, two-
thirds gift, for Egypt. (The subtotals of military sup-
port would be $2 billion a year for Israel and $500 mil-,
lion for Egypt.)
These are not trivial sums; they match those of-
fered any single country by the Marshall Plan for Eu-
rope a generation ago. It is true that the United States
would feel compelled to provide as much or more had
there been no peace treaty, and with no comparable
promise of diplomatic dividends. The treaty serves not
only the security interests of Israel and Egypt but also
the oil and strategic interests of the United States. But
as heavy investors in the peace process, Americans are
entitled to some special consideration.
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Egypt and Israel are economically exhausted.
However great their military needs, they have to
demonstrate to their people that there are economic
benefits in the peace process. Without such progress,
neither Government will have the political strength to
make the further concessions that real peace requires.
American officials contend that Egypt will be get-
ting as much economic aid as it can possibly absorb.
But the World Bank and other international agencies
intend to sow the seeds for more wise investment. They
will need deft political support. Special benefit would.
flow from projects that make Egyptians and Israelis -
mutually debendent. And while Israel and Egypt can-
not be expected to sell out vital security interests for
economic aid, they can be shown that American sup-
port is a crucial aspect of their security - at least as
important as some issues over which they haggled bit-
terly in writing their recent agreements.
S
The American people also have a right to expect
greater help from other nations. The governments of
Western Europe and Japan have been shamefully
timid even with rhetorical support for the Egyptian-Is-
raeli peace treaty. The reason is obvious: dependence
on oil and fear of the Arab oil producers that condemn
the peace. But that very dependence highlights the
value of American diplomacy to our allies. The present
reticence is odd in allies that usually fret about the dan-
ger of the United States going it alone in the world.
More help needs to be demanded as well from con-
servative Arab nations, notably Saudi Arabia. There is
no safety for Arab monarchs in policies that injure
Egypt and erode American influence in the region. To
appease Arab opponents of the peace treaty, the Saudis
intend to cut off "new" aid for Egypt without blocking
"old" aid or the more than $2 billion that Egyptian
workers in Saudia Arabia send home each year. Still, if
the net effect is to cheat Egypt of the added v.alue of
American assistance, Americans will have to draw
some disturbing conclusions.
Dollars now define diplomacy in the Middle East.
Americans should be grateful for the opportunity to
risk money instead of troops. By noting who else chips
in, they will recognize their true partners.
REFERENCE: Original source,
H.E. Suliman Abdel Hai, The
Third World View, A paper
presented to a Regional
Studies Association Confer-
ence, London, 19th May 1976.
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be placed. I do not believe any consultant would refuse to
work in aid on the grounds that its real purpose is depend-
ency building. But I do wonder what he/she can do about it
at project level.
In an article in "The Planner" Journal of the Royal
Town Planning Institute, Volume 65, Number 5 of September
1979, R. Stewart paraphrased an Egyptian clients views on
what he looks for in a planning consultant as follows.
"1. humility - you are not only, nor the best planner
who ever visited these shores! There might well be
someone in the country who is as good, well motivated
and active as you are!
"2. perspective of purpose - you are there to supple-
ment what those in the country have done and are
capable of, not necessarily to start again with new
systems which are operational elsewhere or even only
in your mind. Don't duplicate the efforts of others -
your client can't afford it.
"3. objectivity - don't theorise about the political
and social reality of the country. Go out and find
out what the reality is, constantly seek information,
constantly check and probe your observations. Also
don't assume necessarily that awareness of latest
thinking and techniques in your field doesn't exist
in the country. It is often the case that it is
known about and not deployed for some very practical
reason.
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"4. Willingness to collaborate - a client usually asks
for local associates in a job for the very best reasons.
The foreign consultant must recognise this and modify
his attitude and often his programme and technical
approach to ensure there is collaboration in reality.
(Also where a number of foreign consultants are in
harness together there is no sympathy from the client
for professional jealousies - you are paid to help him
at what is frequently to his government a very con-
siderable amount of money.) Related to this is the
simple point that after you leave, these chaps are the
ones who will probably implement your proposals - if
they are to be implemented at all.
"5. Realisation of worth - when measured by most local
standards such as GNP per capita, the cost of the con-
sultant in his villa or flat with his car and so forth
is a very substantial investment indeed! (To drive
home the point: one hour of a senior team member's
time costs the same as the daily expenditure of 78
families of four on food and accommodation for one day
in one country in which we have worked!)
"6. Quality and effort - maximum effort is required
from consultants to produce well reasoned reports based
upon thorough research related to the problems at hand.
In the 1970's most developing countries have acquired
senior bureaucrats with years of experience in super-
vising foreign consultants' work. Additionally, the
senior personnel upon whom a firm's reputation is
founded (and whose names feature strongly in the sub-
mission!) should be part of the team contributing to
the work - junior professionals learning their craft
are not good enough to man the job in a substantial
sense. (Justify the description 'foregin expert!')
"7. Redundancy - the objective of the consultant must
be to work himself out of a job and recognise that this
is his objective! (even though he feels that foreign
specialist advice may still be needed to support local
professionals)."
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Two aspects of the consultant's work in aid come to
mind that can improve the product for the receiver of aid.
One concerns the relationship between the consultant and
the various people he/she comes into contact with in the
aid receiving country during the course of the contract.
There is a balance, still unstructured in my mind, between
a close relationship of a team of foreign consultants and
the people of the country being served with follow-up pro-
ceedures, and consultants who might be looking to extend
their roles or structure dependencies on their expertise.
My immediate thoughts suggest for example, an orientation
week at the beginning of a program, clearly designed to in-
troduce the main actors to each other and to the problem and
to follow through with further such meetings at various
points during the contract. I do not wish to create the
impression of a "presentation" but rather a participation
oriented session.
The other aspect I consider extremely important is the
proper functioning of a multidisciplinary team. We tend
to ignore too often in Western society the important team
maintenance functions. In planning we seldom stop the
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process we are in and discuss it, the process. Within multi-
disciplinary teams there is likely to be the need for shift-
ing leadership as the program develops. Specialized skills
can be used within a general team objective and these skills
have to be integrated into the team process. The team
should also be aware of its limitations as for each person
and the team as a whole. Sustaining individual interest in
a program requires attention as does any time of stress, say
before a presentation. As agents of change in aid programs
the team must be aware of the full implications of the pro-
duct on the receiving country. Who are they serving, who
will benefit, who will suffer and at what costs. Lastly,
the team should have representation by the aid receiving
country at all times.
Aid continues to be a source of economic development
potential for the Third World and Egypt, and technical
assistance will continue while the "expert" is needed. The
planner will be part of that technical assistance while
urbanization and industrialization continue to be part of
development. Whether he/she will be able to improve the
performance of aid in general is doubtful but at the project
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level there is an opportunity, by fully understanding the
implications and repercussions of aid, to produce useful
and relevant products for the receiving country. There is
no doubt that compromise will be required and that moral
decisions will have to be made as they relate to his/her
beliefs and the purposes of the aid package.
Aid, in general, is a particularly complex institution
with little evidence to suggest its main purpose is other
than to assist foreign relations between donor and recipient
and to influence the economy and political structure of the
receiver to the benefit of the donor,
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APPENDIX 'E' SOME BACKGROUND TO WELL KNOWN DONORS
The U.S.A.
The I.M.F.
The I.B.R.D.
The U.N.
Britain
Canada
West Germany
France
The O.E.C.D. and D.A.C.
The Soviet Bloc
APlENIX
Project Title
1. Water Resources Planning
Nodels for the Nile River
Basin
2.tochastic Model of Nile
Inflows to Lake Nasser
3. Regional Groundwater
Stu die-
4. Housing and Construction
Industry
5. Urban Transportation
6. Intercity Transportation
Planning
7. Engineering Applications for
the Plastics Industry
8. Development of Improved
1lacroeconomic and Sectoral
Planning Methods
1. Lonr; Term Investment Planning
For the Egyptian Electric
Powenr~r Syst em
10. Egyptian Labor Migration
11, lelth Care Delivery :ystems
12. Communication leeds for Rural
1 1 l'ri t c
TABLE 2
HIT/CAIRO UNIVERSITY
TECHNCLOGICAL PLANNING PROGRAM
Cairo
MIT University
1,arks
Bras /
Eagleson
ilson
J. Habraken
Gakenheimer
Hoavenzadeh
McGarry
Eckaus/
Taylor
Wei tzman
Choucri
Eckaus /
Taylor/ J. Field
Po I
I.
I.
A.
A.
S.
Ministry
Supervisors
El Assiouti
Mobarek
Amer
El Erian
El Hawary
El Hawary
Bayoumi
S.
H.
K.
M.
A.
A.
H.
A. Mohie-Eldin
N.
A.
S.
A.
A.
Fahmy
Ibrahim
Hefney
El Hefnawy
Daghestany
Daghestany
Amer
A. Faraz
Abou-Hussein
Nohie-Eldin
Shah bender
Kamal/
Dessouki
Fa i (
M. Abaza
A. Bindary/N. Sakr
A. Nobarak
In process of
being established.
N. El Rafei
A
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Taken from the November 1978 Progress Report Volume I
page 5 of the M.I.T./C.U. Planning Program produced by K.
O'Toole.
Included in the initial program but dropped after it
was considered as irrelevant to the study is Item 13.
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APP1ENI)LX Ii
D1ELO)PM~ENT' OF EGYPI)T
1OLIT1'IL
ITER AINL EXTERINUA
789
?Thech invade Egypt.
1825-1849
Mohammad Ali introduces
reforms for modernization
following Western model.
1850-1859
Abbas, Mohammad's suc-
cessor changes reforms.
Wants to retain Egyptian
autonomy.
1860-1879 (AMERICAN CIVIL
British take over of
Egypt.
300 years of Egypt's
isolation ends.
Egypt struggles for
independence from the
Ottoman Empire. Sudan
incorporated into Egypt.
Focus turns
to England.
SOCIL2
Disposession of land-
owners who stood be-
tween the state and the
peasants.
from France
WAR) (SUEZ CANAL OPENED
Increased linkages be-
tween Egypt and Arab
regions (against Otto-
man Empire).
IN 1869)
Intellectual center.
Arabs exiled gather in
Egypt.
ECONOlIC
Increase in Jumel cotton
production by 500%.
Further increase in
Jumel cotton production
by 40%.
Cotton boom in Egypt (no
cotton from States),
All)
French
tance.
technical assis-
British technical as-
sistance. Building of
railway.
bl
1
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1880-1944 (WORLD WARS) (INDUSTRIALIZATION SPREADS
Egyptian stuggle for
independence.
1945-1951 (UNITED NATION
King Faruk
1952
(JULY) Coup in Egypt
(Monarchy abolished)
Egypt becomes a Republic.
(AUG.) Junta suppresses
revolt of textile factory
workers. Show of
strength.
1953 (STALIN'S DEATH)
(JAN.) All political
parties are disolved.
(JULY)
1955
(JAN.)
(FEB.)
(MARCH)
(AUG.)
1956
(JAN. to MARCH)
(JULY) Suez Canal
Nationalized.
(OCT.)
(NOV.)
S FORMED) (COLD WAR)
First Congress of the
"League of Arab States"
Unity of Nile Valley
policy. Overtures to
the SADAN.
"Voice of the Arabs"
radio station started.
Used for local, and
Arab world propaganda.
Baghdad pact (Iraq/
Turkey).
Israeli raids into Gaza
strip.
Egypt/Syria alliance.
Endorsed by Saudi Arabia
and Yemen.
Israeli raids - Gaza
strip and Al Auja.
Sudan independence. No
ties with Egypt.
Morocco/Tunisia gain
independence (Pro West).
Israel invades Sinai*
Support from British and
French.
Cease fire announced.
Pro-British Iraq condems
British/French involve-
ment. Saudi Arabia/
Syria break relations
with Britain and France.
FROM EUROPE)
Social reform and
Agrerian reforms.
Egyptian intellectuals
advocate isolationist
policy. Nationalism
over Arab unity.
Some spin-off from Wars.
Increase in production.
Agric. Co-ops and Work-
ers Unions.
Exports $431.1 million
Imports $653.4 million
BALANCE -$222.4 million
15% of the G.D.P. is in
Public Sector.
Exports $419.0 million
Imports $536.6 million
BALANCE -$118.6 million
Per Capita income $128
p.y.
U.S.A. refuses $27
million arms request
from Egypt.
CZECH arms deal.
U.S.A., BRITAIN, WORLD
BANK offer aid for Aswam
Dam. Conditions include
supervision of budget
and balance of payments
requirement. Egypt re-
jects.
U.S.A. withdraws offer
for dam aid, U.S.S.R.
gives aid for dam.
1957
(Early 1957)
(JUNE)
(AUG.)
1958
(JAN.)
(FEB.) U.A.R. formed.
Egypt/Syria
(MAY)
(JUNE)
(SEPT.)
(OCT.)
(DEC.) Syrian Communists
squashed by Nasser.
1959
(MARCH)
(APRIL) Syria is unhappy
with land reforms and
single party policy from
Egypt.
(JUNE) Borders open be-
tween Syria/Jordan,
Syria and Iraq form
diplomatic relations.
Treaty of solidarity
Egypt, Syria, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia, King
Jussian beats Nabuisi
(who gets Egypt support)
U.S.A. supports Saudi
Arabia move away from
Egypt.
Nabuisi arrests after
Dulles' statement.
Egypt/Jordan break
relations.
Turkish troops to Syrian
border. Anti-communist
move by U.S.A. Jordan/
Iraq/Saudi Arabia ask
U.S.A. to cool it.
Political stalemate in
Syria (3 parties dead
locked).
Syria sends delegation
to Egypt. Relations
improve.
Yemen form federation
with Egypt. Iraq/Jordan
from Arab Union Feder-
ation in reaction to
U.A.R.
Lebanon Civil War
(Christian/Moslim)
Coop in Iraq, becomes
pro Egyptian Rep.
Lebanon settles down
with new pro Egyptian
Government.
First Arab League Meet-
ing. Tunisia attacks
Egypt at meeting.
Internal struggles in
Iraq. Turns pro-
communist but not
supportive of Egypt.
Unsuccessful Egyptian
supported Shawaf revolt
in Iraq (their commu-
nists bitter against
Egypt).
First Arab Oil Confer-
ence. Iraq refuses to
go,
Exports $477.9 million
Imports $689.4 million
BALANCE -$211.5 million
1958 Defense Budget
$211 million.
First Arab oil Confer-
ence ,
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$70 million to Jordan
from the U.S.A.
Technical Assistance
and Development loans
from the U.S.A. to
Egypt.
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1960
1960 Defense Budget $280
million.
First five year plan.
1961
(JUNE) Import, Export
firms controlled by
Government.
(JULY) Nationalization
of Banks, Insurance Cos.
(SEPT.) Coup in Syria,
breaks ties with Egypt.
1962
TMlCH)
(MAY)Egypt withdraws in-
to Internal policy.
(AUG. to NOV.)
1963
(MARCH)
(JULY)
(SEPT.)
(NOV.)
(DEC.)
British land in Kuwait
to quell revolution.
Egypt supports Kuwait
which lacks British out.
Syria recognized by
Jordan/Iraq/Yemen,
Syria mocks Egyptian
foreign policy.
"Fertile crescent" Iraq/
Syria agreement.
Egypt breaks relations
with K..wait, Jordan
Attacks political struc-
ture of Saudi Arabia.
Does not recognize New
Syria Regime.
Arab League meeting.
Egypt accused of inter-
ference with Syria
(spies caught). Yemen
splits into North and
South. North supported
by Saudi Arabia, South
by Egypt. Jordan joins
Saudi Arabia support.
Egypt bombs Yemen/Saudi
Arabia border. Saudi
Arabia breaks relations
with Egypt and gets
arms from Pakistan and
also enlists U.S.A. and
Iran support.
Coups in Syria/Iraq.
Both realign with Egypt
but get cool support.
Coup overthrown in Syria.
Morocco/Algeria clash.
Egypt supports Algeria.
Coup overthrown in Iraq.
Egypt supports new
leaders in Iraq.
Israel plan to divert
Jordan River. (Uniting
influence in Arabs)
Further land reforms.
Resistance from Syrian
landowners,
Policy of National
Character (Political
Culture)
No income to exceed
$14.350 p.y.
Exports $484.7 million
Imports $699.7 million
BALANCE -$215.0 million
1962 Defense Budget
$314 million.
Gold reserves drop -$20
million. Foregin in-
debtedness up 34% of
G.D.P. in Public Sector.
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1964
(JAN.) First Arab Summit
in Cairo.
(MAY)
1965
(JUNE)
(AUG.)
1966
(JAN.)
(FEB.)
(JULY)
(SEPT.)
(NOV.)
1967
(FEB.)
(JUNE) Nasser resigns
after war but public
pressure encourages him
to stay in office. End
of non-alliance.
(AUG.) Egypt changes
policy from Revolutionary
Arab Leader to Arab
Solidarity support. Move
to right.
First Arab Summit Con-
ference about Israel
P.L.O. started, Jordan/
Saudi Arabia/Egypt
accord, U.S.A./Egypt
relations deteriorate.
Improved relations with
Iraq/Syria/Tunsia/
Morocco.
70,000 Egyptian troops
in South Yemen. Tunisia
suggests peace with
Israel. Strong Arabs
reaction.
Egypt/Saudi Arabia cease
fire in Yemen.
Islamic Summit. Egypt
suspic- ous,
Coup in Syria (Marxist).
Egypt supports new
regime. Jordan/Saudi
Arabia form link due to
Syrian activism in
Jordan.
Egypt refuses to attend
Arab Summit, pro-west
Arab reactionaries is
reason given.
Inter Arab squabbles.
Summit breaks down,
Israel attacks Jordan
village, after P.L.O.
Splits Jordan/Saudi
Arabia and Egypt/Syria,
Jordan/Egypt break
relations.
JUNE WAR. Egypt/Syria/
Jordan defeated. Egypt
aligns with U.S.S.R.
P.L.O. gains impetus.
Egypt breaks relations
with U.S.A.
Arab leaders meet
(Khartoum) to discuss
Israeli strategy,
More equitable income
distribution reached.
22.2% Employment in-
crease over 8 years,
Political and Economical
consessions to the
Bourgeoise
1964 Defense Budget $267
million
Exports $539.1 million
Imports $953,1 million
BALANCE 
-$414.0 million
Per Capita income $171
p.y.
1966 Defense Budget $425
million
Suez Canal netts $219
million
Conscious effort to con-
trol Exports.
Exports $566.3 million
Imports $792.1 million
BALANCE -$225.8 million
Egypt looses revenue
from Suez Canal.
Britain/US.A. arms sale
to Saudi Arabia, $350
million,
U.S.A. defers $150
million food surplus
to Egypt.
I.M.F. refuses $195
million loan to Egypt.
I.M.F./Egypt open
negotiations for loan
again.
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait/
Libia set up annual
grants to Egypt $280
million and Jordan
$100 million.
1968
(MARCH) First Marxist
student/workers riot.
(JULY)
1969
(FEB.)
1970
(JAN.)
(JULY)
(SEPT.) Nasser dies of
heart attack. Sadat
takes over. "Black
September" isolationist
policy begins from Arab
world.
1971
T-A-IL) More leftist
riots. Political Isola-
tion Decrees lifted
allowing large land own-
ers to run for office.
(SEPT.) "Permanent Con-
stitution" passed by
referendum.
1972 (CHINA ACCEPTED INTO
(JUNE)
(JULY) Exodus of U.S.S.R.
military advisors from
Egypt on Sadat's demand.
(SEPT.)
1973 (WORLD RECESSION)
(JAN.)
(OCT.)
P.L.O. inflict heavy
losses on Israeli raid
into Jordan.
Coup in Iraq (right
wing) Egypt cautious to
support,
Yasir Arafat becomes
chairman of P.L.O.
Egypt starts War of
Attrition against
Israel.
Israel starts deep Leftist rhetoric loos
penetration bombing of ing its meaning.
of Egypt.
Peace negotiations
started. Israel/Jordan/
Egypt endorsed by
Britain/France/U.S.A.
and U.S.S.R.
Palestine/Jordan con-
flict ended by Egypt
after P.L.O. are
expelled from Jordan.
Egypt/Syria/Libia form
a federation,
U.N.)
Egypt forms new links
with Syria/Saudi
Arabia/Kuwait/Iraq/
Sudan/Algeria.
Sadat visits Moscow.
Advisors return.
(LAST U.S.A. SOLDIERS OUT OF VIETNAM)
Egypt has to renegotiate
U.S.S.R. use of her
ports,
Yom Kippur War. (Costs Desire to develop pri-
40,000 million) After vate sector, encourage
war "Infitah" rapproche- foreign investment,
ment with the U.S.A.
Abandonment of Nasserite
Socialism Openly
Capitalist Development.
1968 Defense Budget
$506.9 million
Cotton exports reach
$276 million. Foreign
indebtedness reaches
$3,600 million.
Defense Budget $568
million.
Exports $761.8 million
Imports $784.3 million
BALANCE -$ 22.5 million
Relaxation of private
imports.
Rogers Plan accepted.
Exports $1015 million
Imports $1600 million
BALANCE -$ 585 million
Food bill, due to
recession, increases by
40%.
Starting in 196906
western aid stjrts
flowing into Egypt
$12 million per year,.
Egypt gets missiles and
and pilots from U.S.S.R.
Up to 1970 the U.S.S.R.
has lent Egypt non-
military aid of $1023
million.
Start of $10,000
million weapons sale
to Iran from U.S.A.
U.S.S.R. supply of arms
to Egypt and just be-
before the war to Syria.
Loans negotiated with
Private Banks.
-
1974 (OPEC INCREASES PRICE OF OIL FROM $3 TO $9 PER BARREL)
(JAN.) Refocus on Private Military disengagement Highest Court of Appeals
Sector Expansion between Egypt/Israel. declares confiscation
U.S.A./Egypt relations and sequestration of
reestablished. Syrian/ private property il-
Israeli disengagement. legal.
(JUNE) Joint U.S.A./Egypt
Commission. Nixon
visits Egypt.
1975 (U.S.A. BECOMES BIGGEST ARMS SELLER TO WORLD $10,000 MILLION)
(JAN.)
(APRIL) New government
installed.
(SEPT.)
1976
T E .) Egypt has liquid-
ty problems. U.S.S.R.
out of Egypt.
(MAY) Egypt agrees to
compensate U.S. inves-
tors for claims from
1952.
(JUNE TO DEC.) Sadat
re-shuffles cabinet.
Ministers trained in
West appointed.
1977
Food riots in Egypt.
Subsidy cutbacks have
to be stopped,
(NOV.)
1978
(AU7.)
1979
(MARCH)
Interim government be-
tween Egypt/Israel.
Military Transport
plans to Egypt from
U.S.A. Sadat asks Gulf
nations for loans.
Sadat flys to Jerusalem.
Negotiations for Egypt/
Israeli peace agree-
ment,
Egypt/Israel peace
agreement signed.
Per capita income $240
p.y. Canal Free Zones
exempt from taxes and
duties.
Egypt encourages flow
of Foreign Capital
($3000 million).
1976-80 Five Year Plan.
Exports $2040 million
Imports $5100 million
BALANCE -$3060 million
A.I.D. aid program to
Egypt $250 million.
Workers riots in Cairo
suppressed.
Mill workers riots
suppressed.
Reaction to I.M.F. and
GADE requirements for
loans,
Gulf Authority formed
for Development of Egypt
(GADE). Elimination of
production Controls, re-
duction in food sub-
sidies, Floating Egypt-
ian currency.
Investment law 43 -
Eases restrictions on
repartiation of Profits.
Exempts imports from
custom charges.
U.S.A. sells $700
million in arms to
Saudi Arabia,
Two weeks after: GADE
$250 million loan.
I.M.F. $450 million
over 3 years.
West comes to Sadat's
aid $137 million in
"soft" loans.
Saudi Arabia buys $525
million in jets from
U.S.A., originally
for Egypt.
Promises of aid from
USA,
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APPNDIX C1-T Q S O A
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
NOTE: Professor Moavenzadeh
was not convinced the thesis
was of value as structured.
He was also extremely busy
and could not see me for a
full interview. This was
unfortunate since he is the
chairman of the Steering
Committee.
NOTE: It was made clear
that the respondent shcald
reply from his/her per-
spective, first as a member
of this project and then in
any other capacity they
wished (e.g., as a member
of a department, personally
as an economist, etc.)
Appointments were made by telephone. Three people were
too busy or put-off the interview. Two people could not be
reached. The interviews took place in the offices of each
respondent. A brief description of the thesis subject matter
preceeded the interview. Questions were followed in order
(as below) but respondents were requested to volunteer any
other information they felt was relevant or important. Only
one out of the six respondents asked that anyonymity be a
condition of the interview.
Question One: Have you worked for the Department of State
A.I.D. before?
Response: No 4, Yes 2 If yes, often? No 1, Yes 1
Question Two: Have you worked for other aid organizations?
Response: No 3, Yes 3
Information volunteered: 1) Consulted for others, World
Bank, etc.
World Bank, Ford Foundation,
many organizations in different
capacities. As consultant to
organizations and also to a
particular country or city
using aid.
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NOTE: This program is the
A.I.D. program in Egypt man-
aged by M.I.T.
NOTE: There was some hesi-
tancy in answering this
question. It is presumed
that (A) People heading a
particular part of the pro-
grain did not manage the 'nuts
and bolts' of it. (B) They
were not too concerned about
what happened to the reports.
Question Three: How is this program monitored?
Response: 1) Reports are written over the year which first
go to the MIT Steering Committee, which then
passes them all on to A.I.D. (1)
2) Six monthly progress reports are passed on
to M.I.T. Committee. Papers also go to
T.A.P. (1)
3) Reports are submitted to the M.I.T. Committee.
(3)
4) Quarterly reports to T.A.P. They pass on
info to A.I.D. (1)
Question Four: Were you provided with terms of reference?
Response: No 4, Yes 1 (No Reply 1, see Question 5)
1) (For the Yes reponse) Discussions with
colleagues about area of research which res-
pondent considered as a kind of terms of
reference.
Question Five: (A) Did you formulate your own scope of work?
Response: No 1, Yes 5
1) (For the No response and 'no reply' in
Question 4) You can't work with Cairo in
areas where there is no counterpart available
at the university there. Therefore A.I.D.
is not only interested in education through
links with Cairo. A.I.D. has had direct
involvement with the program formulation in
my case. Cairo University has been able to
set up a counterpart at this stage.
(B) Did you work with Cairo University when
drawing up your proposal?
Response: No 1, Yes 5
1) (See reponse (1) under Question 5 (A)).
NOTE: Response (3) was one
of the people who had worked
with A.I.D. and other aid
organizations before.
NOTE: Response 'restricted'
also responded to Question
6 (A) as noted under (4).
2) Two members of the ministry involved with this
section of the project (in Egypt) proposed the
subject for research.
3) It is unusual (in general) for the first visit
with a counterpart in Egypt to take place
before proposals are submitted. This is what
happened in this case.
Question Six: How open-ended is the scope of work?
Response: Restricted 1, Open-ended 5
Question Six (A): Have you changed focus on the area of your
research since you started?
Response: No 2, Yes 4
NOTE: Response (1) was by
a person who had worked for
A.I.D. before.
1) This was no problem, unlike usual A.I.D. pro-
grams.
2) There were A.I.D. requirements for change which
were only slight - due to the bureaucratic
nature of that organization.
3) A T.A.P. project is open-ended in this sense.
4) The area of research was relatively tight and
well defined. No need to change focus.
Question Six (B): Do you have to re-motivate your research
each time with the extensions to the
contract?
Response: No 0, Yes 6
1) Not sure but I think so. I do not handle the
management side.
2) A decision by the Steering Committee has to
be taken with respect to whether this piece
of research should continue or not. If okay,
then a proposal has to be re-submitted. The
program is funded for five years but if an
area of research is complete before then it
will not continue.
210
211
NOTE: There was a general Question Six (C): Does the budget determine the scale and
understanding that this work- nature of the research?
ed within some idea of budget
limitations. Response: No 4, Yes 1 (1 response was "Give and take")
Question Seven: Do you think this program has established
a research capability in Egypt for your
area of research?
Response: No 1, Yes 3 (No direct answer 2)
1) More successfully than other parts of this
program.
2) (No answer) The problem to be solved is not
yet clear. Difficult to evaluate.
3) (No answer) If they wished to, yes. They
have the capability but they probably wont.
Question Eight: Is this program progessing well;
Question Eight (A): in terms of your personal objectives?
Response: No 0, Yes 4 (No direct answer 2)
1) In the middle. Not intellectually or finan-
cially.
2) I am not learning anything new. This could
be a factor in the overall program, whether
M.I.T. can actually 'stick it out' or whether
people will get bored with the project.
Question Eight (B): in terms of A.I.D. objectives (that you
are aware of)?
Response: No 2, Yes 3 (No direct answer 1)
1) (No direct answer) It is not important to me.
2) Yes, because of their mandate to spend money.
Question Eight (C): in terms of Cairo University objectives?
Response: No 1, Yes 3 (No direct answer 2)
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1) (No direct answer) In a soft sense, yes.
Cairo has had to overcome its shyness. This
is starting to happen.
2) (No direct answer) Difficult to say. There
are some problems with the government ministry
involved.
Question Nine: Do you consider interdisciplinary links at
M.I.T. between various departments working
on this program as:
Response: (A) Not necessary 1 (B) Strong 5
NOTE: Response (4) here was
the same person who gave
response (2) for Question
8 (A).
NOTE: Response (1) was the
same person who gave response
1) Within the program it is strong where necessary.
2) Only where necessary.
3) Weak in general over all the parts of the
program.
4) An opportunity has been missed to have in-
tellectually loose inter-linking of disci-
plines, to discuss this program.
Question Ten: How many people do you have working on this
research?
Response: 1) Two faculty (total time per year approximately
one month). We could use a high level Research
Assistant position.
2) Six people (two responses).
3) Two faculty and two full time Research Assistants.
4) Four faculty, three other Research Assistants
and some students occasionally
5)
Question Eleven: Can you name any specific constraints on
this program:
Question Eleven (A): with respect to content of your research?
Response: 1) Major problem is follow through. The ministry
(involved) has shown good response.
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(3) to Question 7 and res-
ponse (2) to Question 5.
Question
Note: Response (2) had not
worked for A.I.D. or any aid
organization in the past.
C_ (I
2) Getting data without exorbatant costs has been
difficult. Not that it hasn't been collected
but because of interdepartmental resistance
and red tape in Egypt.
3) Within the understanding of criticism of
institutes, a new country cannot be too self
critical and Egypt is in this position. There
is room for improvement in many areas.
4) Availability of data. Exagerated secrecy.
Social development of Egypt causes a lowering
of quality of the final product. Some com-
promise is required from our side.
5) None.
6) There is a problem with the 'mechanicalness'
of Cairo's approach. The program is defined
in a vague way.
Eleven (B): with respect to the management of the
program?
Response: 1) Well managed (4 responses).
2) There is a large amount of bureaucratic red
tape.
3) Minimum interference.
Question Twelve: In terms of work accomplished and work
method is the program progressing well:
Question Twelve (A): in terms of your links with Cairo?
Response: No 0, Yes 1, Moderately 4
1) Cairo people are not incompetent but they are
not interested.
2) Most work is done here (M.I.T.). Could be
altered with more contact.
Question Twelve (B): in terms of your links with M.I.T.?
Response: No 0, Yes 5, Moderately 1
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Question Thirteen: How many people are working on this
project in Cairo?
Response: 1) Three faculty and approximately four students.
2) Same number as here at M.I.T.
3) Five junior faculty. Twelve in all.
4) Six people.
5) Six senior and six junior staff. Group with
M.I.T. and ministry work as a team together.
6) Two faculty plus some interviewers.
Question Fourteen: Do you consider your counterpart in Cairo
responsive to Egypts overall policies as
they relate to this area of research?
Response: No 0, Yes 4 (No direct response 2)
1) (No direct response) They are as critical as
M.I.T. about their government.
2) (No direct response) Moderately so.
3) He is sensitive to the political implications
of this research.
Question Fifteen: Do you think you are breaking new ground
within the ministry you are dealing with?
Response: No 1, Yes 5
1) Yes, but I am not sure they know it.
2) No, not yet. There is some resistance to the
research.
3) Yes, they are more aware of problems. They
still deal with the informal sector in a
physical sense. (This specific to area of
research.)
Question Sixteen: Where was your counterpart trained?
NOTE: Same respondent
answered Question 11 with
response (4).
Response: 1) Cairo University.
2) U.S.A., all three of them.
3) Cairo then Aachem, West Germany.
4) Leeds University after Cairo.
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NOTE: It could be inter-
preted that they considered
Egypt to still clearly be
developing intellectually.
This is reinforced by re-
sponse (3) to Question 15
and response (4) to Question
11 (A). One respondent con-
sidered this a reflection
of a developing country.
NOTE: Response (5) was a
clear reference to Nassers
revolution, placing those
50 year olds at 25 years old
at the time of the revolution.
NOTE: One response 'Yes' to
Question 18 was not followed
by any explanation, even
after prompting. Respondent
gave response (2) to Question
12 (A) and response (4) to
Question 11 (A).
5) Manchester.
6) England.
Question Seventeen: To what social class does your counter-
part belong?
Response: 1) Don't know. Probably middle class. (2 re-
sponses).
2) Upper class. The ministry people also upper
class.
3) Affluent people.
4) Split; half upper class and half on the way
up. This includes people from the ministry.
5) Upper class is still there. Those people
in their 50's come from middle to lower
middle class. New intelegencia apparent.
Question Eighteen: Are there any conflicts that you know of
between Egyptian policies and this area
of research?
Response: No 4, Yes 2
1) Yes, conflict between Egypt, A.I.D. and this
program. Some resentment on part of Eygptian
government to necessity of this type of pro-
gram. They could do more with the money go-
ing directly to them.
2) No, but only because of the nature of this
program. These bumps have already been ironed
out.
3) No, but there is some apprehension on the part
of the government to the area to be researched.
They were hoping for technology, like getting
a box of apples.
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NOTE: The purpose of this
question was to gain some
understanding of peoples
knowledge of the political
structure in Egypt. One
question is not enough to
be able to establish a clear
comprehension of peoples
political awareness of Egypt
but the four 'don't knows'
were definitely expressed in
bewilderment which suggests
some isolation from the
politics involved here.
Question Nineteen: Related to this project, do you have
direct contact with A.I.D.:
Question Nineteen (A): here in the U.S.A.?
Response: No 3, Yes 3
1) Yes, in similar types of projects. Contact
is usually controlled through Fred (Professor
Moavenzadeh).
2) Yes, also with the World Bank where people
have been working on similar things. This
has been useful.
Question Nineteen (B): in Cairo?
Response: No 2, Yes 4
1) Yes, as a courtesy.
Question Twenty: Is it true that university research projects
in Egypt are restricted by government decree?
Response: No 2, Yes 0, Don't Know 4
Question Twenty-One: Who you you think will benefit most
from your research?
Respondent: A B C D E F
Response:
Egyptian
Government
People of
Egypt
Cairo
University
Others
1st 2nd lst 2nd 2nd
1st lst 2nd lst lst
MIT
3rd
1) (Respondent F) My counterpart in the short
term, Cairo University in the long term and
the government, hopefully, in the long term.
Question Twenty-Two: Is the response in Cairo to this
research positive, negative or neutral:
positive negative
(A) for A.I.D.
(B) for Cairo University
3
3
(C) for the Ministry involved 4
1
1
0
1) One person responded no answer to (A) since
they had received no feedback as yet.
NOTE: One respondent did
refer to the cultural and
language barriers also being
a limiting factor in the
beginning. This person also
gave response (1) to Ques-
tion 16.
Question Twenty-Three: Do you consider the distance between
Egypt and the U.S.A. as a limiting
factor for the program as a whole?
Response: No 1, Yes 5
1) No, because program is well funded.
A.I.D.
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Question Twenty-Four: How often do you go to Egypt in a
year?
Response: 1) Two times, 5 Do they come here? 5
2) More, 5 visits between two of us. The team
in Cairo wants to meet more often. They come
here too.
AP-EN)IX
Diagram Number 1, an attempt to
of aid and the various links between
summerize the overview
the main actors, was
drawn in February 1979.
Diagram Number 2, with the same purpose in mind was
drawn in March 1979.
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APP1END)IX E
SOME WELL KNOWN
DONOR1S
A brief description of existing aid organizations
is required to enlarge the understanding of the differences,
and complexities of these agencies.
1. THE U.S.A.
Before 1945 the government owned Export Import Bank,
established in 1934, was the only channel available for
aid programs and the financing of them. With the end of
the war and the beginning of the Marshall Plan most of
the U.S. aid flowed to Western Europe with small scale
bilateral aid going to other countries. The Truman doctrine
which considered international aid to be the base needed .
to promote a suitable rate of growth in receiving countries,
NOTE: Between 1948 and 19-
51 $300 million in aid was
directed to Latin America.
NOTE: In 1977 $1215 million
in food exports were
provided under aid. Until
1971 sales were made in the
local currencies causing
large U.S. holdings of these
currencies. This caused
problems for both the U.S.A.
and the countries involved.
This has been changed
to include payment in
dollars (U.S.). In 1968
four million tons of grain
although aimed at Europe, became the prototype of modern
development aid. The IBRD and the UNRRA were formed and
used for this purpose. With the success of the Marshall
Plan and the growing influence of other developed countries
in these organizations the U.S.A.'s control over them was
reduced. It therefore, started to focus more on bilateral
assistance, arguing it to be a temporary continuation of
the postwar effort and in the 1949 made it clear that bi-
lateral aid was considered as normal policy.
At the beginning of the 1950's aid also started
flowing through Europe to its colonies. The main purpose
being to provide a continuous flow of raw materials for
Europes reconstructed industry.
By 1954, with Europe back on its feet the U.S.A.,
to avoid a food glut, set up the PL480 program (Food for
Peace) which enabled it to sell its growing agricultural
surplus and influence Third World countries at the same
time. During this same year the U.S.S.R. also started
out on aid agreements, reinforcing the U.S.A.'s policy to
win support for itself by the means of aid.
The growing number of independent countries over the
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(1/2 from U.S.) was used in
aid. By 1975 this was eight
million tons.
DEFINITION: A.I.D. = Agency
for International Develop-
ment.
NOTE: In 1971 the Peace
Corps merged with domestic
volunteer programs to form
'Action.'
NOTE: This might sound like
a large number of people but
in the same year companies
like Ford, G.M., and I.T.T.
each had over eight times
this amount in foreign
countries.
beginning of the 1960's resulted in a further increase of
U.S.A. aid. Formally the exclusive political responsibility
of the colonial powers, the U.S.A. argued that aid brought
these new nations stability and created anti-communist
allies.
In 1961 President Kennedy presented to Congress the
Foreign Assistance Act out of which came A.I.D. with a
more comprehensive set of goals and objectives than aid
organizations had before. The Peace Corps Act was also
passed in this year.
By 1964 there were 5,000 U.S.A. citizens and 9,000
nationals involved in aid programs. The first Family
Planning programs under "aid" were started with half of
the overall expenditure of $125 million going to the Third
World.
Various refinements and adjustments have been made to
the U.S.A. aid program (the formation of the tax exempt
O.D.C., etc.) but at present the semi-autonomous agency
within the State Department, A.I.D., is still its principal
agent. Its main instruments are (a) direct aid, (b) Capital
loans, (c) technology transfer and, (d) trade agreements.
2 24 L--
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Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, South Korea, and
Taiwan are officially considered to have attained "self
sustaining growth."
Many agencies and acts were passed before the form-
ation of A.I.D. From the Marshall Aid Program (1948/1952);
Economic Cooperation Administration; the Mutual Security
Agency (1951) that was replaced by the Foreign Operation
Administration (1953) which in turn was merged with Technical
Cooperation Administration - a project based loan fund; to
the International Cooperation Administration and Develop-
ment Program the focus of which was.program aid to countries
whose military operations against communism endangered
their economies.
Whichever agency was used there is both an advantage
and restriction in U.S. aid resulting out of the method
by which it is practiced. The advantage is that U.S.
aid is more adaptable to changes than many other donors
because of the political system in which it operates.
Separate agencies can be set up to deal with new problems
and within the powers invested in these agencies as
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defined by Congress they are relatively free to get on with
the tasks they have at hand. The problem on the other hand
consists of the complex process by which Congress votes
aid funds. Expenditures must first be authorized, a policy
decision, and then appropriated, the financial house keep-
ing by two appropriation committees. Thus the U.S.A.
has to write two pieces of legislation and run through
two processes handled by diffirent committees. It must
be remembered that aid involves public funds from taxes
to finance the transfer of goods and services abroad for
the objectives of foreign policy. Disenchantment with
aid, as happened in the early 1970's, can result in changes
of the level of U.S. aid by a series of compromises made
on the part of all the parties involved. Because of-
Vietnam and the A.I.D. connection there a policy of 'low
profile' was established that brought about the with-
drawal of A.I.D. from deep involvement in economic planning
in developing countries. A.I.D. funding was reduced.
From the start aid was considered both altruistic
and in the national interest. The U.S.A. and the "American
way of life" was considered a model for all countries. The
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assistance the U.S.A. provided to countries 'resisting
agression' and the power politics involved was not consider-
ed to be Imperialism. It argued that by cutting itself
free from class conflicts, unlike Europe and its colonies
it was somehow different. The rational used was one of
self protection against the forces of communism. The present
forms of U.S.A. aid has been focused on the poorest countries and
areas of special interest (Israel and Egypt). In return
it is looking for an international economic system that
runs well and in which mutual obligations are observed.
2. THE INTERNATIONAL MONITARY FUND (I.M.F.)
The I.M.F. was started in 1944 at the Bretton Woods
conference. Atits instigation the U.S.A. had the controlling
voice since it was the largest partner in terms of contri-
butions. Its main function was to act as the organizer of
aid through the Marshall Plan and allow a form of control
of domestic money supply that uncontrolled before, as be-
tween the World Wars, had caused imense problems in inter-
national trade. The I.M.F. used a par value system in
which currencies were fixed in value but could be adjusted
DEFINITION: I.D.A. = Inter-
national Development
Association.
NOTE: S.D.R.'s are dis-
cussed further in 2.4 of
this chapter.
through controlled exchange rates. It was not used out-
side Europe during its first years of operation and was
relatively low keyed compared to the U.S.A. aid budget.
In 1956 its headquarters was established in Washington,
D.C.
By 1959 I.M.F. quotas had increased by 50% and the
I.D.A. was formed for setting up 'soft' loans. Also
practiced by this time was the 'stand by arrangement'
through which a country could temporarily increase its
drawing rights by providing the I.M.F. with a letter of
intent.
During the 1960's the dominance of the U.S.A. de-
clined with the economic growth of Japan and Europe and
towards the end of the 1960's the U.S.A. had become the
biggest borrower from the fund to help the U.S.A.'s balance
of payments problems.
By 1973 the Special Drawing Rights had been instigated
giving the I.M.F. the power to create and international
money (S.D.R.'s). Countries with the largest quotas, and
therefore drawing rights, were the U.S.A., Britain, France,
Germany, and India.
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NOTE: The U.S.A. executive
director in the I.M.F. has
to accept instructions of
the Secretary of the Treas-
ury of the U.S.A. There is
a strong link in most coun-
tries between their direct-
In reaction to the 1974 International monetary crisis,
and with Henry Kissinger's advice, a liberalized compensatory
financing facility was established allowing loans to flow
to the primary producing countries of the world that suffer-
ed temporary shortfalls in export earnings. Soon after,
in 1975, the I.M.F. started the Special Trust Fund which
provided concessional balance of payments financing to the
poorer developing countries allowing them to borrow money
at low interest rates and liberal repayment schedules.
The I.M.F. holds about $30,000 million in various
currencies of its members, and this is what it uses for
loans and special agreements. The managing director is,
by tradition and agreement, a European with a twenty member
board. The I.M.F. is considered to be part of the U.N.
system but it has its own constitution which does not work
on the one nation one principal and vote format of the U.N.
The control of the I.M.F. by member states is in proportion
to their quota sizes. The U.S.A. quota was 36% at the start
of the I.M.F and while this has been reduced over time to
22% the U.S.A. still has a veto power by virtue of there
having to be an 80% majority for a decision.
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ors on tne I.M.F. and nat-
ional and foreign policies.
The contributions by each country are made up of 25%
paid in gold and the rest in the countries currency. If
that country then requires foreign exchange it can borrow
this up to 25% of its contribution. The next 25%, the First
Credit Tranche, is conditional on the member making 'reason-
able' attempts to resolve its balance of payments problems.
If further credit is required a sound program of establishb
ing and maintaining exchange stability has to be defined
by that country. This program has a bias of specific kinds
of solutions as set out by the most powerful members by
virtue of their voting powers (e.g., U.S.A.). The standard
prescription is a combination of devaluation of the particular
country's currency with deflationery monetary and fiscal
policies. With the stand by arrangement disimbursements
could be tied to specified performance criteria and the
I.M.F., acting as coordinator in foreign debts, by setting
up a rescheduling conference, could also decide whether an
aid receiving country was credit worthy for extention of
its debts. It is therefore a major force in aid agreements
and often in bilateral aid negotiations that the I.M.F. support
for aid agreements is sort.
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REFERENCE: C. Payer's The "Although the details of each programme will vary,
Debt Trap, p. 33 the I.M.F. standard of a desirable economic policy
is uniform and predictable enough to allow us to
sketch a model of it here. The basic components
of any such programme are the following:
(1) Abolition or liberalization of foreign
exchange and import controls.
(2) Devaluation of the exchange rate.
(3) Domestic anti-inflationary programmes,
including:
(a) control of bank credit; higher in-
terest rates and perhaps higher
reserve requirements;
(b) control of the government deficit;
curbs on spending; increases in
taxes and in prices charged by
public enterprises; abolition of
consumer subsidies;
(c) control of wage rises, so far as
within the government's power;
(d) dismantling of price controls.
(4) Greater hospitality to foreign investment.
The I.M.F. then was founded to suppliment each member's
reserves so that, by drawing on its quota each country could
have 'breathing space' if a critical monetary situation
arose. The objective was to create the widest possible
freedom of play for market forces. That is, by providing
this 'breathing space' the I.M.F. could insist that countries
in payments crisis did not curtail imports.
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NOTE: Membership of the
I.M.F. is a prerequisite
to membership in the World
Bank and eligability for
its loans.
DEFINITION: I.F.C. = Inter-
national Finance Corpcration
In 1976 its capital was in-
creased from $110 million
to $650 million .
I.D.A. = International
Development Association.
3. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP-
MENT (I.B.R.D. or WORLD BANK)
The I.B.R.D. was formed with the I.M.F. in 1944 at
Bretton Woods. Its main function was to provide countries
with long term loans and for the first ten years of its
existence it acted mainly as a financier for reconstruction
in Europe after the war. By 1950 it had initiated a modest
beginning with development loans and via British legislation,
Britain's colonies gained access to borrowing powers,
guaranteed by Britain.
In 1950 more funds were made available for countries
outside Europe. $400 million, 86% of this from the U.S.A.,
was provided with the purpose of injecting new life into
the technical aid programs that had already been started.
By 1958 the I.F.C. had been established, loans for
private enterprise in Developing Countries, and the bank
had formed its affiliate, the I.D.A. to be used for 'soft'
loans to countries with a G.N.P. of under $375 per capita
"In 1966 the Fund and the Bank agreed on the
definition and delimitation of their respective
spheres of responsibility and on the terms of
their liaison:
It was agreed that the Fund has primary res-
ponsibility for exchange rates and restrictive
systems, for adjustment of temporary balance
of payment disequilibria, and for evaluating
and assisting members to work out stabilization
programmes as a sound basis for economic advance.
On the matters thus identified, the staff of
the Bank would inform themselves of the esta-
blished views and position of the Fund and adopt
these as a working basis for their own activities.
On the other hand, the Bank was recognized as
having primary responsbility for the composition
and appropriateness of development programmes
and project evaluation, including development
priorities. On these matters, the Fund staff
would adopt the views of the Bank. In spheres
which were not the primary responsibility of
either institution, such as the structure and
functioning of financial institutions, the staff
of the Fund would acquaint itself, before visit-
ing a member country, with the views of the Bank;
and vice versa."
In 1975 negotiations took place to increase its capital
by $8,300 million to $40,800 million. The World Bank had
also decided to provide balance of payments support.
Recently the World Bank has come under fire from the
NOTE: The U.S. Congress U.S. Congress. The allogation, that millions of dollars
feels it has some say in
I.B.R.D. since for every have been wasted and that the Bank opperates like the large
$3 put in by other count-
ries the U.S.A. put in $1. private corporations but with public money and therefore
public accountability, has been made. The Bank, however,
is a profit making organization and with its rather un-
weadly bureaucratic structure and the probability of doubling
its capital in the early 1980's it is unlikely that the
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NOTE: The first consortium
was formed around India's
balance of payments crisis
of 1958.
U.S. Congress can make an important impact on its structure.
The I.B.R.D., part of the U.N. system has its head-
quarters, like the I.M.F. in Washington, D.C. The President
of the World Bank is always an American, by tradition. Many
of its board members are directors in both the I.M.F. and
I.B.R.D. In fact, the annual general meetings for both
are held jointly and they both publish the magazine "Finance
and Development" together.
The I.B.R.D. is the largest source of multilateral
financing and it borrows money on commercial terms and
therefore commensurate interest rates are passed on to
Developing Countries who borrow from it.
Most consortia (or consultative group) have been form-
ed and organized by the World Bank so as to prevent one
loan from being used to pay for imports to a developing
country arizing out of the conditions of a previous loan to
that country.
The I.B.R.D. considers the expert to be the problem
solver. The Bank's professionals are trained technical
experts and at varying degrees of involvement make policy
decisions for the Third World institutions. This process
REFERENCE: Joe A. Ouye's
On the Choice of Parti-
cipatory Models (unpublish-
ed Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California,
Berkeley, 1976, p. 42).
has been strengthened over time to a point where it now
identifies and designs large parts, or all, of projects
in the Third World prior to appraising and financing them.
The degree of structured dependency on the expert has been
intensified, and the local expert, as a token jesture, is
allowed input into construction or implementation of a
solution.
"The basis of the expert model is the trust in
the legitimacy of someone planning for others
by virtue of his education, training, experience,
or status. The primary decision makers are ex-
perts of a body of knowledge of a field and its
methods. Thus, the name 'expert model,' as
opposed to participatory models where the legi-
timacy of such expertise is not recognized and
non experts are the primary decision makers."
The I.B.R.D. has a clearer and more defined set of
rules for consultants to work in; as is described in
the Terms of Reference prepared, often by consultants,
or the Bank itself for other consultants to follow;
with respect to a particular job to be carried out in
a developing country. The goal structure and operating
principals are strongly reflected in the organization of
this institution. The Bank's growth has increased the costs
of loans to the borrower and compounded the institutions
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internal communications. There are at present one hundred
and thirty-two governments who are shareholders in it, and
the profit in 1978 was $238 million.
The I.B.R.D.'s major goal is rather ambigious in that
it attempts to attain both efficiency and equity. It
provides economic analysis and policy recommendations as a
basis for consortia discussions and through the I.F.C. it
supplies venture capital to productive enterprises to
stimulate the development of local markets and promote the
flow of international private capital. As far as its
interests in equity are concerned, while it practices sites
and services solutions on the one hand it has also been used,
in Latin America, to construct luxury housing projects.
4. UNITED NATIONS (U.N.)
REFERENCE: This text, The U.N. was founded in San Francisco in 1945. The
tnrough to France is based
on Chapters from G. Cunning- I.M.F. and the I.B.R.D. were to be subordinated to the U.N.
ham's The Management of Aid
Agencies. In 1948 the Technical Assistance Program (T.A.P.) was
established. The more wealthy countries on the U.N. resisted
efforts to further enlarge U.N. funds for development
finance over the 1950's. It was only during the 1960's,
with the increse in member countries of approximately 50
newly independent nations that the U.N. could argue that
the famous 1% of wealthy nations G.N.P. should be used to
aid the developing world and called the 1960's the U.N.
Development Decade. By 1964 the U.N. had 5,500 people
working in aid positions throughout the world, but its
stakes in economic development were still small. It started
through its many subcommittees and branches to concentrate
on those areas neglected or only indirectly covered by the
larger aid donors. In 1970 for example it set out the
'World Plan of Action' for science and technology establish-
ing thirty-one top priorities for areas of research.
The U.N. has many programs, W.H.O., U.N.E.S.C.O.,
U.N.C.T.A.D., F.A.O., etc. but the system around which it
works is too loose for concrete operational issues. This
is reflected in its charter, part of which reads "to
achieve international cooperation in solving the international
problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian
character." Member states have to pledge to assist the
U.N. in furthering "...higher standards of living, full
employment and conditions of economic and social progress
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and development." Add to this its commitment to its
declaration of Human Rights and with countries as varied
as the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Sweden it is no surprise that
its impact on development is statistically low compared to
other aid donors already described. It has however filled
some of the gaps in other forms of aid and particularly in
the areas of education and science.
REFERENCE: This text,
through to France, is based
on Chapters from G. Cunning-
5. OTHER AID ORGANIZATIONS
To go through, in detail, all the other aid organ-
izations on the planet would take many pages. We there-
fore note them here so that their existence is made known
but not the workings and objectives of each.
Most countries in the Western World have some form of
aid policy. While their aid agency structures are similar
there are distinct differences as will be observed in the
few examples listed below. They form a small section of
world aid in terms of volume and often have particular
interest areas in terms of the countries they provide aid to.
A. Britain: Aid from Britain is administered by the
Overseas Development Administration. Its aid policy
ham's The Management of Aid
Agencies.
was changed during the 1960's with the creation of
independent colonial powers. The different depart-
ments of government, coordinated and combined into
the Department of Technical Cooperation (D.T.C.)
worked together under O.D.A. Parliament must approve
expenditures which are channelled into different
categories: (a) aministration costs of agency;
(b) international overseas aid both bilateral and
multilateral; (c) overseas aid general services,
the use of aid varies from research institute assist-
ance to pensions for retired Colonels; and, (d) Foreign
Commonwealth Services, an area which includes a number
of items all with political overtones.
British aid flows mostly to Africa and India but it
is spread over a large number of countries (one hun-
dred and twenty each year). Each country therefore
receives a small share of the overall total, 260
million in 1973. About two thirds of the bilateral
aid was concentrated into twenty countries in this
year and the principle determining factor for dis-
tribution is the Commonwealth connection, 83% of 1973
-1 
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aid going to those countries.
B. Canada: The C.I.D.A. (Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency) controls Canada's aid program. Its
functions are officially defined as: to operate and
administer the economic assistance program; to insure
coordination in the operations of other departments
concerned with various aspects of these programs; to
consult and cooperate as appropriate with international
organizations and agencies and with Canadian voluntary
agencies active in developing countries; and to co-
ordinate Canadian efforts to provide emergency assist-
ance. The C.I.D.A. has attempted to provide funding
of up to the 1% of G.N.P. criteria as set out by the
U.N. but it seldom manages to meet this limit.
The government has stated that it intends to allocate
the major proportion of Canadian bilateral funds to
selected countries of concentration, but it has also
made available about 20% of these funds to other
countries, mainly for education and technical assist-
ance and for occasional capital projects of high
development priority. The qovernment defends its
2 4
'concentration' policy by arguing that it results
in effectiveness if concentrated around a few count-
ries and reduces the problems of administration.
C. West Germany: Uses the B.M.Z., or Ministry of
Economic Cooperation to practice its aid policies.
Most of Germany's aid has been bilateral, some 60%
of its 2,660 million Marks in 1972, Germany also aims
for the 1% of G.N.P. threshold. Under the wing of
the U.S.A. after the war it was 'encouraged' to be-
come a partner in the consortia used to program aid
to India in the 1950's and soon after Pakistan and
Turkey. It now provides varying degrees of aid to
one hundred countries in the Third World.
D. France: France has always had a special relationship
with her colonies which she continues to protect
through aid agreements. There are five major agencies
that deal with aid. The National Assembly votes funds
to be shared between Technical Assistance Programs,
budget support for her ex-colonies, costs of overseas
aid missions and investments. France has also set
out its priorities for aid very clearly. Priority one
REFERENCE: From Zeylstra's
Aid for Development, p. 33.
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goes to Europe and the Middle East, two is the French
speaking world and, three is Latin America. Its aid
is heavily concentrated in the technical assistance
sector and deals mostly with education and the
cultural field reinforcing French culture in other
parts of the world.
E. The O.E.C.D. and D.A.C: Mention must also be made of
these organizations here.
"The American authors of the Marshall Plan saw from
the beginning that the policies of assistance they
envisaged could not be realized autonomously. In
his historic speech on June 5th, 1947, General
Marshall declared: 'Before the United States Govern-
ment can proceed much further in its efforts to
alleviate the situation and help start the European
world on its way to recovery, there must be some
agreement among the countries of Europe as to the
requirements of the situation and the part those
countries themselves will take in order to give
proper effect to whatever action might be under-
taken by this Government.' Left without choice,
the European countries decided, though not without
hesitation, to meet the American wishes as far as
possible. The Europeans made an outward display of
the unanimity expected by the Americans by entrust-
ing their answer to Marshall's speech to an ad hoc
'Committee of European Economic Cooperation.' When
the aid became a reality, they were forced to go
a step further and to convert the C.E.E.D. into a
permanent organ of co-operation, the O.E.E.C."
The formation of this organization, requiring the
cooperation of European countries, helped to move
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Europe's development away from direct U.S.A. in-
fluence through the necessary inter-Europe trade
agreements. In 1960 the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (D.A.C.) was formed and the following year
when the O.E.E.C. was converted to the O.E.C.D.
(Organization for Cooperation and Development) with
the addition of the United States and Canada as full
members the D.A.C. became known as the 'donors club.'
The D.A.C. functioned first as a collector of statistics
and presented them on a consistent basis. It was soon
to have many members, from the U.S.S.R. to Japan and
Germany. As aid became more complex, over the late
1960's and early 1970's the D.A.C. became the one
reliable source of statistics by streamlining and
defining what could be included in aid and what not.
Two other sources of aid must be mentioned before
going on to the more generalized objectives and types of
aid.
6. THE SOVIET BLOC
The U.S.S.R. relied strongly on the West for aid and
NOTE: Of course U.S.S.R.'s
internal abilities to con-
centrate its development
needs had much to do with
its development. The tech-
nical capabilities of the
U.S.S.R. are founded in
part by Western aid.
technical assistance before World War II. In spite of the
imaginable difficulties, both politically and culturally
this aid had assisted with the development of the U.S.S.R.
to the point that by 1945 the Soviet Union ceased to be in
debt to foreign countries. It was however only after the
death of Stalin in 1953 that the U.S.S.R. started its
venture into the area of aid by providing $1 million to the
U.N.'s Technical Assistance Program.
With the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the announce-
ment of a group of non-aligned Third World countries, the
U.S.S.R. actively participated in aid, offering the Third
World an alternative to the West. This is illustrated by
the happenings in Egypt at this time. With Nassers anti-
western policies it is not surprising that the west was
reluctant to provide Egypt with arms. With the Czech
arms deal to Egypt, weakening the relations between the
U.S.A. and Egypt, which in turn led to the withdrawal of
U.S.A., British, and I.M.F. aid to construct the Aswan
Dam, it is understandable that Nasser turned to the one
guarantee of income in his grasp. He nationalized the
Suez Canal. Soon after this the U.S.S.R. took over the
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responsibility of the Aswan Dam construction.
REFERENCE: Statistics from
V. Vassilev's Policy in the
Soviet Bloc on Aid to Dev-
eloping Countries.
NOTE: It is difficult to
obtain statistics related
to Soviet aid. For example
between 1958-1966 the UAR
had a deficit of 93 million
roubles, while it purchased
capital equipment to the
value of 560 million rou-
bles. Egypt pays for this
with cotton exports, but it
must have enjoyed large
Soviet credit loans as well
to make this all balance.
REFERENCE: From Vassilev's
Policy in the Soviet Bloc
on Aid to Developing
Countries, p. 54.
Trade between the Soviet Bloc and the :Third World
grew rapidly after the 1950's. The number of independent
countries, growing due to decolonialization, with, in many
cases bitter resentment to the colonial powers, created an
increased zone for U.S.S.R. trade.
The developing countries' share of the Soviet Bloc
foreign trade increased from 5.2% in 1955 to 12.4% in 1968
and is still growing. The nature of Soviet foreign exports
has also shifted from agricultural products to capital'equip-
ment, in the Third World used for building up new enter-
prises.
The U.S.S.R. placed higher priority on 'Turnkey'
plants, especially in the early 1960's, than it does now.
"In the case of the Soviet Union, as for other
countries in the Soviet bloc, such agreements seem
designed to sell capital equipment to the develop-
ing countries on the strength of promises, apparent-
ly not always honoured, to purchase raw materials.
This is the only explanation for the worsening of
the under-developed countries' trade deficit vis-
a-vis the U.S.S.R., especially since their de-
colonialisation in the sixties. Up to 1960, the
balance was inclined to weigh in their favour, and
against the countries in the Atlantic bloc. Since
decolonialisation (1961), the position has been
completely reversed, with a very rapid increase in
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the overall volume of the Soviet side, and a
permanent deficit in the trade balance of the Third
Countries. At about the same time (1960), the U.S.
S.R. acquired a permanent deficit in its trade
balance with the countries in the Atlantic bloc.
"The explanation can only lie in the policy pursued
by the Soviets and the other countries in the Soviet
bloc in order to earn foreign exchange by sales of
capital equipment to the under-developed countries,
then purchase with that exchange other capital
equipment in the industrial countries which are
members of the O.E.C.D. The countries in the Soviet
bloc have succeeded in introducing this triangular
trade system on a large scale in the world market.
"The result of such a policy has been a yearly
increase in the trade deficit of the countries in
the Third World vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., from 18.3
million roubles in 1961 to 317.1 million in 1966,
and to over 1.5 billion for the period 1961 to
1966."
The U.S.S.R. having started later with aid programs
than the West and with less resources, selected a small
number of countries as politically feasible areas of con-
centration and selected projects.
The main institutions through which the Soviet bloc
defines its policies are, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council
for Mutual Economic Aid, known as C.O.M.E.C.O.N.
C.O.M.E.C.O.N. is dominated by the U.S.S.R., with most of
Eastern European countries being members. There is how-
ever no coordination of trade with the industrialized
West or the Third World within C.O.M.E.C.O.N. Foreign
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aid and trade is integrated with the national economic
plan of each country through the national accounting system
and foreign trade plans are prepared in the light of
targets set for the national economic plan. A distinction
is drawn between purely commercial operations and those
of an economic and technical assistance cooperation aspect.
Planning for this aid is complicated and is made up of
stages:
(a) Planof study projects on construction abroad.
(b) The delivery plan for study projects.
(c) Plan for the supply of capital equipment.
(d) Plan for exports of capital equipment.
(e) Technical cooperation plans.
aid
were
They
work
The U.S.S.R. often includes technical assistance with
as for example in 'Turnkey' opperations. In 1966 there
some 16,000 Soviet experts workinq in the Third World.
included high level staff, overseers and specialized
ers.
NOTE: Imports from the
Third World are often heav-
ily taxed, if they are con-
sidered unnecessary, to re-
duce consumption in the
Soviet home market.
The terms appear to be 'harder' than some Western aid.
A 2.5% interest rate payable over twelve years starting one
year after completion of a project, but repayments can be in
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REFERENCE: From Vassilev's
Policy in the Soviet Bloc
on Aid to Developing
Countries, p. 76.
REFERENCE: From Vassilev's
Policy in the Soviet Bloc
on Aid to Developing
Countries, p. 62.
the form of traditional exports or goods produced in newly
built Soviet financed factories. Non-productive activities
(such as feasability studies, etc.) must be payed for out
of the loan negotiated.
"Such aid is completely tied, as it is directed
to specific objectives under the co-operation
agreements. The benefiting country cannot use
the credits allocated to purchase goods in a
third country. On the other hand, in certain
cases two or more countries in the Soviet bloc
may to some extent co-operate in granting credit
to a country of the Third World, for example for
the construction of a large enterprise, where each
creditor country provides a pre-agreed contribution.
This is, in fact, a form of multilateral aid.
"If must be added that the Eastern European
countries - especially the U.S.S.R. - participate
in multilateral aid as practised through the
medium of the United Nations' specialised agencies.
Their contribution is not considerable, but at
least it exists."
Economic aid is often backed with military aid and
the U.S.A. Department of State put total socialist countries
economic commitments to the Third World at $8,981 million
with a further $5,510 million in military aid for the period
1954 to 1968.
There are two main differences between aid from the
U.S.S.R. and aid from the U.S.A. The U.S.S.R., for political
reasons does not exploit investments in the Third World by
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repatriation of profits, and it avoids explicit conditions
to its aid. It does however purchase goods from the Third
World at market rates and can thus be considered to exploit
these goods as the West is critized of doing.
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D.A.C.
I.D.A.
I.F.C.
I.I.T.
M.I.T./C.U.
O.D.C.
0.E.C.D.
0.E.E.C.
U. N. S. F.
Development Assistance Committee
International Development Association
International Finance Corporation
International Investment Trust
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Cairo
University Technological Planning Program
Overseas Development Council
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
Organization for European Economic Co-operation
United Nations Special Fund
U.R.R.A.
U.S.A.I.D.
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration
United States Agency for International Devel-
opment
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There are some sources of information used in this
document which cannot be listed in the reference section.
They include: (a) U.S. Television Networks
(b) Lecture by Paulo Ceccarelli at M.I.T.
(May 1979)
(c) A series of lectures by the Architectural
Department at M.I.T. on New Towns in the
Middle East (Spring Term 1979)
(d) Discussions with friends
(e) Fidel Castro's speach to the United
Nations (November 1979)
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